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Case No. 20060189 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Court has given the State and Maughan permission to appeal the trial court's 
interlocutory order granting in part and denying in part the State's motion to disqualify 
Maughan's counsel. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
One day after the trial court appointed Mr. Richard Mauro and Mr. Scott Williams to 
represent Maughan in this capital case, Spokane police arrested Mauro for tampering with 
witnesses who reported to Spokane police that Mauro had told them not to speak to police. 
The State moved to disqualify counsel. The trial court disqualified Williams, but permitted 
the Mauro to remain as second-chair counsel. 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by disqualifying Williams? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing Mauro to continue representing 
Maughan? 
The Court reviews a trial court's disposition of a motion to disqualify counsel for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 11J88, 63 P.3d 731. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The texts of U.S. Const. Amend. 6 and Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-7(1) (West 2004) 
are in addendum A. 
CASE STATEMENT 
Approximately twenty-two years ago, Bradley Perry was murdered at the gas station 
where he worked. Recent DNA testing identified blood found at the crime scene as Glen 
Griffin's. The State charged Griffin with aggravated murder, a capital felony. (R77-89.) 
In connection with investigating the Griffin case, Box Elder County Detectives 
interviewed Wade Maughan in Spokane, Washington. Maughan told detectives that he was 
present when Griffin murdered Perry and helped Griffin commit the crime. Based on 
Maughan's statement, Maughan was arrested on November 3,2005. On November 4,2005, 
the State charged Maughan with capital murder and aggravated robbery. (Rl-3, 50, 91-92.) 
On November 18,2005, Mr. Richard P. Mauro entered an appearance as Maughan's 
counsel. On that same date, Mauro filed a formal discovery request. (R21-26.) 
On November 29, 2005, the trial court issued a warrant to obtain Maughan's blood, 
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hair, and fingerprints. On Friday, December 2,2005, police took Maughan to the Box Elder 
County Jail to execute the warrant. Maughan volunteered a statement that he was drunk 
when the Box Elder detectives took his statement. (R94-112.) 
Also on December 2nd, Mr. Scott Williams entered his appearance as co-counsel 
representing Maughan (R27-28). 
On December 5,2005, Box Elder detectives asked the Spokane Police Department to 
interview Maughan's girlfriend, Lorraine Rima, about Maughan's report that he was drunk 
when he spoke to the Box Elder detectives in Spokane. Spokane Detective Mark Burbridge 
interviewed Rima that same day. Rima informed Detective Burbridge that Randy Wagar, a 
friend of hers and Maughan's, visited Maughan in jail, and that Maughan told Wagar that he 
had been present during the robbery and murder. (Rl 18-20, addendum B.) 
Spokane police went to Wagar's home on the morning of December 5th. Wagar was 
not there, and Detective Burbridge left his card with a request that Wagar contact him. 
(R122 (R122-25 is attached as addendum C).) 
Also on December 5th, Mauro and Williams made their first court appearance on 
Maughan's behalf, and the trial court then formally appointed them to represent Maughan. 
The investigator working on the case, Mr. Theodore Cilwick, was also present at the 
December 5th hearing. (R50, 270, 424A.) 
On that same day, Mauro and Cilwick flew to Spokane, where they interviewed Rima 
and Wagar. Rima's friend, Kimberly Jeffreys, was present when Mauro and Cilwick 
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interviewed Rima. Alta Raney, Wagar's mother, was present when Mauro and Cilwick 
interviewed Wagar. (Rl 18-20, 123-24.) 
Spokane police interviewed Rima again on December 6, 2005. Rima told Spokane 
police that, on December 5th, Mauro and Cilwick visited her and identified themselves as 
Maughan's attorney and as a "detective" from Utah. She told Spokane police that both 
Mauro and Cilwick told her not to talk to police, and that they told her that she could go to 
jail. Jeffreys also told Spokane police that she was present when Rima was told not to talk 
to police. (Rl 18-20, 124, 127 (addendum D).) 
Wagar contacted Detective Burbridge on the morning of December 6, 2005. 
Burbridge and another Spokane detective interviewed Wagar that same morning. Wagar first 
told Spokane police that Maughan's attorney visited him on the evening of December 5, 
2005, and that Maughan's attorney and a detective told him not to talk to police about what 
Maughan had told him. In that same interview, Raney told Spokane police that she heard 
"the attorney and the investigator tell [Wagar] not to speak with police." (Rl 19, 122-23.) 
After Burbridge told Wagar that he was a witness and could "get himself into trouble 
for "Obstruction of Justice," Wagar spoke to police. Wagar reported that Maughan told him 
that Maughan, Griffin, and a blond male went to a convenience store, and that Griffin got 
into an argument with the clerk at the convenience store over $10, so Griffin stabbed and 
killed the clerk. (R119.) 
On the evening of December 6th, and after speaking with Rima, Jeffreys, Wagar, and 
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Raney, Spokane police contacted Mauro and Cilwick and asked them about their contacts 
with the witnesses. Mauro "immediately said that [he and Cilwick] would not speak with 
them." The Spokane police then arrested Mauro and Cilwick for witness tampering. (Rl 27.) 
Sometime between Mauro's and Cilwick's arrests and December 8, 2005, Williams 
and a defense investigator visited Rima, Wagar, and Raney. 
On December 8th, Spokane police again interviewed Wagar and Raney. Wagar 
reported that Williams and the investigator explained to him that Wagar "most likely" 
misunderstood what Mauro and Cilwick told him. Wagar reported that Williams told him 
to talk to police. Also on December 8th, Raney told Spokane police that Williams explained 
that there was a misunderstanding, and that it was "o.k." for her to talk to police. (R129-31, 
addendum E.) 
However, Wagar also stated in the December 8th interview with Spokane police that 
1) he informed Mauro and Cilwick that police were trying to contact him; 2) Mauro and 
Cilwick told him that police probably would try to contact him; 3) it was in the course of that 
conversation that Mauro and Cilwick instructed him not to talk to anyone; 4) the instruction 
not to talk to anyone came after Wagar told Mauro and Cilwick that police were trying to talk 
to Wagar; 5) he recalled telling Detective Burbridge that he had been instructed not to talk 
to police; 6) he was not lying to Burbridge at that time; and 7) believed that he had been 
instructed not to talk to police. Wagar also told Spokane police that he did not want to get 
Maughan's attorneys into trouble. (R130.) 
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Likewise, Raney, in the December 8th interview, told Spokane police that 1) she heard 
Wagar tell Mauro and Cilwick that police were trying to contact them; 2) Mauro and Cilwick 
told Wagar and Raney that the police likely would try to contact them; 3) Mauro and Cilwick 
told them not to talk to anyone about the case; 4) Mauro and Cilwick gave them that 
instruction in the initial conversation where they had talked about police trying to contact her; 
and 5) Mauro and Cilwick did not tell her to talk to police (R129). 
On December 14, 2005, Rima, in the presence of her attorney, gave a videotaped 
statement. Rima acknowledged that she was "kind of in a fog here" because she had not 
taken her medication (R386). During the video statement, she seemed somewhat confused; 
however, she did state that Mauro and Cilwick 1 old her not to talk to police (R392). (R3 82-
97 is attached as addendum F.) 
On December 15, 2005, after Mauro's and Cilwick's arrests for witness tampering, 
Williams responded to the State's request to discuss converting the voluminous discovery 
into electronic media. Williams stated, "[T]he firestorm related to the events in Spokane 
have wholly occupied our time." The letter continues, "[W]e would appreciate all discovery 
that should be provided pursuant to rule 16 at the earliest possibility, especially that which 
may pertain to the events and circumstances of the Spokane incident." (Rl 50-51 (addendum 
G).) 
Mauro, Williams, and Cilwick, retained Mr. Ken Brown and Mr. Mark Moffat to 
represent them. On December 27, 2005, Moffat wrote to the prosecutor that the Spokane 
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witness tampering investigation had "substantially interfered with Mr. Mauro's and Mr. 
Williams' efforts to represent Mr. Maughan" (Rl34-35, addendum H). 
On January 4, 2006, the State moved to disqualify Mauro and Williams. The State 
based the motion on the events surrounding the Spokane witness tampering allegations. The 
State also initially based the motion on a report from Ms. Cheryl Elzinga that Maughan's 
counsel had attempted to elicit information from her by posing as news reporters. The State 
attached a copy of the police statement taken from Elzinga. (R49-75, 114.) 
On January 31, 2006, Brown took sworn statements from Wagar and Raney (R329-
80). Using leading questions, Brown asked Wagar multiple times whether Mauro and 
Cilwick ever told him not to talk to the police; Wagar denied each time that Mauro and 
Cilwick told him not to talk to police (R334-35, 337-39, 343). However, Wagar also told 
Brown that Mauro and Cilwick told him not to talk to anyone, and that they told him that the 
police would probably be contacting him (R338, 343). 
Similarly, Brown, again using leading questions, repeatedly asked Raney whether 
Mauro and Cilwick told her not to talk to police. She stated that they did not, that they told 
her not to talk to anybody, but that she understood "anybody" to include police (R361-63, 
366-68). 
Mauro and Cilwick both filed affidavits with their objection to the motion to 
disqualify (R255-62 (addendum I), 269-73 (addendum J)). Cilwick states that he never told 
any of the witnesses not to talk to or cooperate with police, and that he never heard Mauro 
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tell the witnesses not to talk to or cooperate with police (R272). Mauro's affidavit says 
nothing about what he did or did not tell the Spokane witnesses (R255-62). 
However, neither affidavit refutes Wagar's and Raney's post-December 5th statements 
that Mauro and Cilwick told Wagar and Raney not to talk to anyone. Neither affidavit 
refutes their December 8th statements to Spokane police and Wagar's January 31st statement 
to Brown that the direction not to talk to anyone came in the same interview where they told 
Wagar that police would be trying to contact him. 
Williams also filed an affidavit. His affidavit says nothing about what he did or did 
not say to the Spokane witnesses. (R264-67). 
Before the State filed its reply memorandum and argued the motion to disqualify, the 
State's investigation revealed that Elzinga's allegations lacked credibility. Therefore, both 
in its reply memorandum and at oral argument that State withdrew its motion to the extent 
it relied on Elzinga's allegations. (R545-47, 650A:14.) 
On February 10, 2006, the Utah prosecutor interviewed Wagar. This time, Wagar 
stated that Mr. Perry grabbed and used a screwdriver in the fight with Griffin. (R544; Tr. 
February 10, 2006 (addendum K), at 13). 
Also, for the first time in the February 10th interview, Wagar denied that Mauro and 
Cilwick told him that the police would be trying to contact him. However, he stated that they 
told him not to talk to anybody in the same part of the conversation where they told him to 
expect other attorneys to contact him. He further stated that the police got angry because he 
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would not talk to them, and stated that this was so because he understood the direction "not 
to discuss this with anyone" to include police. (Tr. February 10, 2006, at 6.) 
On February 15, 2006, the trial court heard argument on the motion to disqualify 
Mauro and Williams (R650A, addendum L). 
The trial court issued a memorandum decision immediately after argument. The trial 
court found that 1) counsel's arrest on witness tampering charges appeared to be an 
unprecedented event; 2) counsel's arrest and potential prosecution created "a firestorm of 
controversy totally independent of the pending capital homicide charges;" 3) there existed 
a continuing possibility of criminal prosecution in Washington or of proceedings under Utah 
R. Prof. Conduct 3.4; 4) the case was in its earliest stages, noting that Maughan's preliminary 
hearing was not yet scheduled; and 5) examining Wagar at trial might raise issues that would 
implicate Mauro or Williams to Maughan's detriment, creating a potential conflict. Although 
the court made no finding that Mauro and Williams had committed any wrongdoing, it did 
find "'at least a reasonable possibility that either a serious violation of the law or ethical 
standards occurred'" and "a reasonable possibility that witness tampering occurred." (R634-
35 (citation omitted), addendum M.) 
The trial court continued that it had to balance Maughan's purported "right to be 
represented by an attorney of his choice against the need to maintain the highest standards 
of professional responsibility" (R634). The court ordered the appointment of new lead 
counsel, but allowed Maughan to choose which of his present counsel to retain as co-counsel, 
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"[i]n an attempt to balance [Maughan's] Sixth Amendment rights" (R635). 
After recessing to allow Maughan time to confer with counsel about his choice, the 
trial court reconvened and asked Maughan whether he wished to keep either appointed 
attorney. Maughan, through Mauro, responded that he wished to keep both and expressed 
his willingness to waive any potential or actual conflict as to both attorneys. (R650A at 43-
44.) 
The trial court declined Maughan's request and required him to choose. Maughan 
chose to retain Mauro as co-counsel. (Id. at 44.) 
The trial court then inquired whether Maughan had had an opportunity to discuss 
"with counsel the potential conflicts of interest that could occur." Maughan agreed that he 
had. The trial court continued that it wanted "to make sure" Maughan was aware that a 
conflict of interest is "a potential issue." The court continued that "[i]f, for instance, at trial 
something arose where Mr. Mauro would possibly become a witness, he wouldn't be allowed 
to testify because he's your attorney." Maughan agreed that he understood that possibility. 
The court discussed with Maughan no other existing or potential conflict, including those 
identified in its order. (Id. at 45-46.) The trial court did not appoint independent counsel to 
advise Maughan about the disqualification issues or on his choices with respect to current 
defense counsel. 
Following the order, both parties moved to stay the trial proceedings (R648-49, 676-
80). Both parties timely requested leave for permission to appeal: the State from the part of 
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criminal proceedings, the judiciary's interest in efficient case management, and a defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel all may limit a trial court's 
discretion to remove appointed counsel. 
However, under either approach - entertaining a presumption in favor of counsel of 
choice or substituting for that presumption other considerations - the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it concluded that the potential conflicts outweighed any interest in 
allowing Williams to continue as Maughan's attorney. In addition, Williams admitted that he 
had prioritized co-counsel's and the investigator's interests in defending against Spokane 
witness tampering allegations over preparing Maughan's defense and mitigation case. 
Maughan's proffered waiver did not require the trial court to ignore either the potential or 
actual conflicts. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mauro to remain on Maughan's 
case. 
The trial court's order disqualifying Williams cannot be reconciled with its order 
allowing Mauro to continue representing Maughan. The trial court should have exercised its 
discretion to remove both. 
The reasons for removing Mauro were even more compelling than the reasons for 
removing Williams. Mauro, like Williams, admitted an actual conflict: he admitted that he 
had prioritized defending against the Spokane witness tampering allegations over preparing 
Maughan's case. 
Moreover, the trial court found "at least a reasonable possibility" that witness 
13 
tampering occurred. That finding established the risk of a potential conflict of interest as well 
as the risk of undermining public confidence in this capital murder prosecution. 
On the other side of the balance, no substantial reason weighed in favor of allowing 
Mauro to continue representing Maughan regardless of the standard applied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DISQUALIFYING WILLIAMS BECAUSE NONE OF MAUGHAN'S 
RIGHTS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL AND ADMITTED 
CONFLICTS OR THE NEED TO ENSURE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN 
THE PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court granted the State's motion to disqualify Williams. This Court reviews 
that decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^|88, 63 P.3d 731. 
The trial court applied the balancing test that this Court established m Arguelles, which 
required the court "to recognize a presumption in favor of [Maughan's] counsel of choice." 
Id. As detailed below, Maughan, as an indigent defendant, enjoys no such right. To the 
extent that Arguelles recognizes a limited Sixth Amendment right to representation by 
appointed counsel of choice, it contradicts clearly controlling federal precedent; therefore, the 
Court should overturn it. 
However, the State is not asking the Court to eliminate the Arguelles balancing 
procedure or to give trial courts unfettered discretion to remove appointed counsel. Other 
legitimate interests of a defendant, the victims,, and the judiciary may limit a trial court's 
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discretion. Indeed, giving due weight to the appropriate considerations will protect many of 
the interests that Maughan and UACDL argue should be protected. The State asks the Court 
to substitute in the balancing process those legitimate considerations for the legally 
insupportable presumption in favor of an indigent defendant's right to choose his appointed 
counsel. 
Under either analysis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying 
Williams. 
A. An indigent defendant has no right to choose his counsel. 
The trial court founded its decision and Maughan founds his appellate arguments on 
the purported "presumption in favor of counsel of choice." R634-35; Appellant's Brief at 31. 
Both rely on the balancing test that this Court established in State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 
which requires weighing an actual conflict or a serious potential conflict of interest against 
the "presumption in favor of [] counsel of choice." State v. Arguelles., 2003 UT 1 ^[87-88. 
Like Maughan, Arguelles was indigent, and, like Maughan's counsel, Arguelles's counsel 
were appointed. Therefore, Arguelles creates for an indigent defendant a "presumption in 
favor of [appointed] counsel of choice." Id. at^}88. 
The Arguelles presumption misapplies and contradicts federal precedent, including 
controlling United States Supreme Court precedent.2 To support its conclusion that an 
2The State recognizes that it did not make this argument in the trial court; 
nevertheless, the issue is properly before the Court. The trial court granted the State's 
motion to disqualify Williams. The Court may rely on any "'legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record'" to affirm that outcome. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 
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indigent defendant enjoys a limited Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel of choice, 
this Court relied solely on United States v. Okun, slip op. 00-1716,12 Fed. Appx. 83 (2nd Cir. 
June 20,2001), and Wheatv. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 
1 [^87. However, both cases stand only for the proposition that a non-indigent criminal 
defendant has a limited right to retain, at his own expense, his chosen counsel. United States 
v. Okun, slip op. 00-1716 at 1 (Okun retained the attorney who was disqualified over his 
objection); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The sixth 
amendment provides that criminal defendants who can afford retained counsel have a 
qualified right to counsel of their choice" (emphasis added)), affirmed, Wheatv. United States, 
486 U.S. 153 (1988). Neither Okun nor Wheat support this Court's conclusion that indigent 
defendants such as Arguelles and Maughan have a Sixth Amendment right to representation 
by appointed counsel of choice. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the limited Sixth Amendment 
right to representation by chosen counsel applies only to non-indigent defendants. In United 
States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006), the Supreme Court, citing Wheat, stated, 
"We have previously held that an element of [the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] is the 
right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent 
him." Id. at 2561 (citing Wheatv. United States, 486 U.S. 153,159 (1988) (emphasis added)). 
T[10, 52 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). See also State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 
1996) (the Court may affirm the outcome on a theory that the lower court considered and 
rejected). 
16 
The Supreme Court also recognized this distinction in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered 
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). The defendant in Caplin selected and retained Caplin 
& Drysdale to represent him in a criminal prosecution. The government sought forfeiture of 
the assets that the defendant intended to use to pay his chosen counsel, and after the defendant 
was indicted, those funds were frozen. Nevertheless, the defendant used those funds to pay 
Caplin & Drysdale a $25,000 fee. Id. at 620-21. Caplin & Drysdale filed a claim to have their 
fees paid from the funds, arguing, in part, that the forfeiture infringed on their client's Sixth 
Amendment right to choose his counsel. Id. at 623-24. 
In rejecting Caplin & Drysdale's claim, the Supreme Court reasoned that Caplin & 
Drysdale had "not, nor could it defensibly [have done] so, assert[ed] that impecunious 
defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel. The Amendment 
guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate representation, but those who 
do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they 
are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts." Id. at 624. In support of 
that reasoning, the Supreme Court quoted Wheat for the proposition that"' [a] defendant may 
not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.'" Id. (quoting Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. atl59).3 
3Numerous other courts also recognize that only defendants who can afford private 
counsel enjoy the limited right to choose their counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Oreye, 
263 F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 2001) (district court properly denied request for second 
substitute counsel, "given the fact that an indigent defendant has a right to competent 
counsel but not a right to counsel of his choice"), cert denied, 535 U.S. 933 (2002); 
Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir.) (right to chose counsel does not extend 
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Gonzales-Lopes, Caplin & Drysdale, and Wheat, including the lower-court decision 
in Wheat, demonstrate that this Court misapplied Wheat to require weighing the need to 
remove appointed counsel against a presumption in favor of an indigent's purported right to 
representation by counsel of choice. The right to be presumed under Wheat does not exist in 
the context of appointed counsel for indigent defendants such as Maughan.4 
B. Maughan has no Sixth Amendment right to continued representation by his 
appointed counsel. 
UACDL argues that, even if Maughan had no right to select the counsel appointed to 
represent him, he does have a Sixth Amendment right to continued representation by 
appointed counsel of choice co-equal to a non-indigent defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
beyond person's ability to pay for counsel), cert denied, 522 U.S. 884 (1997); United 
States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("an indigent defendant who seeks 
court-appointed representation has no constitutional right to the counsel of his choice; he 
has only the right to effective representation"), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1136 (1997); United 
States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1015 n.12 (10th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that an 
indigent defendant does not have the right to chose counsel) (dicta); United States v. lies, 
906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990) (indigent defendant must demonstrate good cause for 
substituting appointed counsel because he has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 
choice). 
4The State acknowledges that it bears a "'substantial burden of persuasion" to 
justify overturning this Court's precedent. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994). The "doctrine of stare decisis" "mandate[s]" that burden. Id. 
However, as a court of last resort, this Court is not"'inexorably bound by its own 
precedents.'" Id. at 399 (citation omitted). This Court will follow its precedents "'unless 
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent.'" Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted). The State has satisfied its 
"substantial burden" because, as established, Arguelles misapplied and contradicts 
controlling United States Supreme Court authority. Therefore, the rule that this Court set 
in Arguelles "was originally erroneous." 
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to choose his counsel. Amicus Brief at 6-9. 
The Court should ignore the argument. Amicus curiae may not expand the appellate 
issues beyond those that the parties present. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,629 
n.3 (Utah 1983); Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App. 50 ffi[5-7,975 P.2d 946. Maughan, relying 
on Arguelles and Wheat, has argued only that he has the same right to representation by 
counsel of choice that a non-indigent defendant enjoys. Appellant's Brief at 31. He has not 
argued that, although he had no right to choose who would be appointed to represent him, he 
does have a right to continued representation by the attorney chosen for him. The Court 
should not address this argument. 
Alternatively, UACDL's argument fails on the merits. UACDL relies on appellate 
court decisions from other States holding that, once counsel is appointed, the indigent 
defendant enjoys the same right to continued representation by his preferred appointed 
counsel that a non-indigent defendant enjoys to continued representation by his retained 
counsel. See generally Amicus Brief at 6-7, citing and quoting Smith v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1968), and citing Commonwealth v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 
147, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Johnson, 547 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996); and State v. Husky, 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). 
However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the reasoning on which 
UACDL and the cases it cites rely. UACDL argues that an indigent defendant must have a 
Sixth Amendment right to continued representation by preferred appointed counsel because 
19 
the attorney-client relationship involves "'an intimate process of consultation and planning 
which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his [] attorney/" 
which is "'particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client's life or 
liberty."5 Amicus Brief at 6 (quoting Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d at 74). In Slappy v. 
Morris, 649 F.2d 718,721 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit followed this same reasoning and 
quoted the same language from Smith to support it's the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel must encompass a right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Id. at 
720-21. Applying that analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that the state trial court violated 
Slappy's right to continued representation by preferred appointed counsel when it denied 
Slappy's motion to continue his trial to allow time for his preferred appointed counsel to 
recover from an illness and forced Slappy to proceed to trial with a substitute public defender. 
Id. at 722. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Morris v. Slappy, 461 
U.S. 1 (1983). As to the reasoning at issue here, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit's "conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 'would be without substance 
if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship,'... is without basis 
in the law. No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be." Id. at 13 (emphasis in Supreme Court 
opinion). The Supreme Court's holding that the Sixth Amendment right 1o counsel includes 
no guarantee to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" refutes UACDL's argument that 
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the Sixth Amendment must create for indigent defendants a limited right to continued 
representation by a specific appointed counsel because such a right is necessary to foster a 
relationship of trust and confidence. See United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 57, 61 (2nd Cir. 
2006) (citing Slappy for the proposition that "[t]here is no constitutional right to continuity 
of appointed counsel").5 
Caplin & Drysdale also undercuts UACDL's reasoning. The defendant in that case, 
5Even if the Supreme Court had not rejected the Smith reasoning that UACDL asks 
this Court to adopt, Smith does not support UACDL's argument that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees the right to continued representation by a specific appointed 
counsel. Amicus Brief at 6-7. As the California Supreme Court later recognized, it was 
"far from clear" whether Smith was grounded on the federal constitution, on the 
California Constitution, or merely on a court-imposed rule delineating trial court 
discretion. People v. Jones, 91 P.3d 939, 945 (Cal. 2004). 
Smith's reasoning also does not support its conclusion that an indigent defendant 
enjoys the same right to continued representation by appointed counsel of choice as a 
non-indigent defendant enjoys to continued representation by retained counsel. First, 
Smith, as stated, founded its conclusion on the need to foster a relationship of trust and 
confidence between a defendant and his counsel. Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d at 
561. Even if the Supreme Court had not rejected that reasoning, it rests on the 
unsupported assumption that a defendant can develop a relationship of trust and 
confidence with only one attorney, and one that was appointed at random to begin with. 
Second, Smith also founded its holding on the assumption that failing to give an 
indigent defendant the same right to continued representation by appointed counsel of 
choice that a non-indigent enjoys to continued representation by retained counsel of 
choice would result in an "invidious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of 
the accused." Id. at 562. However, the right to choose counsel in the first place rests on 
the same discrimination between indigent and non-indigent defendants. UACDL fails to 
explain why the Sixth Amendment permits one economic discrimination, but not the 
other. Moreover, as explained in the text, the right to continued representation by 
retained counsel of choice ends once a defendant becomes impecunious. UACDL cites 
nothing for the proposition that a defendant who was indigent when the criminal 
proceedings began has greater rights than a defendant who became indigent during the 
course of those proceedings. 
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who was not indigent at the outset, retained Caplin & Diysdale to represent him in the 
criminal proceedings. However, the order freezing the defendant's assets rendered him 
indigent after he had retained his chosen counsel. The Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that this situation violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choose his counsel. 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. at 621-24. In other words, the 
defendant's right to continued representation by the attorneys that he had retained ended when 
he became indigent during the course of the criminal proceedings. See also United States v. 
Messino, 181 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 1999) (Messino's right to counsel of choice ended when 
he ran out of funds to pay his retained counsel). UACDL offers no analysis to support its 
necessary argument that a person who never had the right to choose his counsel enjoys a right 
to continued representation by an appointed attorney, but a person who originally had the right 
to choose his counsel loses his right to continued representation by his chosen attorney when 
he becomes indigent. 
C. Although a defendant has no right to representation by his preferred appointed 
counsel, other legitimate interests may limit a trial court's discretion to replace 
an indigent defendant's appointed counsel. 
The State does not ask the Court to eliminate the balancing procedure established in 
Arguelles. An indigent defendant's other constitutional and statutory rights, the victim's 
rights, and other institutional interests may limit a trial court's discretion to remove appointed 
counsel. The State asks only that the Court substitute in the weighing process those legitimate 
concerns for the legally insupportable presumption in favor an indigent defendant's limited 
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right to choose his public defender. Indeed, most of the reasons that Maughan and UACDL 
advance about why the Court should limit on a trial court's discretion to remove appointed 
counsel are implicated by and may be addressed through other, legitimate considerations. 
Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to a "meaningful attorney-client 
relationship," interrupting an indigent defendant's long-standing attorney-client relationship 
with appointed counsel may threaten other rights and interests. All defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. Amend VI. The Victims' Rights Act requires 
that a trial court setting a trial date "shall consider the interests of the victim of a crime to a 
speedy resolution of the charges " Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-7(1) (West 2004) (emphasis 
added). In addition, the courts have an institutional interest in seeing that a case proceeds 
efficiently and expeditiously. 
The delay that may follow from interrupting an attorney-client relationship while 
replacement counsel comes up to speed may threaten these rights and interests. The case's 
complexity, counsel's preparation and familiarity with the case, the time left before the 
scheduled trial, and the potential loss of evidence should all factor into considering how much 
weight to give to the need for expedition. A complex case with a looming trial date and with 
which appointed counsel has extensive familiarity should weigh more heavily against 
replacing counsel. On the other hand, when the replacement issue arises in a nascent case and 
will not result in the loss of evidence, expedition should carry less weight in the balancing 
process. Cf, e.g., Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ga. 1989) (trial court erred by not 
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appointing counsel for Amadeo's retrial the attorneys who had represented Amadeo for ten 
and four years on the same and were thoroughly familiar with his case); Harris v. Superior 
Court of Alameda County, 567 P.2d 750, 754, 757-58 (Cal. 1977) (en banc) (trial court erred 
by not appointing attorneys who previously had represented defendants in criminal 
proceedings with similar issues, in part because of their experience with those issues and 
because the prosecutor had been preparing the case for three years). 
In addition, the Sixth Amendment clearly guarantees to all criminal defendants the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. The State agrees that a rule allowing a court to 
remove counsel for competent or even aggressive representation conducted in compliance 
with the controlling rules threatens that right. Clearly, removing counsel for promptly 
interviewing witnesses will discourage effective and efficient representation. Appellant's 
Brief at 37-38; Amicus Brief at 15-18.6 
6In support of its argument that Maughan's counsel merely complied with the 
American Bar Association Guidelines when they met with the Spokane witnesses, 
UACDL states that the United States Supreme Court has endorsed the ABA Guidelines in 
counsel's investigative duties. Amicus Brief at 14. UACDL then relies heavily on what 
the ABA Guidelines prescribe for capital case preparation. Id. at 14-17. If UACDL 
intends to argue that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel in every death-penalty case to 
perform all that the ABA Guidelines suggest, it misstates the law. In Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court recognized that the ABA Guidelines are 
"guides" in assessing the reasonableness of trial counsel's performance,, Id. at 522. 
Further, the Supreme Court cited to Strickland v. Washington, in which it declined to 
adopt the ABA Guidelines as rules for representation. Id. (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (the ABA Guidelines are "only guides" to what 
constitutes objectively reasonable representation under the Sixth Amendment; "[n]o 
particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would 
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Similarly, a court should not remove counsel merely because the court finds his 
litigation style distasteful or even uncivil. Defense counsel should have the freedom to 
represent their clients without having to worry about being removed from a case by offending 
an overly sensitive judge. Cf., e.g., State v. Husky, 82 S.W.3d at 309 (trial court erroneously 
disqualified counsel who had represented Husky on the murder charges alone for ten years 
and through three trials; basis for disqualification - perceived abusive motion practice -
required more measured responses); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104-1105 
(D.C. 1978) (trial court unjustifiably removed appointed counsel who had extensively 
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions")). 
UACDL also argues that counsel's failure to investigate his client's past "fully" 
constitutes ineffective assistance, citing to Wiggins and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 
(2005). Amicus Brief at 14. To the extent UACDL suggests that the Sixth Amendment 
requires an exhaustive mitigation investigation irrespective of a client's wishes or the 
information that the client provided to his counsel, it again misstates the law. In Wiggins, 
the Supreme Court stressed that the Sixth Amendment "does not require counsel to 
investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the 
effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 533. 
In addition, Wiggins relied on Strickland v. Washington, where the Supreme Court stated 
that the reasonableness of counsel's investigation "depends critically" upon information 
that his client provides and found that Washington's counsel's far less than exhaustive 
investigation complied with Sixth Amendment requirements. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. at 672-73, 690-91, 698-701. 
Rompilla did not change that standard. Rompilla's counsel relied on Rompilla's 
and his family's representations that there was no mitigation evidence beyond what they 
told him. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. at 381-82. The Supreme Court did not hold, as 
UACDL represents, that counsel in every death-penalty case must look for additional 
mitigation evidence despite his client's assurances that no more exists. The Supreme 
Court held only that Sixth Amendment obligates defense counsel to review the 
prosecution's aggravation evidence. Rompilla's counsel failed to do so. If they had, they 
would have found clues that there was more mitigation evidence available despite 
Rompilla's and his family's assurances to the contrary. Id. at 377-87, 389-93. 
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prepared Harling's case, litigation practices that court found objectionable were within the 
bounds of legitimate advocacy).7 
The State also agrees that unfettered discretion in replacing appointed counsel poses 
systemic threats. Amicus Brief at 17-18,24-26. An unfounded replacement of counsel in one 
case will chill counsel's representation in others. For example, replacing counsel in a case 
for making novel legal arguments in compliance with the controlling rules may chill counsel 
in other cases from fully pressing their client's case.8 
The State also agrees that the Court should not countenance the State using a motion 
to disqualify as a tool to remove an attorney that the prosecutor dislikes or fears as a 
"formidable" opponent. In particular, when the State uses such a motion merely to "elbow" 
out an particular opposing counsel, it threatens the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective representation. See State v. Serna, 787 P.2d 1056, 1063-65 (Ariz. 1990). 
In sum, the State is not advocating that the Court abolish the balancing procedure 
adopted in Arguelles and Wheat. The State argues only that the Court should substitute the 
appropriate considerations identified above for the legally insupportable presumption in favor 
7Granted, Husky, Amadeo and Harris, depend in part on the purported right to 
choose or continue to be presented by appointed counsel. As established, neither right 
exists. However, they do recognize the institutional costs that flow from replacing 
counsel with experience and expertise in complicated cases and for reasons . 
8This is not to say, of course, that effective representation means that appointed 
defense counsel have carte blanche in representing their clients. As they have with 
retained counsel, courts should have the authority to replace appointed counsel who 
recalcitrantly or blatantly violate court rules, press arguments that the court has rejected, 
or otherwise unjustifiably disrupt a case's progress. 
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of an indigent defendant's right to representation by a preferred public defender. However, 
as explained in points ID and II, none of the rights and interests discussed above are or would 
be threatened by removing both Williams and Mauro. 
D. Applying a balancing test that relies on appropriate considerations establishes 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified Williams. 
Nothing weighs in favor of reversing the trial court's order removing Williams. First, 
replacing counsel will not threaten Maughan's speedy trial right. The murder occurred over 
two decades ago, and, at this point, the case against Maughan turns primarily on his 
confession. As detailed, the witness tampering issue arose the same day that Williams was 
appointed, and by his own representation, Williams's preparation for Maughan's case stopped 
at that point (R135, 150-51). There has not been a preliminary hearing (R634). Replacing 
Williams will cause little or no delay to bring new counsel up to speed, or, it appears, threaten 
the loss of evidence critical to Maughan's defense. 
This is not a case, as both Maughan and UACDL assert, where the State has 
"orchestrate[d]" or'"manufacture^]"'a basis for disqualifying Williams. Appellant's Brief 
at 41-45; Amicus Brief at 19-20 (citation omitted). The State did not "orchestrate" or 
"manufacture" the witness tampering allegations that caused Williams to cease working on 
Maughan's case. The State did not tell Raney, Wagar, Rima, and Jeffreys to report to police 
that the Maughan's defense team told witnesses not to speak to police. 
To the contrary, the events leading to the witness tampering allegations and to the 
motion to disqualify all arose out of events over which the State had no control. Spokane 
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police acted on a report that Maughan's attorney and investigator told them not to talk to 
police. When Spokane police asked Mauro and Cilwick about the alleged witness tampering, 
they refused to talk about it. At that point, Spokane police arrested them on witness tampering 
charges. Williams later represented that the witness tampering charges had "wholly occupied 
[the defense team's] time." (Rl 18-20, 122-24, 127,150-51.) Thus, when the State moved 
to disqualify Williams, he had stopped working on Maughan's case as a consequence of 
events over which the State had no control. The State neither "orchestrated]" nor 
"manufacture^]" anything on which it relied to support its motion to disqualify.9 
This case also does not present the problem, as UACDL argues, of the State moving 
to disqualify counsel to remove Maughan's "formidable defense team" in favor of less 
aggressive or competent opponents. Amicus Brief at 21-22. The record does not support the 
motive UACDL attributes to the State.10 The State has no idea who will replace Williams and 
had no idea who would replace him when it filed the motion to disqualify. The high 
qualification standards set by Utah R. Crim. P. 8 protect against the State generally using 
disqualification motions to secure less competent opponents in capital cases. In this case, rule 
9Maughan's argument violates standard 3 of the Utah Standards of Professionalism 
and Civility, which 1) provides that u[l]awyers shall not, without an adequate factual 
basis, attribute to other counsel... improper motives, purpose, or conduct;" and 2) 
prohibits "disparaging] the integrity,... ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary 
unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling law." As detailed in the 
argument, there is no factual support for the argument that the State "orchestrate[d]" a 
conflict. 
10This argument also violates standard 3 of the Utah Standards of Professionalism 
and Civility. 
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8 should secure replacement counsel with skill comparable to the attorneys whom they will 
replace, and who may be even more "formidable" than Williams and Mauro. 
On the other side of the scale, an actual or serious potential conflict of interest will 
weighs in favor. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ffi[87-88. In addition, a trial court must 
consider whether the continued representation "' create[s] a serious risk of undermining public 
confidence in the integrity of our legal system.'" State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,490 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citation omitted). A trial court "has "an independent interest in ensuring that 
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal 
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.'" Arguelles, 2008 UT 1 [^89. Here, the 
circumstances, including circumstances that Williams admitted, weigh heavily in favor of the 
trial court's decision to disqualify Williams. 
Williams admitted to an actual Sixth Amendment conflict of interest. A Sixth 
Amendment conflict of interests exists where counsel make choices that advance interests 
other than their client's to the detriment of their client. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681,686 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). Here, Williams admitted that he put 
his co-counsel's and investigator's interests in defending against the witness tampering 
allegations ahead of Maughan's interest in preparing his case. When the prosecutor wrote to 
Williams to discuss a cooperative discovery effort, Williams responded that defending his co-
counsel and investigator against the Spokane witness tampering allegations had "wholly" 
occupied his time. In addition, his discussion of the discovery focused on discovery related 
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to the witness tampering allegations, not discovery related to the prosecution again his client. 
(Rl 50-51.) 
In addition to the admitted actual conflict of interest, the trial court correctly found that 
Williams had a potential conflict because examining Wagar at trial may raise issues that 
would implicate Williams to Maughan's detriment (R634). Wagar has given different 
accounts of Maughan's admissions to him about Brad Perry's murder. Wagar initially 
reported to Spokane police that Maughan admitted being present when Griffin stabbed Brad 
Perry after Griffin got into an argument with Perry over $10 (Rl 19). Williams then traveled 
to Spokane and met with Wagar (R129-31). In a videotaped statement taken some time after 
Williams met with Wagar, Wagar stated that Maughan reported that Brad Perry grabbed and 
used a screwdriver in the fight with Griffin (Tr. February 10,2006, at 13). The first account 
describes an aggravated murder; the second incorporates a possible imperfect self-defense 
theory or a lack of intent theory. 
At trial, Williams clearly must elicit the second, more exculpatory account. However, 
if he does so, it will open the door to a cross-examination admission that Wagar changed his 
testimony only after Williams met with him, leaving the inference that Williams prompted the 
change. On the other hand, it would work to Williams's benefit if Wagar disavowed the more 
exculpatory version and embraced the more inculpatory version that preceded the Williams-
Wagar interview. That scenario would remove the inference that Williams may have said 
something to prompt Wagar to give the more exculpatory version, but would implicate 
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Williams's client in an aggravated murder. Similarly, the admission that Wagar gave a more 
exculpatory version of Maughan's account of the murder after Williams interviewed Wagar 
would hardly lend credibility to Maughan's defense if Williams continues to represent him 
in front of the jury. Cf. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 490 (accusations that Johnson's counsel 
was implicated in Johnson's criminal activity eroded his credibility as defense counsel). 
Maughan has not established that no actual or potential conflict existed. Maughan 
asserts only that the conflict was based on Williams's interviews concerning the witness 
tampering allegations. He continues that the witnesses have all asserted that they 
misunderstood what Mauro and Cilwick told them, and that the change did not result from 
"anything told to them by other members of the defense team." Appellant's Brief at 39-40.n 
Maughan wholly ignores the actual conflict to which Williams admitted and the potential 
conflicts that on which the trial court relied. 
In sum, nothing weighs in favor of allowing Williams to remain on the case. On the 
other side of the scales, Williams already has admitted to a Sixth Amendment conflict of 
interest, and the trial court correctly found other potential conflicts related to examining 
Wagar at trial. Based on this balancing, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to 
replace Williams. 
nMaughan overstates the record. Wagar and Raney told police that they had 
determined that they misunderstood what Mauro and Cilwick told them about talking to 
police after Williams had "explained" that they misunderstood it. 
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E. Alternatively, under Arguelles^ the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
deciding to remove Williams. 
Even applying the Arguelles presumption in favor of representation by counsel of 
choice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing Williams. Under Arguelles, an 
actual or serious potential for a conflict of interest will overcome the presumption in favor 
representation by appointed counsel of choice. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^ [87-88. As 
demonstrated, Williams has admitted to an actual Sixth Amendment conflict of interest: he 
placed his co-counsel's interests in defending against the witness tampering allegations over 
his preparation of Maughan's case. Also as demonstrated, the trial court correctly found that 
a serious potential for a conflict exists because examining Wagar may raise issues that may 
"implicate . . . Williams to [Maughan's] detriment" (R634). 
Little weighs on the other side of the balance. Maughan at best had only a weak 
interest in having Williams continue as his counsel. Any relationship of trust and confidence 
that may have developed between Maughan and Williams, even if it is entitled to 
consideration, is not entitled to much weight in this case.12 Again, the case and the attorney-
client relationship was in its nascent stages when the events occurred that caused Williams 
to halt his work on Maughan's case. This case does not present an attorney-client relationship 
that may require its preservation by virtue of its length and depth. Compare State v. Husky, 
82 S.W.3d 297,309 (Term. Crim. App. 2002)(trial court erroneously disqualified counsel who 
12As detailed in point IB, controlling law does not support considering this as a 
factor in determining whether to disqualify appointed counsel. 
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one potential conflict: that Mauro could become a witness. The court did not discuss with 
Maughan any of the risks that it found Williams's continued representation posed. The trial 
court did not discuss with Maughan the actual conflict to which Williams had admitted: that 
he had advanced his co-counsel's and investigator's interests in defending against the witness 
tampering allegations over Maughan's interests in preparing his defense to the capital 
homicide charges. (R635, 650A:45-46.) 
As to all remaining actual or possible conflicts, the trial court relied on Maughan's 
discussion with the very attorneys whom the court found had potential conflicts of interest and 
who denied and still deny that they have any conflicts (id.). That reliance did not cure the 
inadequate colloquy because the court never inquired into and the record includes none of the 
details of what risks counsel apprised Maughan or of what options they offered him. Based 
on counsel's statements to the trial court and appellate argument in Maughan's opening brief, 
it seems possible, if not likely, that they advised Maughan that there was no conflict, and that 
the motion to disqualify was merely a ruse to remove counsel. 
For all of these reasons, the purported conflict waiver was insufficient to require the 
trial court to allow Williams to continue as Maughan's counsel. 
In Arguelles, the Court assessed the trial court's insufficient consideration of 
Arguelles's waiver for harmless error. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^[93-94. If this Court 
continues to hold that an indigent defendant has a right to choose his appointed counsel, that 
part of Arguelles likely is no longer good law. In United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 
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2557 (2006), the United States Supreme Court held that a violation of the limited Sixth 
Amendment right to choose counsel is structural error. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Williams. Under any 
standard, the actual and potential conflicts outweighed any reason to allow Williams to 
continue representing Maughan, and Maughan's waiver was insufficient to require the trial 
court to ignore the serious actual and potential conflicts. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE MAURO'S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WERE EVEN 
MORE EGREGIOUS THAN WILLIAMS, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIM AS WELL 
As demonstrated in point I, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying 
Williams. However, that ruling cannot be reconciled with the trial court's decision not to 
disqualify Mauro. The reasons for disqualifying Mauro were even more compelling than the 
reasons for removing Williams. 
A. Mauro's conflicts were greater than Williams's. 
As established, an actual or serious potential conflict of interest weighs in favor of 
removing counsel. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ffi[87-88, 63 P.3d 731. A trial court "has 
''an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.'" 
Id. at Tf89. 
In addition to the findings discussed in point I, the trial court found that Mauro5s arrest 
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and potential prosecution created "a firestorm of controversy totally independent of the 
pending capital homicide charges;" there existed a continuing possibility of criminal 
prosecution in Washington or of proceedings under Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.4; and that there 
is "'at least a reasonable possibility that either a serious violation of the law or ethical 
standards occurred'" and "a reasonable possibility that witness tampering occurred." (R634-
35 (citations omitted.) These additional reasons weighed more heavily in favor of removing 
Mauro than Williams. 
A trial court must consider whether the continued representation '"create[s] a serious 
risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system,'" which requires 
the trial court to take into account "'the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy' . . . ." 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). Accusations that 
counsel is implicated in criminal activity related to his client will erode his credibility as 
defense counsel. Capital homicide proceedings are time-consuming, expensive, and exposed 
to close public scrutiny. The trial court's findings of "at least a reasonable possibility" that 
witness tampering occurred and, as a result, that a serious criminal and ethical violation 
occurred, reflects how the public will view these events. It hardly promotes public confidence 
in the fairness of the trial proceedings to allow the attorney and investigator implicated in 
those events to continue to represent Maughan. The public will view with suspicion a 
criminal proceeding in which an attorney who represents one party was implicated in an 
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attempt to restrict the other party's access to evidence. 
The trial court also found that there existed a continuing possibility of criminal 
prosecution in Washington State or of disciplinary proceedings under Utah R. Prof. Conduct 
3.4. If either possibility materializes, counsel will be forced to withdraw, causing additional 
delay in the proceedings. Public confidence will not be promoted by additional delay 
triggered by an eventuality that was anticipated and could have been cured early on.15 
In their briefs, Maughan and UACDL challenge the validity of the witness tampering 
14Even if Maughan's counsel and investigator actually did not direct or even 
suggest to the witnesses that they should not talk to police, the controversy surrounding 
the arrest and the allegations support removing counsel to avoid even the appearance of 
impropriety. Moreover, as detailed in subsequent argument, the fair inferences from the 
unrefuted evidence support the trial court's conclusion of "at least a reasonable 
possibility" that the witness tampering occurred. 
15Maughan complains that the trial court "fails to articulate a factual basis for how 
[rule 3.4] was violated nor identifies who on the defense team violated the rule." 
Appellant's Brief at 37 n.18. The answers are obvious. Rule 3.4 prohibits an attorney 
from, among other things, obstructing another party's access to relevant information, 
counseling a non-client to refrain from giving voluntary information to another party, or 
counseling a party to alter evidence. Wagar (a witness to Maughan's incriminating 
statements) and Rima reported that Mauro and Cilwick told them not to talk to police. 
Two other witnesses reported that they heard Mauro and Cilwick give that instruction. 
(Rl 18-20, 122-24, 127. They modified this account after stating that Williams explained 
that they likely misunderstood what Mauro and Cilwick told them (R129-31). As detailed 
in subsequent argument, the modified versions do not negate finding thatt counsel led the 
witnesses to believe that they should not talk to police or to State's counsel. In addition, 
Wagar changed his testimony after Williams interviewed him. If believed, these facts 
could support finding a rule 3.4 violation by Mauro for either expressly or implicitly 
directing the witnesses not to talk to police and against Williams if he convinced Wagar 
to modify his testimony about Maughan's admissions. 
The Office of Professional Conduct may take no action. The OPC or a court 
ultimately may conclude that no rule violation occurred. However, the potential factual 
basis for the violation is plain from the record. 
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allegations. Appellant's Brief at 35-40, Amicus Brief at 9-10. Although they are not clear 
on this point, they appear to challenge the trial court's finding that there was "at least a 
reasonable possibility that witness tampering occurred" (R635). In effect, they challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented to the trial court to support its finding. 
In order to succeed on a sufficiency challenge to a trial court's finding, Maughan and 
UACLD must first marshal all of the evidence supporting it. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). They 
must "comb[] the record for and compil[e] all the evidence" that supports the trial court's 
finding that there is at least a reasonable possibility that witness tampering occurred. Wilson 
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94121,54 P.3d 1177; Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82 TJ20,100 P.3d 1177 (appellant must marshal the evidence "if a determination of 
the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive"). They 
"'must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82 \ll (citation omitted). They must "'temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully 
embrace [the opponent's] position'; [they].. . must play the "devil's advocate."'" Id. at f78 
(citation omitted). Then, they must demonstrate that the marshaled evidence was legally 
insufficient to support the challenged finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing 
Corp., 2002 UT 94^21. 
Neither Maughan nor UACDL have fulfilled that obligation. Both emphasize facts 
that, in their view, refute the trial court's finding. For example, they state that, after Mauro's 
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and Cilwick's arrests, Wagar and Raney denied that Mauro and Cilwick told them not to talk 
to police and reported that Mauro and Cilwick told them not to talk to anyone, which they 
believed included police. Appellant's Brief at 35-40, Amicus Brief at 9-10. 
Both Maughan and UACDL ignore the evidence, much of it undisputed, that supports 
the finding of "at least a reasonable possibility" that witness tampering occurred. Rima did 
not retract her report that Mauro and Cilwick told her not to talk to police. 
On balance, Wagar's and Raney's unrefuted accounts support the trial court's findings. 
It is true that Wagar and Raney later reported that Mauro and Cilwick did not use the words, 
"Don't talk to police." However, even Maughan's lawyers and UACDL do not dispute that 
Mauro and Cilwick told Wagar and Raney not to talk to anyone, and that they gave this 
direction in the same interview where it was discussed that police had been or would be trying 
to contact them. Wagar and Raney told Spokane police that Mauro and Cilwick told them not 
to talk to anyone in the same interview where Mauro and Cilwick told them that police would 
be trying to contact them (R129-30). Brown (Mauro's, Cilwick's, and Williams's attorney) 
elicited the same information from Wagar (R338, 343). Even when in a later interview with 
State's counsel Wagar retracted his statement that Mauro and Cilwick told him that police 
would be trying to contact him (Tr. February 10, 2006, at 6), he did not refute his statement 
to Spokane police that he told Mauro and Cilwick that police were trying to contact him in the 
same interview where Mauro and Cilwick told him not to talk to anyone. He also stated that 
Mauro and Cilwick told him not to talk to anybody in the same part of the conversation where 
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they told him to expect "other attorneys" to contact him. "[OJther attorneys" would include 
State's counsel; Wagar could not refuse to talk to State's counsel any more than he could 
refuse to talk to their agents. 
Mauro did not report to the trial court what he told the witnesses. Cilwick only denied 
telling the witnesses not to talk to police. He did not deny that he and Mauro told the 
witnesses not to talk to anyone in the same conversation where it was discussed that police 
had been or would be trying to contact the witnesses. (R255-62, 269-73.) 
A fair reading of the unrefuted and unmarshalled evidence is that Mauro and Cilwick 
led the witnesses to believe that they should not talk to police. Therefore, this unrefuted and 
unmarshalled evidence amply supports the finding of "at least a reasonable possibility" of 
witness tampering. In turn, that finding weighed heavily in favor of removing Mauro.16 
Moreover, the witness tampering allegations may become relevant impeachment to 
Wagar's testimony. According to Spokane police, Wagar reported to them that Maughan 
admitted that Griffin stabbed Brad Perry during an argument over $10 (Rl 19). That report 
occurred the day after Mauro and Cilwick told the witnesses not to talk to anyone in an 
interview where it was discussed that police had been or would be trying to contact them (see 
above). In a subsequent videotaped interview, Wagar reported that Maughan told him that 
16Although less clear, the inferences from evidence that Maughan ignores support 
the finding of a "reasonable possibility of witness tampering" by Williams. The Spokane 
police reports indicate that the Spokane witnesses denied that Mauro and Williams told 
them not to talk to police after Williams "explained" that they misunderstood what Mauro 
and Williams told them (Rl29-30). Similarly, Wagar gave a more exculpatory version of 
Maughan's admissions to him after Williams interviewed him. 
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Brad Perry grabbed the screwdriver during a fight with Griffin (Tr. February 10, 2006). 
Wagar may testify at trial he has always reported the same exculpatory version that he 
later told to State's counsel in the videotaped interview, including in his interviews with 
Maughan's counsel. If he does, and especially if Cilwick corroborates that testimony, the 
witness tampering allegations will be relevant. Maughan's defense team would have no 
reason to lead Wagar to believe that he should not talk to police if he has always reported the 
more exculpatory version of the Maughan's admission. 
In addition, Brown's interview with Wagar, in the context of defending Mauro and 
Cilwick on the witness tampering allegations, provides a source of bias evidence. For 
example, Wagar reports that he did not want to talk to police because they were against 
Maughan. He also reported that he responded to a note police left to schedule an interview 
only because he thought that one of Maughan's attorneys had left it. He also stated that he 
felt bad because Maughan's attorneys got into trouble. (R335-38.) Those statements show 
a clear bias in favor of Maughan and anyone on Maughan's side, which the State is entitled 
to explore as a reason for Wagar changing his testimony about Maughan's admissions. The 
context in which the statements were given - an interview about the witness-tampering 
allegations - is admissible foundation. 
Similarly, the witness tampering allegations show Wagar's proclivity to change his 
story to favor Maughan and anyone who is pursuing Maughan's interests. Wagar initially told 
Spokane police that Mauro and Cilwick told him not to talk to police. He then told police and 
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Brown that Mauro and Cilwick told him not to talk to anyone in the same interview where 
they told him that police would be trying to contact him. He then told the prosecutor that 
Mauro and Cilwick did not tell him that police would be trying to talk to him. Each account 
that Wagar gave of the witness tampering allegations becomes more favorable to Mauro and 
Cilwick. In turn, those changes show Maughan's bias in favor of Maughan and those who 
represent him, and will impeach his changed and more favorable account of Maughan's 
admissions about the Perry murder. 
The State is entitled to explore Wagar's biases. When it does, the events concerning 
the witness tampering allegations will become relevant. Mauro, Cilwick, Williams, and 
Brown may become necessary witnesses on what happened in their interviews with Wagar. 
Apart from all of the above, Mauro, like Williams, admitted to an actual conflict of 
interest. Mauro, through his attorney, asserted that the witness tampering allegations had 
"substantially interfered" with his efforts to represent Mr. Maughan (R135). Thus, Mauro 
already has put his interests in defending against those allegations ahead of Maughan's 
interests in proceeding with the criminal prosecution. That course creates an actual conflict 
of interest. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) (counsel have a 
constitutional conflict of interest where they make choices that advance interests other than 
their client's to the detriment of their client), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). 
For the same reasons argued with respect to Williams, Maughan's purported waiver 
was insufficient to cure the error in allowing Mauro to remain on the case. However, the lack 
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of a clear waiver is even more problematic with respect to Mauro. Mauro remains on the 
case. He has admitted to an actual conflict of interest, and the trial court correctly found that 
he had potential conflicts of interest. The actual conflict and the potential conflicts if they 
materialize, combined with the inadequate waiver, may support a claim that Maughan was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. If so, he will not have to establish 
that the conflict affected the trial outcome. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487-88. 
Thus, allowing Mauro to continue to represent Maughan even though he has actual and 
potential conflicts that Maughan did not waive gives to Maughan the power to overturn his 
conviction or sentence on direct appeal or in post-conviction and without having to prove that 
Mauro's continued representation affected the trial or sentencing outcome. The trial court 
should have eliminated that risk by removing Mauro as well as Williams. 
B. Maughan has no substantial interest in allowing Mauro to continue as his counsel. 
No interest in continued representation by these public defenders outweighed the 
reasons for removing Mauro. First, for the reasons argued in point IE, that result follows even 
under the Arguelles presumption in favor of Mauro's continued representation. 
Similarly, that result follows even applying the substitute considerations for which the 
State advocates in point IC.17 Most of the arguments made with respect to Williams apply 
17Again, the State recognizes that it did not make this argument in the trial court. 
However, as demonstrated in point I, it is properly before the Court as an alternative basis 
for affirming the trial court decision to disqualify Williams. If in affirming the part of the 
order on which the State won the Court reverses Arguelles, no reason exists not to apply 
that rationale to the part of the order on which the State lost. Indeed, if the Court does not 
follow that course, it may lead to legally inconsistent orders in the same appeal. That is, 
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with at least equal force to Mauro. 
Maughan and UACDL argue that removing Mauro for interviewing witnesses will chill 
competent representation. Appellant's Brief at 37-38; Amicus Brief at 15-18. The State 
agrees that it would be inappropriate to remove Mauro merely for interviewing witnesses, but 
that is not this case. Mauro was arrested for tampering with witnesses in this case. The 
unrefuted evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there was a "reasonable 
possibility" that Mauro and Cilwick led witnesses to believe that they should not talk to 
police. Removing Mauro on these facts will not chill counsel in this or other cases from 
interviewing witness. If it will chill anything, it will chill counsel from leading witnesses to 
believe that they should not speak to police or State's counsel.18 
the Court may affirm the trial court's order allowing Mauro to remain on the case based 
on case law that the Court overturned in affirming the order to remove Williams. 
18Maughan accuses the Spokane detective of arresting Mauro and Cilwick to keep 
them from interviewing the witnesses. Appellant's Brief at 37-38 n.19. UACDL 
similarly argues that the State has attempted to restrict the defense's access to witnesses, 
and that the Court should not permit the State to do so. Amicus Brief at 10-11. The 
accusations and suggestions are false. The State of Utah instructed no witnesses to refuse 
to talk to the defense. Spokane police arrested Mauro and Cilwick based on a report that 
those witnesses have not denied making. Nothing in the record supports the suggestion 
that the arrests were made at the State of Utah's behest, let alone to keep the defense team 
from interviewing the witnesses. Moreover, Mauro and Cilwick interviewed the 
witnesses before the arrest. Williams and Mauro's and Williams's attorneys have 
interviewed the witnesses extensively after the arrests and without any interference from 
the State of Utah. 
Maughan also claims that the State was trying to "pin" some offense on the 
defense team. He refers to the State's initial reliance on the allegations made by Elzinga 
that Mauro posed as a news reporter to get a statement from her. Maughan continues that 
the State relied on statements proven to be false. Appellant's Brief at 43-44. What 
Maughan fails to disclose is that the State relied on a report that Elzinga made to police 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision to 
remove Williams, but should reverse the decision to allow Mauro to remain on the case. The 
actual conflicts, the serious potential conflicts, the serious threat of undermining public 
confidence in this capital murder prosecution, and the built-in potential for reversal on plenary 
appeal or in post-conviction weighed heavily in favor of removing both counsel. Because the 
case is in its nascent stages and because the Statev did nothing to precipitate the events that 
triggered the disqualification issue, no substantial consideration militates in favor of allowing 
either counsel to remain on the case. 
DATED June 12, 2007. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for appellee and cross-appellant 
and withdrew that reliance as soon as additional investigation proved it to be incredible 
(R545-47;650A:14). 
Maughan further asserts that his mitigation specialist retained an attorney in the 
context of arguing that the State made unfounded accusations against his defense team. 
Appellant's Brief at 44. As demonstrated in the fact statement, she retained an attorney 
when the State's investigation revealed evidence that she had directed her secretary to 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 7 7 - 3 8 - 7 . Victim's right to a speedy trial 
(1) In determining a date for any criminal trial or other important criminal 
or juvenile justice hearing, the court shall consider the interests of the victim of 
a crime to a speedy resolution of the charges under the same standards that 
govern a defendant's or minor's right to a speedy trial. 
(2) The victim of a crime has the right to a speedy disposition of the charges 
free from unwarranted delay caused by or at the behest of the defendant or 
minor and to prompt and final conclusion of the case after the disposition or 
conviction and sentence, including prompt and final conclusion of all collateral 
attacks on dispositions or criminal judgments. 
(3)(a) In ruling on any motion by a defendant or minor to continue a 
previously established trial or other important criminal or juvenile justice 
hearing, the court shall inquire into the circumstances requiring the delay and 
consider the interests of the victim of a crime to a speedy disposition of the 
case. 
(b) If a continuance is granted, the court shall enter in the record the 
specific reason for the continuance and the procedures th&t have been taken 
to avoid further delays. 
Laws 1994, c. 198, § 8; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 13, eff. May I, 1995. 
Addendum B 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/6/05 CASE NQ._: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION PET. MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
PERSONS: 
LORRAINE W. RIMA, IF, 3/8/54 
RANDY L. WAGER, WM, 4/3/67, 723 E NEBRASKA, NO PHONE 
On 12/5/05 I received a request from the Box County Elder Utah Sheriffs 
Department asking that I contacted Wade G. Maughan's girlfriend, Lorraine 
Rima, and ask her questions about Wade's drinking habits. 
I contacted Rima at her residence at approximately 1130 hours. Rima was 
cooperative and agreed to speak with me. Rima told me that she talked to Wade 
yesterday (12/4/05) on the phone. He told her that things were going well, but he 
couldn't talk about specific stuff on the phone per directions of his attorney. 
Wade said he would be sending her a letter, telling her everything that he could. 
Rima said she has known Wade for 15-16 years. They have been living together 
since September 1991. 
Rima said Wade has always been a heavy drinker, but he quit drinking for 
several months about five years ago. This period only lasted about four or five 
months before he started drinking heavily again. 
Rima said Wade would go through periods where he would quit drinking for a 
couple of days, then start up again. Rima believed the night before Wade came 
to talk to police and never came home, he stayed up until 0200 or 0300 hours 
drinking a large quantity of beer. Rima said when she woke up in the morning. 
Wade was already up. She believed he got up about 0700 hours. 
Rima said when she walked into the kitchen, Wade was doing his daily chores 
and she noted there were several open beers on the counter. Rima did not know 
if Wade was drinking alcohol that morning. Rima said she was positive she 
never saw him actually drink any alcohol that morning. 
Rima did say she did not smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Wade's 
breath that morning, 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/6/05 CASE NO.: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION PET. MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
Rima told me approximately five or six years ago, she and Wade went to Utah. 
While at a party at a campground, Wade introduced her to a white male named 
Glen. Rima said Glen scared her and that he was a very scary looking person, 
Rima said Wade and Glen stepped off by themselves and had a very private, 
whispered conversation. When she approached them, they stopped talking 
immediately. Glen took Wade aside so that she couldn't hear what was being 
said. 
Rima mentioned a subject named Randy Wager, who has come to her since 
Wade's arrest. He said Wade told him about a robbery that had occurred when 
he was younger in Utah. 
Rima provided me with a description of Randy's address. 1 responded to that 
location and attempted to make contact. No one answered the door at that 
location. 1 did leave a note requesting a phone call. 
On 12/6/05 I checked my voice mail and found that I had received a phone call 
from a male identifying himself as Randy Wager who said he would speak with 
me. 
On 12/6/05 at approximately 0830 hours De t Madsen and I went to 723 E. 
Nebraska and contacted Randy Wager. The first thing Wager told me was that 
he had already spoken to Wade Maughan's attorney and investigator. They had 
told him not to speak with police. I informed Wager that he was a witness in this 
case, not a defendant, and that he did not have the right to remain silent. I told 
him that he could get himself into trouble for Obstruction of Justice charges. 
Wager then told me that he, his cousin Ashley and Lorraine Rima went to visit 
Wade in jail. Wade told them that he was with a friend of his,-Glen, and another 
subject he did not know the name of but described him as a blonde male, and 
they.aJLyvr^nttcu3*convenience store.* Wade told them that Glen got into an 
argument with the clerk at the convenience store over $10, so Glen stabbed the 
guy, killing him. Wager said this was all Wade told him, and that Wade did not 
tell him specifics about what he, Wade, had done. Wager was unable to look me 
in the eye and was very evasive during my questioning. 
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ADDITIONAL REPORT 
QAIEflDME; 12/6/05 CASE MO.: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION DET. MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
I provided Wager with my name and phone number and asked him to give that to 
the Utah investigators and attorney who were still supposed to be in Spokane, to 
interview additional people on today's date. 
I asked Wager if he knew where his cousin Ashley was. He said she was 
somewhere in Clarkston and he didn't know where, as the family was attempting 
to contact her to get her to come back to Spokane. 
Wager then remembered that while he was talking with Wade, Wade told them 
that he was drunk when the murder happened and he didn't remember anything 
about it until the police started showing him pictures on the day he was arrested. 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
DETECTIVE MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
Major Crimes Unit 
12/6/05 sc 
Addendum C 
STATEMENT OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE) REPORT NUMBER: 05-387533 
DEFENDANT: Richard P. Mauro. WM, 10/23/59 
DEFENDANT: Theodore T. Cilwicft W M , 12/06/54 
The undersigned, a law enforcement officer, competent to testify, states as follows; 
That he/she believes a crime was committed by the above named 
defendant/defendants in the City and County of Spokane, State of Washington, 
because: 
DETECTIVE MARK BURBRIDGE W I L ^ TESTIFY: 
He was assisting Box Elder County Utaih Sheritf Deputies with a homicide investigation 
involving Wade Maughan who was facing the death penalty for a robbery/homicide. 
Detective Burbridge will testify that Deputy Scott Lewis of the Box Elder County Sheriffs 
Dep t asked him to contact Lorraino Rima and conduct a followup interview- Detective 
Burbridge will testify that Ms, Rima told him that a friend of hers and Wade's by the 
name of Randy Wager had told her that while he was visiting Wade in jail after his 
arrest. Wade told him about the robbery and murder in Utah. Detective Burbridge will 
testify that on 12/05/05 he attempted tp contact Randy Wager at 723 E. Nebraska and 
found na one at home so he left a detailed note on the door requesting a phone call 
from Mr Wager. 
Detective Burbridge will testify that on 12/06/05 when he arrived at work, he found a 
phone message from Randy Wager saying he would be glad to speak with him about 
what Wade Maugban had told him while in jail. 
Detective Burbridge will testify he and Detective Madsen went to 723 E. Nebraska and 
contacted Wade Maughan and his mother Alta Raney in their residence. Mr. Wager 
immediately told Detective Burbridge ^hat Wade Maughan's attorney and a detective 
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from Utah told him not to talk to the police about what Wade had told them saying he 
could get in trouble* Wager said That the attorney and detective contacted him during 
the evening hours of 12/0505. 
Detective Burbridge will testify that JVte. Raney said she was present when this 
conversation occurred and heard the attorney and the investigator tell her son not to 
speak with the police. 
DETECTIVE T, H, MADSEN WILL TESTIFY: 
He conducted a followup interview wlthj Randy Wager and Alta Raney on 12/08/05 and 
Mr. Wager told him he had been vfsrteq by an attorney and an investigator who told him 
that he misunderstood the first two investigators and what they really told him was not 
to talk to ar\yon^ except the police. Mr. Wager told Detective Madsen h<5? is now 
confused, about what he was really told that day, but he doss remember telling the 
officers he had been told not to speak to the police, but he now believes he 
misunderstood the attorney and the investigator. Detective Madsen will testify he 
interviewed Alta Raney and she now remembers that the attorneys told them not to talk 
to anyone and they thought that meant including the police. Detective Madsen will 
testify to statements made by Randy Wager and Alta Raney during their first contact on 
12/06/05. 
RANDY WAGER WILL TESTIFY: 
On 12/05/05, he arrived home and found a note addressed to him from Detective 
Burbridge asking him to call him and leave a message reference being interviewed by 
3bout statements being made to him by Wade Maughan, Mr, Wager will testify that he 
left a voice message on Detective Burbridge's phone mail Indicating that he would talk 
with the police. Mr- Wager was contacted by Robert Maura and Theodore Gilwick at his 
residence on 12/05/05. Mr. Wagar \AfiU testify that he originally believed they had 
ordered him not to talk to the police. Mr, Wager now believes this was a 
misunderstanding and he was told not to talk to anyone except the police. Mr. Wager 
will testify that on 12/06/05 he was contacted at his residence by Detectives Burbridge 
and Madsen and he initially told them the attorneys from Utah had ordered him not to 
speak with the police. 
Randy Wager will testify that on 12/07/05, he was contacted by an attorney who 
discussed with him the conversations he had with the first set of attorneys and they told 
him it was a misunderstanding and those attorneys explained it was o.k. for him to talk 
to the police, but he shouldn't talk to anyone else. Mr, Wager now believes it was a 
misunderstanding. 
ALTA RANEY WILL TESTIFY: 
She told Detectives Burbridge and IVjadsen she was present when the first set of 
attorneys told her son, Randy Wager, not to talk to the police. Ms. Raney will testify 
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that she was also present when the second set of investigator and attorney showed up 
at her house and explained to her that they were confused about what the first set of 
attorneys had said and she now believes the first set of attorneys told them not to 
speak with anyone and they just assumed that Included the police. 
Detective Mark Burbridge will testify th^t he and Sg t Joe Peterson contacted Lorraine 
Rima at her residence on 12/D6/D5 and she was somewhat hostile on this contact. Ms, 
RTrna said Wade's attorney and a detectivo from Utah had taken letters and belongings 
that were hers without her permission- Ms. Rima then said that these attorneys had 
ordered her not to speak with The police and indicated she could go to jail if she did. 
Detective Burbridge will testify that Ms, Rima identified Kimberly Jeffreys as a friend, 
who was staying at the apartment. Ms. Jeffreys was present when these statements 
were made. Detective Burbridge will testify that he interviewed Ms. Jeffreys and to 
otatemente made fay her, 
LORRAINE RIMA W I L L TESTIFY: 
Ms. Rima will testify that on 12/Q5/0S she was contacted at her residence by Robert 
Maura and Theodore Cilwick who identified themselves as Wade Maughan's attorney 
and as a detective from Utah. Ms. Rima will testify that both subjects told her not to talk 
to the police and indicated she could go to jail. 
KIMPERIY JEFFREYS Wil l TESTIFY: 
She is a friend of Lorraine Rimafs and was staying at the apartment while she visited for 
several days, Ms. Jeffreys will testify she was present when the attorneys first visited 
with Ms. Rima and told her not to sepak with the police. 
Detective Burbridge will testify he interviewed Ms. Jeffreys a second t ime on 12/Q7/QS 
and she believes she was now confused and they said don't talk with anyone and she 
jumped to the conclusion that included the police, 
SGT. JOE PETERSON WILL TESTIFY: 
He was present on 12/06/05 at Lorraine Rirna's apartment whan Ms. Rima told 
Detective Burbridge that she had been ordered by the attorneys not to speak with the 
police. 
DETECTIVE MARK BURBRIDGE WILL TESTIFY; 
Detective Mark Burbridge will testify th^t on 12/14/05, Lorraine Rima came to the police 
station and consented to a videotaped;interview. Ms. Rima related that she remembers 
telling Detective Burbridge that the attorneys had ordered her not to speak with the 
police, but when asked if they had indicated she would be in trouble if she did, she said 
she didn't remember that occurring. Detective Burbridge will testify that later on during 
this interview. Ms. Rima indicated that at some point the attorney and detective from 
T-903 P 08/32 F-851 
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Utah told her she could go to jail if she talked about this incident Detective Surbridge 
wil l testify that during this videotaped interview, Ms. Rima seemed easily confused, but 
was adamant that the attorneys had told her that she was not to talk to the police. 
I cortfrfy (or declare) under penatty of perjury under the lawe of the State of 
Washington that the foregoing is true and correct (9A.72„G85) 
D A T E / g - ^ - ^ ^ PLAGE Spokane, WA SIGNATURE ^ ^ ~ ^ ^ ' 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/6/05 CASE NO.: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION PET, MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
PERSONS: 
LORRAINE W. RIMA, IF, 3/8/54 
RANDY L. WAGER, WM, 4/3/67, 723 E NEBRASKA, NO PHONE 
On 12/5/05 I received a request from the Box County Elder Utah Sheriffs 
Department asking that I contacted Wade G. Maughan's girlfriend, Lorraine 
Rima, and ask her questions about Wade's drinking habits. 
I contacted Rima at her residence at approximately 1130 hours. Rima was 
cooperative and agreed to speak with me. Rima told me that she talked to Wade 
yesterday (12/4/05) on the phone. He told her that things were going welt, but he 
couldn't talk about specific stuff on the phone per directions of his attorney. 
Wade said he would be sending her a letter, telling her everything that he could. 
Rima said she has known Wade for 15-16 years. They have been living together 
since September 1991. 
Rima said Wade has always been a heavy drinker, but he quit drinking for 
several months about five years ago. This period only lasted about four or fiva 
months before he started drinking heavily again. 
Rirna said Wade would go through periods where he would quit drinking for a 
couple of days, then start up again. Rima believed the night before Wade came 
to talk to police and never came home, he stayed up until 0200 or 0300 hours 
drinking a large quantity of beer. Rima said when she woke up in the morning. 
Wade was already up. She believed he got up about 0700 hours. 
Rima said when she walked into the kitchen, Wade was doing his daily chores 
and she noted there were several open beers on the counter. Rima did not know 
if Wade was drinking alcohol that morning. Rima said she was positive she 
never saw him actually drink any alcohol that morning. 
Rima did say she did not smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Wade's 
breath that morning. 
2 
SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/6/05 CASE NO.: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION DET. MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
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Rima told me approximately five or six years ago, she and Wade went to Utah. 
While at a party at a campground, Wade introduced her to a white male named 
Glen. Rima said Glen scared her and that he was a very scary looking person. 
Rima said Wade and Glen stepped off by themselves and had a very private, 
whispered conversation. When she approached them, they stopped talking 
immediately. Glen took Wade aside so that she couldn't hear what was being 
said. 
Rima mentioned a subject named Randy Wager, who has come to her since 
Wade's arrest He said Wade told him about a robbery that had occurred when 
he was younger in Utah. 
Rima provided me with a description of Randy's address. I responded to that 
location and attempted to make contact No one answered the door at that 
location. I did leave a note requesting a phone call. 
On 12/6/05 I checked my voice mail and found that I had received a phone call 
from a male identifying himself as Randy Wager who said he would speak with 
me. 
On 12/6/05 at approximately 0S30 hours De t Madsen and I went to 723 E. 
Nebraska and contacted Randy Wager. The first thing Wager told me was that 
he had already spoken to Wade Maughan's attorney and investigator. They had 
told him not to speak with police, I informed Wager that he was a witness in this 
case, not a defendant, and that he did not have the right to remain si lent I told 
him that he could get himself into trouble for Obstruction of Justice charges. 
Wager then told me that he, his cousin Ashley and Lorraine Rima went to visit 
Wade in jai l . Wade told them that he was with a friend of hisr Glen, and another 
subject he did not know the name of but described h im as a blonde, male* and 
they,all wentta,a»convenience store.- Wade told them that Glen got into an 
argument with the clerk at the convenience store over $10, so Glen stabbed the 
guy, killing him. Wager said this was all Wade told him, and that Wade did not 
tell him specifics about what he, Wade, had done. Wager was unable to look me 
in the eye and was very evasive during my questioning. 
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DATE/TjME: 12/6/05 CASE NO.: 05-353547 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION DET. MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
I provided Wager with my name and phone number and asked him to give that to 
the Utah investigators and attorney who were still supposed to be in Spokane, to 
interview additional people on today's date. 
I asked Wager if he knew where his cousin Ashley was. He said she was 
somewhere in Clarkston and he didn't know where, as the family was attempting 
to contact her to get her to come back to Spokane. 
Wager then remembered that while he was talking with Wade, Wade told them 
that he was drunk when the murder happened and he didn't remember anything 
about it until the police started showing him pictures on the day he was arrested. 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
DETECTIVE MARK BURBRIDGE 209 
Major Crimes Unit 
12/6/05 sc 
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that she was also present when the second set of investigator and attorney showed up 
at her house and explained to her that they were confused about what tho first set of 
attorneys had said and she now belieyes the first set of attorneys told them not to 
speak with anyone and they just assumed that included the police, 
Detective Mark Burbridge will testify th^t he and Sgt Joe Peterson contacted Lorraine 
Rima at her residence on 12/06/05 and she was somewhat hostile on th!s contact- Ms, 
Rfma said Wade's attorney and a detective from Utah had taken fetters and belongings 
that were here without her permission. Ms. Rima then said that these attorneys had 
ordered her not to speak with The police and indicated she could go to jail if she did. 
Detective Burbridge will testify that Ms, Rima identified Kimberiy Jeffreys as a friend, 
who was staying at the apartment. Ms. Jeffreys was present when these statements 
were made. Detective Burbridge will testify that he Interviewed Ms, Jeffreys and to 
statements made by her, 
LORRAINE RIMA WILL TESTIFY: 
Ms. Rima will testify that on 12/05/05 she was contacted at her residence by Robert 
Maura and Theodore Cilwick who identified themselves as Wade Maughan's attorney 
and as a detective from Utah. Ms. Rima will testify that both subjects told her not to talk 
to the police and indicated she could go to jail. 
K1MBERLY JEFFREYS WILL TESTIFY: 
She is a friend of Lorraine Rima's and was staying at the apartment while she visited for 
several days. Ms. Jeffreys will testify she was present when the attorneys first visited 
with Ms. Rima and told her not to sepak with the polios. 
Detective Burbridge will testffy he interviewed Ms. Jeffreys a second time on 12/07/05 
and she believes she was now confused and they said don't talk with anyone and she 
jumped to the conclusion that Included the police, 
SGT. JOE PETERSON WILL TESTIFY: 
He was present on 12/06/05 at Lorraine Rirna's apartment when Ms. Rima told 
Detective Burbridge that she had been ordered by tho attorneys not to speak with the 
police. 
DETECTIVE MARK BURBRIDGE Wl l f , TESTIFY; 
Detective Mark Burbridge will testify th^t on 12/14/05, Lorraine Rima came to the police 
station and consented to a videotaped;interview, Ms. Rima related that she remembers 
telling Detective Burbridge that the attorneys had ordered her not to speak with the 
police, but when asked if they had indicated she would be in trouble if she did, she said 
she didn't remember that occurring. Detective Burbridge will testify that later on during 




SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
PATE/TIME: 12/0S/05 CASE NO.: 05-387533 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: Tampering With A Witness 
FURTHER INVgSTlGATlQN: DETECTIVE JOE PETERSON #076 
On 12/06/05 at approximately 1230 hours, Detective Burbridge requested that l 
accompany him to 1325 W- Dean Apt. A, while ha spoke with Lorraine Rima. At 
that location, Lorraine Rima answered the door and told Detective Burbridge that 
she had been contacted by an attorney named Richard Maura and a second 
subject who had identified himself as a police detective. Rima said both of these 
people told her not to talk with the1 police about the investigation involving the 
homicide. Several other people were present when this occurred and they gave 
Detective Burbridge further information regarding this situation. 
At approximately 1700 hours. Detective Burbridge and I contacted Richard 
Mauro and a person named Thepdora T. Silwick, 12/06/54. W e identified 
ourselves as police officers and Detective Burbridge stated he wished to talk 
about their contacts with witnesse? on this date. Richard Mauro immediately 
said they would not speak with us. • Both subjects were arrested and l searched 
Mr. Silwick. Mr. Silwick had folded currency in his front pocket which I counted in 
front of him and found it to be $75. Both subjects were booked for tampering 
with a witness. 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
SGT. JOE PETERSON #07S 
MAJOR CRIMES UNIT 
3B 12^07/05 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/08/05 CASE NO.: 05-357538 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: Tampering With A Witness 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION: DETECTIVE T. H« MADSEN #366 
PERSON: Alta Raney, WF, 3/17/46 
Randy L Wager, WM, 4/03/67 
On 12/0S/Q5, myself and Sgt Peterson drove to 723 E. Nebraska to reinter/iew 
Randy Wager and Alta Raney. R^ney answered the door and advised Wager 
was in Holy Family Hospital because he had had a seizure earlier on that day 
after being interviewed by defense attorneys representing Richard Mauro, 
Theodore Cilwick and Wade Maughan, Alta allowed us into the residence. I told 
Alta I wanted to interview her further reference the first conversation she had 
overheard between her son, Randy Wager, and Cilwick and Mauro. 
Aha Raney told ma she was present when they were at "Stubby's" residence. 
She stated while they were there.; she heard Randy and Stubby talking to the 
investigator and the attorney abqut Wade. She also heard conversation by 
Randy that the police had already been by the E. Nebraska residence and were 
trying to contact them. The attorney told them that the police would most likely 
be trying to talk to them- The attorney and the investigator also told them not to 
talk to anyone about the case. She stated they believed they had been told not 
to talk to the police at that time. After 12/08/05, when a second group of 
attorney's contacted her and her son. Those attorneys explained there was a 
misunderstanding and it was o.le for them to talk to the police. Raney told me 
she was now confused and believes both she and her son must have 
misunderstood what the original attorneys told them. I asked her if the attorneys 
told them to talk to the police, Srje said no. The attorneys told them not to talk 
to anyone and they thought that meant including the police. I again asked her if 
that would have been the initial conversation where the attorney had already 
talked about the police contacting them. She stated yes. l asked if that was 
when the attorneys directed them not to talk to anyone. She stated yes. She 
stated after talking to the second group of attorneys on this day, she believed 
she have been mistaken as to what the first group of attorneys had told them, 
I asked her If she knew who the second group of attorneys were. She stated no 
and they told her they were frojn Salt Lake and were Wade's attorneys and 
worked with Mr. Mauro, the first ajttorney she had talked to, 
On 12/0S/05, myself and Sgt, Peterson interviewed Randy Wager at Holy Family 
Hospital Emergency Room- YVsger said he recalled talking to Detective 
Eurbridge and l earlier in the week. He admitted recalling telling us he had been 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
PATE/TIME: 12/08/05 CASE NO.: 05-387538 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: Tampering With A Witness 
FURTHER1NVESTIC5AT1QN: DETECTIVE T. H. MADSEN #366 
directed by Wade's attorneys hot tp talk to the police, I asked him what he had 
based that statement on and he told me he had based it on the following. 
Wager stated he had talked to Wade's attorney (Maura) and investigator 
(Cilwick) prior to talking to the polios. He knew police ware trying to contact him 
because of a note left by Detectivp Burbridg© on his door. When he talked to 
Mauro and Cilwick, he told both qf them that the police were trying to contact 
him- W^ger stated in the course df that conversation, he stated the police were 
looking for him. The attorney and the investigator said the police would probably 
be trying to get a hold of him- In tfae course of that conversation after the police 
were mentioned, he admitted the attorney and investigator directed them not to 
talk to anyone about the caso. After that conversation, he believed he had been 
instructed not to talk to the police, but now thinks he was in error. I asked why, 
l ie stated because on 12/03/05 two other attorneys cams to his mother's house 
and talked to both he and his mother. Those attorneys explained to him that it 
was most likely a misunderstanding. The attorneys were trying to represent 
Wade and the police would be talking to them. They did not have to talk to 
anyone without an attorney, but the attorneys on 12/08/05 told them to talk to the 
police. 
Wager stated he did not want to get Wade's attorneys in trouble or be a problem. 
He believed he may have misunderstood them. Wager then stated what he 
thought they meant was not to talk to anyone but the police. Again I told Wager 
to remember specifically what the first group of attorneys and investigator had 
told him. He stated they told us not to talk to anyone. J asked him if that 
happened after you had mentioned the police were trying to talk to you and he 
conceded that it did. I asked hiijn if he thought the second group of attorneys 
had tried to manipulate him as to what he had heard- He slated no. 1 asked 
Wager if he recalled looking at Detective Burbridge and telling us he had been 
directed not to talk to the police apd he stated yes. I asked rf he was lying at that 
t ime. He told me no. He had believed he had been instructed not to talk to the 
police, but after 12/08/05, he may have misunderstood them. That concluded 
my interview with Randy Wager. 
Wager told me after talking to the second group of attorneys, he also 
remembered Wade Maughan telljng him approximately one year ago about a 
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SPOKANE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
ADDITIONAL REPORT 
DATE/TIME: 12/08/05 CASE NO.: 05-387533 
CHARGE/INCIDENT: Tampering With A Witness 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION: DETECTIVE T. H. MADSEN #366 
robbery of a liquor etor© that Maughan had committed several years earlier. He 
claimed to recall nothing else about the homicide in Utah. 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
DETECTIVE T. H. MADSEN #36B 




INTERVIEW - LORRAINE RIMA 
December 14, 2005 
[Court LLC 
THE REPORTING GROUP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Lorraine, 
3 I've turning the video on. It is recording so we 
4 have it on tape. I do have your permission to record 
5 the interview, correct? 
6 MS. RIMA: (Inaudible.) 
7 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: It is about eleven 
8 o'crock in ttre morning. Present is L O T ran ne~Rrma, 
9 Scott --
10 MR. STAAB: Staab. 
11 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Staab, S-T-A-A-B? 
12 MR. STAAB: That's correct. 
13 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Ms. Rima's attorney. 
14 And so we're here solely today to talk about your 
15 interaction with Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick who were 
16 an attorney and investigator from Utah that came and 
17 talked with you and Randy Wagar? 
18 MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
19 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Do you remember my 
20 coming to your apartment with a bald guy, my 
21 sergeant? I introduced you, but I don't know if you 
22 remember that. 
23 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. Yeah, I do. 
24 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Do you remember what 
25 you told me when I came to the door there and I asked 
CitiCourt, LLC 
to talk to you that a f t e r n o o n ? 
MS. RIMA: H u h - u h . 
D E T E C T I V E B U R B R I D G E : Did you say 
s o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r to me like, "Mark, I can't talk to 
you a n y m o r e ; they told me I would be in trouble if I 
talked to y o u ? 
M S . RIMA: No, I didn't say I would get in 
tr o u b 1 e 
you"? 
D E T E C T I V E B U R B R I D G E "I can't talk to 
MS. RIMA: No. I just said that I 
can't -- they said I couldn't talk to n o b o d y . 
D E T E C T I V E B U R B R I D G E : You said I couldn't 
talk to the p o l i c e ? 
M S . RIMA: Y e a h . 
D E T E C T I V E B U R B R I D G E : Is that what you 
said? 
MS. RIMA: No, not the p o l i c e . That I 
can't i n t e r v i e w with them g u y s . I m e a n , they said 
that I w i l l go to jail if I ( i n a u d i b l e ) . He left 
on -- I d o n ' t even know what day he left. 
D E T E C T I V E B U R B R I D G E : The day prior to him 
l e a v i n g , p r i o r to me and Rusty and my s e r g e a n t , I 
came by. 
M S . RIMA: Y e a h . 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Knocked on your 
2 door? 
3 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
4 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: And Randy was 
5 sitting there? 
6 MS. RIMA: Oh, yeah, Randy was there, me 
7 and Maughan. 
8 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: And your friend from 
9 Montana was there? 
10 MS. RIMA: Yes. 
11 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Was her name 
12 Rebecca? Or what was her name again? I've got it 
13 written down on her form. 
14 MS. RIMA: Rebecca from Montana. 
15 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: She was the one that 
16 was visiting with the kids. 
17 MS. RIMA: Oh, yeah, my twins. That's 
18 Kim. 
19 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Kim. 
20 MS. RIMA: Kimberly. 
21 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I recall you saying 
22 and my sergeant recalls you saying, "I can't talk to 
23 the police. They told me I couldn't." 
24 MS. RIMA: They -- no. My attorney 
25 told -- not my attorney, but the dude said that I --
CitiCourt, LLC 
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he don't want me to talk to them. It would look 
better on my case, on me, so I can't. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: On you? How could 
you be in trouble? 
MS. RIMA: Well, I don't know. That's 
what I'm here for today. I'm thinking, what did I 
do? 
MR. STAAB: She may think she's in trouble 
because she's in a police interview setting so... 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Lorraine, you're not 
in any trouble, period. You're a witness and a 
witness only, just let me be clear. 
MS. RIMA: Okay. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You're not in any 
trouble in any manner, all right? 
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You never have been. 
You're a very nice lady. You've always been honest 
wi th me. 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You may get confused 
easily or -- but --
MS. RIMA: Yeah, I do a lot. I didn't 
take my medicine today and I'm kind of in a fog here. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: But you have never 
2 been in trouble with me ever. 
3 MS. RIMA: No. 
4 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I have always been 
5 honest with you and I think you try to be honest with 
6 me. 
7 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
8 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. After they 
9 were arrested, did they come back and see you or did 
10 different attorneys or investigators come and see 
11 you? 
12 MS. RIMA: It was another detective. I 
13 don't know his name, over there. 
14 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. And what kind 
15 of conversation occurred at the house? 
16 MS. RIMA: At my house? 
17 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Or where did it 
18 happen at? 
19 MS. RIMA: Let me think. I don't know. 
20 Who did you send? 
21 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: They day after they 
22 were arrested, I arrested the attorney and the 
23 investigator from Utah. 
24 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. That's because they 
25 came into house and they got my books and my cards 
CitiCourt, LLC 
and all my letters from Wade. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Do you remember 
talking to me about that? 
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You were kind of 
angry that they took your stuff? 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: You said they didn't 
have your permission --
MS. RIMA: Yes. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: - to take your 
stuff? 
MS. RIMA: Yes. They just wanted to look 
through it. But they took it all with them. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Is that the 
same time you told me that "I can't talk to you 
because they told me I can't talk with the police"? 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. After they took all my 
stuff, them guys told me, the guy right here. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: All right. The very 
next day, did a different investigator come and see 
you? 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: And what d i d he say 
t o you? 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 
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1 I MS. RIMA: He told me that they have the 
2 two guys in jail. I don't know what they were in 
3 there for. He told me that. 
4 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: And did he try to 
5 clarify what they meant or maybe clarify a 
6 misunderstanding with you? 
7 MS. RIMA: Huh-uh. 
8 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: No? 
9 MS. RIMA: No. 
10 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Anything else 
11 you want to tell me? 
12 MS. RIMA: No. Just that I'm worried 
13 about Wade and I don't think he'll ever come home 
14 ever. 
15 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Well, I'm not a 
16 judge or a jury and I'm not the prosecutor down 
17 there. So I don't know all the facts of the case, 
18 Lorraine. 
19 MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
20 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I told you what I 
21 knew when I came and saw you the day before all this 
22 started. 
23 MS. RIMA: Who is them two guys? 
24 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: One of them is one 
25 of Wade's co-counsel, he's an attorney, and the other 
CitiCourt, LLC 
is a private investigator working for that attorney. 
MS. RIMA: And there was a detective, a 
sergeant and -- a detective, sergeant, you and some 
other guy came over to see me. I've got their cards 
at home. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Huh. I would like 
to see them. 
MS. RIMA: Yeah, there's two more. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: What are they saying 
to you? 
MS. RIMA: They just said not to go get --
he told me not to go get really happy to get Wade 
home, he says, because he ain't coming home. Because 
I ask him that. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: The reason I ask you 
some of this is because Randy told us, Randy Wagar, 
your friend and Wade's friend? 
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: That the day after 
the attorneys were arrested he was visited by an 
investigator and an attorney --
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: -- from Utah who 
told him that it was a misunderstanding between the 
previous attorney and investigator and Randy, and 
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that they told him not to talk to anybody. 
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: But they had to talk 
to the police. And so I'm just wondering if that 
conversation occurred with you. 
MS. RIMA: Huh-uh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Nothing like that? 
MS. RIMA: No. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Do you think 
you misunderstood them at all when they talked to you 
that day? 
MS. RIMA: I knew about it. I just didn't 
want to tell them. I was embarrassed to talk because 
I didn't feel good. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Did you 
misunderstand them when they were talking about 
"Don't talk to anybody" or "Don't talk to the 
police"? 
MS. RIMA: I didn't even hear them say 
that. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: What's your mem --
what's your memory --
MS. RIMA: I need to stop. I need to take 
my medicine. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I'm sorry. What is 
CitiCourt, LLC 
1 I your memory of the exact wording they used with you 
2 I that day, "Don't talk to anybody" or "Don't talk to 
3 I the police"? 
4 MS. RIMA: They said I can't, not to talk 
5 to the policemen. 
6 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. 
7 MS. RIMA: And not to let them guys taking 
8 any more of my stuff at home. Because they didn't 
9 have a search warrant, they just took it. 
10 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: No. I'm talking 
11 about the guys that took your stuff? 
12 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. That's what I'm 
13 talking about. 
14 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. What did they 
15 say to you that day? What's your exact wording? 
16 MR. STAAB: If you remember. 
17 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: If you remember 
18 about what they said? 
19 MS. RIMA: I don't remember. 
20 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. 
21 MS. RIMA: I don't know. I'm upset with 
22 all this stuff. 
23 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I understand. You 
24 would like a nice quiet life and things are 
25 complicated. 
Ci t iCou r t , LLC 
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1 MS. RIMA: (Inaudible) in my house. 
2 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Okay. Anything else 
3 that you can think of, Lorraine, that I need to know? 
4 MS. RIMA: Huh-uh. 
5 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Anything that's 
6 concerning you that I can help you with? 
7 MS. RIMA: No. 
8 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: All right. 
9 MS. RIMA: Not at all. 
10 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: That was pretty 
11 painless, wasn't it? 
12 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
13 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Anything, any 
14 questions for me, Scott? 
15 MR. STAAB: Not at this time. Other than 
16 if you need to speak to her again you've got my card. 
17 I will gladly set time and place when you --
18 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I can't see a time 
19 we need to talk unless, of course, the prosecutor's 
20 office decides to file and then I'll be calling her. 
21 But if you would prefer I talk to Scott 
22 before I talk to you even just to stop by and say 
23 "Hi, have you heard from Wade," because you are his 
24 girlfriend, I am law enforcement. 
25 MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
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am ^^i IAA-\ 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: I understand the 
concerns there. But does Scott know we have 
a previous -- not a relationship, but a previous -- I 
don't want to say friendship either, but an 
acquaintance between each other prior to this? 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: She was a witness in 
a homicide transaction about a year ago. 
MR. STAAB: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: December 26 of '03 
and we got to -- and I talked to you probably almost 
a dozen times over a period of a couple of years --
MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: -- about stuff. So 
I knew her, I knew Wade and so --
MS. RIMA: We got pretty close 
(inaudible.) 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: -- (inaudible) what 
happened across the street she saw or -- she was 
actually a pretty important witness in that one so... 
MS. RIMA: Yeah. That baby died in my 
arms. 
DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: And resulted in a 
conviction, I think. So... 
MR. STAAB: Okay. 
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801.532.3441 
1 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: What kind of 
2 medication are you taking, Lorraine? 
3 MS. RIMA: Oh, gees. I've got about 13, 
4 14 medicines I got to take. 
5 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Which ones affects 
6 your memory or helps make things clearer for you? 
7 MS. RIMA: My Prednisone, when I take them 
8 they make me lose my memory. 
9 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Oh, okay. 
10 MS. RIMA: And then the other stuff don't 
11 bother me, you know, except when I take that so I can 
12 kind of (inaudible). 
13 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: How come you take so 
14 much medication? 
15 MS. RIMA: Because I've got lupus. 
16 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: Oh, I'm sorry. 
17 MS. RIMA: And that's (inaudible) 
18 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: (Inaudible). 
19 MS. RIMA: Uh-huh. Like yesterday and the 
20 day before I was so sick and now today I feel better. 
21 DETECTIVE BURBRIDGE: All right. That's 
22 it. We're done. Let me turn off the recording 
23 machine and I'll walk you guys out. 
24 MR. STAAB: Can I walk you home? 
25 MS. RIMA: I can walk over there. How do 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801 W7 ^441 
you get out of here? 
MR. STAAB: Right here 
let us out this way. 
MS. RIMA: Oh. 
(End of recordi ng.) 
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I. LANETTE SHINDURLING, a Registered 
Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify: 
That on January 25th, 2006, I transcribed 
a videotape at the request of the law firm BROWN, 
BRADSHAW & MOFFAT; 
That the testimony of all speakers was 
reported by me in stenotype and thereafter 
transcribed, and that a full, true, and correct 
transcription of said testimony is set forth in the 
preceding pages, according to my ability to hear and 
understand the tape provided; 
I further certify that I am not kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND 
25th day of January, 2006. 
OFFICIAL SEAL this 
.NETTE SMINDURLING, RPR/YIRR 
Utah L i c / n s e No. 103865-NZ-&01 
. „ ' ^ - ^ y r t f e ^ »Mi*»• v"v*** 
KnitA** PUBLIC 
U k t f U f E 5 H I N D U R U N G 
HCf40HrH CENTER 
WIUWAY. UT 84049 
VX COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JULY 1/.2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Addendum G 
B R O W N , BRADSHAW & MOFFAT, L .L ,P . 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1 0 W E S T B R O A D W A Y , S U J T E 2 1 0 
S A L T LAKE: C I T Y , U T A H 84101 
WWW.HROWNBKAUSHAW.COM 
TFI FPHONE M**K@B*OWNBRADSMAW,C0* FACSIMILE 
01) 532-5297 (801) 532-5298 
N N b l H R. BKOWIN 
MTC C. B R A D S H A W 
I U K R M n r r A T 
IN MAKib IALIAI LKRO December 27, 2005 
CHAEL T. HOLJL 
Fto Facsimile Transmission - (455J 734-3374 and (801) 399-9954 
Original to Follow Via First Class Mail 
Mr. H. Thomas Stevenson 
Mr. Brad C. Smith 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorneys 
Stevenson & Smith 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogdcn, Utah 84403 
Re: State v. Wade Maughan 
Gentlemen: 
I am in receipt of a letter from your office dated December 19,2005, addressed to my 
client Richard Mauro. Through this letter, your office has informed Mr. Mauro of your intent to 
seek his removal as defense counsel in the Slate of Utah v. Wade Maughan, Your expressed 
desire to seek Mr. Mauro's removal has apparently been prompted by recent reports from Det. 
Mark Burbridge of the Spokane Police Department. Our office represents both Mr. Mauro and 
Mr. Cilwick on all matters relating to the interview of witnesses in Spokane, Washington. 
Accordingly, in my capacity as Mr. Mauro's and Mr. Cilwick's attorney, please consider this 
letter my formal request for immediate production of all reports in your possession relating to 
Mr. Mauro, Mr. Cilwick and their interaction with witnesses in Mr, Maughan's case. 
As you evaluate your options, please consider the following: 
Det. Burbridge's decision to arrest my clients prompted an extensive and exhaustive 
investigation of the facts and circumstances thai preceded their incarceration. As part of that 
effort, investigators have interviewed every witness present at the time that Mr. Mauro and Mr. 
Cilwick met with Ms. Rina. The reported contents of Det. Burbridge's most recent reports 
regarding Ms. Rina's account of the initial interview with Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick do not in 
any way comport with what Ms. Rina and the others present have related to investigators about 
the meeting. In short, every witness has denied Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick identified themselves 
as "police officers" or as members of law enforcement. All persons, including Ms. Rina, were 
clear that Mr. Mauro was a lawyer acting on behalf of Mr. Maughan and thai Mr. Cilwick was a 
members of Mr. Maughan's defense team; neither Ms. Rina nor any other person present recall 
Mr. Mauro or Mr. Cilwick ordering or admonishing them not to speak to or cooperate with 
Mr. HL Thomas Stevenson 
Mr, Brad C.Smith 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorneys 
December 27, 2005 
Page 2 
members of law enforcement Ms. Rina and the other witnesses present Hat out deny that Mr. 
Mauro or Mr. Cilwick ordered them not to cooperate. While Det. Burbridge continues to report 
that my clients led witnesses to believe that they were members oflaw enforcement, one 
inescapable fact remains: Det, Burbridge identified Mr. Mauro, and thereafter telephoned him, by 
way of a business card Mr. Mauro left with Ms. Rina. Interestingly, that card identifies Mr. 
Mauro as a lawyer, not a cop. 
Ms, Rina's shortcomings as a witness are reportedly well known to authorities in the 
Spokane area. Apparently, one year ago, Ms, Rina was an essential witness for the prosecution in 
a child homicide case in Spokaiue. Our interviews with those familiar with the case reveal that 
Ms. Rina had limitations as a witness related to her memory. While Ms. Rina has consistently 
reported to our investigators that there was no wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Mauro and Mr. 
Cilwick, I cannot help but wonder, given the marked discrepancies reported by Det. Burbridge, 
whether her faulty memory is once again at play. 
Any effort by your office to remove Mr. Mauro as counsel will necessarily involve 
testimony from Ms. Rina and the other witnesses present Without exception, these witnesses 
have denied that there was wrongdoing of the type complained of by Del. Burbridge on the part 
of Mr. Mauro and Mr. Cilwick. The marked discrepancies between Burbridge's account and 
those of our investigators cause me to question many things, not the least of which is the 
credibility of the very witnesses that you will need to make your case for removal. 
Please understand that, to date, Det. Burbridge's actions have substantially interfered with 
Mr. Mauro's and Mr. Williams' efforts to represent Mr. Maughan. It is my sincere desire before 
additional action is taken that due consideration be given to the issues identified above and the 
significant ramifications to the constitutional rights of my clients and Mr. Maughan. 
Thank you for considering this letter. Please contact me with whatever questions* or 
concerns you may have. I look forward to further dialogue with your office on these matters. 
Sincerely, 
Marlta Moffat ^ ^ 
mc 
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Addendum H 
S c o t t C. Wi l l iams , L.L.C. 
Attorney a t Law 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 220-0700 Facsimile: (801) 344-3232 
December 15,2005 
H. Thomas Stevenson 
Deputy County Attorney 
Box Elder County Attorney's Office 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Re: State of Utah v. Wade Manghan 
Case No. 051100355 
Dear Tom; 
An update on a few matters: 
1 received the police reports that you sent, and am. happy to see that they support the 
proposition that allegations that criminal or improper conduct on the part of Rich and Ted are 
unsupported and unfounded, (I understand the statement by Randy Wagar has been subsequently 
explained as fc'his misunderstanding,") 
I am very concerned about the status of the contract in this case. In your letter to the 
Board last week you seemed to indicate that your office and/or Box Elder County intend to hold 
up the process of getting the contract executed. My contacts with the Board suggest that this 
would be inappropriate. (In the letter that you wrote to the Board, you reference paragraph 1 ,E. 
of the contract. If it is the same as other contracts which we have signed, paragraph I.E. makes it 
incumbent on the "Defenders'* to inform the uBoanf of any possible conflicis, and makes no 
reference to the prosecution,) The defense team has incurred significant fees and costs associated 
with this case. I ask you to please expedite the contract process so that we can work with 
confidence. 
As to the issue of conversion of discovery to electronic media: the firestorm related to the 
events in Spokane have wholly occupied our time. Additionally, without an executed contract 
related to representation in this case, we will not pursue cooperative endeavors which may result 
in costs for which we are responsible. For theses two reasons there is presently no continued 
effort to arrange for electronic conversion of discovery. Thus, we would appreciate all discovery 
that should be provided pursuant to Rule 16 at the earliest possibility, especially that which may 
pertain to the events and circumstances of the Spokane incident (As per your most recent letter, 
we expect that there must be police reports from the Box Elder Sheriffs Office related to the 
execution of the search warrant which led to statements by Mr. Maugjian which triggered the 
Y. UcS 
contact with Spokane police, as well as police reports regarding those contacts and follow-up 
contacts.) 
Thank you for your consideration of these matters at your earliest convenience. I look 
forward to our continued interaction in relation to this case. 
Sincerely, 
Scolt C. Williams 
Attorney for Wade Maughan 
Addendum I 
RICHARD P. MAURO (5402) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-9500 
Lawyer for Defendant 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD P. MAURO 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
WADE MAUGHAN, : Case No. 051100355 
Defendant. : Judge Ben Hadfield 
Richard P. Mauro first duly sworn on his oath deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah. I have been duly 
licensed since May, 1989. I graduated from the University of Utah College of 
Law in 1988. After graduation, I clerked at the Utah Court of Appeals from 1989 
to 1990. I accepted employment at the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association and 
worked at the defender office from 1990 to 1997. I also served as an adjunct 
professor at the University of Utah College of Law teaching trial advocacy from 
1994 to 2004. I served as President of the Utah Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (UACDL) from 2000 to 2001. I presently serve as co-chair of the 
UACDL Capital Defense Committee which is a committee within the 
organization that monitors and reviews pending capital cases, compiles pleadings 
unique to death penalty cases and makes those documents available to defense 
lawyers, and coordinates and organizes training materials and seminars to ensure 
compliance with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 and the American Bar 
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases. In October 2005,1 was an invited speaker at the UACDL 
Rule 8 Seminar held at Snowbird, Utah and lectured regarding the ethical 
considerations related to compliance with the American Bar Association 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death penalty 
Cases; 
2. I am currently a Rule 8 qualified lawyer in that I meet the criteria outlined in Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 for the appointment of counsel in indigent capital 
cases. I serve on the Utah Indigent Defense Trust Funds Board, which is a Board 
comprised of court representatives, county commissioners, division of finance 
personnel, prosecutors and defense lawyers. The Board reviews and administers 
funding and contract issues in capital cases filed in rural participating counties. I 
have served on the Board since its inception in 1999. As a Board member, I 
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participated in the drafting and revising of the contract used in indigent death 
penalty cases. I have also served on the funding subcommittee reviewing for 
approval every defense bill and expense related to capital defense representation. 
As part of my Board duties, I am uniquely familiar with the American Bar 
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases. Those Guidelines set forth a national standard for the 
performance of defense counsel in death penalty cases. Compliance with those 
Guidelines is mandatory and written into the contract meaning that appointed 
counsel must perform in accordance with Guideline standards; 
3. Mr. Maughan's case is the ninth capital case I have been appointed on as counsel. 
That number consists of eight trial level cases and one post-conviction case. All 
eight trial level cases were resolved with pleas to sentences less than death. In the 
post-conviction case, my client is presently on death row and his matter is pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court. In addition to that, I have served as counsel or 
co-counsel in at least twelve additional non-capital homicide cases, six of which 
were tried to a verdict; 
4. During the week of November 14, 2005,1 received a phone call from Rick 
Schwermer at the Utah Court Administrators Office, asking if I would be willing 
to accept the appointment in the case of State of Utah v. Wade Maughan. I 
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indicated that I would be willing to accept the court appointment in Mr. 
Maughan's case; 
5. On November 17, 2005,1 signed and forwarded to the court an appearance of 
counsel. Sometime during that week I spoke with Scott Williams, a Rule 8 
qualified attorney, about serving as co-counsel. Mr. Williams and I share office 
space in the same office building, but we are not law partners. Mr. Williams 
agreed to serve as co-counsel; 
6. The court scheduled the initial appearance in Mr. Maughan's case for Monday, 
December 5, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Ben Hadfield in Brigham City, Utah; 
7. On that day, Mr. Williams and I met at our office building, located at 43 East 400 
South in Salt Lake City sometime around 7:00 a.m. I parked my vehicle, a 2001 
gray Toyota Four-Runner, in front of my office, and Mr. Williams and I rode to 
Brigham City in his vehicle, a dark maroon Audi station wagon; 
8. On that day I wore a light gray suit, which I left on a hanger in my office after 
returning from court. At no time that day did I wear a leather jacket. Nor did I 
wear dark pants while in Brigham City. In fact, the entire time I was in Brigham 
City, I was wearing the light gray suit; 
9. Mr. Williams and I arrived in Brigham City sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 
a.m. We entered the courthouse and met briefly with our client in the holding 
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area. Mr. Cilwick, our investigator, was present with us at that meeting; 
10. The court called Mr. Maughan's case at approximately 9:10 a.m. We discussed 
scheduling matters with the court; 
11. After reviewing my cell phone records, I remember making a call to my office at 
9:18 a.m. I believe this call was made after court and lasted approximately four 
minutes; 
12. After court, Mr. Williams, Mr. Cilwick and I walked across the street to Amy 
Hugie's office. I spoke briefly to Ms. Hugie about the status of our contract in 
Mr. Maughan's case. Mr. Williams also spoke to Ms. Hugie about another case, 
unrelated to Wade Maughan's case; 
13. We spent approximately fifteen minutes at Ms. Hugie's office. We left her office 
sometime between 9:30 and 9:50 a.m. After leaving Ms. Hugie's office, the three 
of us walked back to the courthouse where Mr. Williams' and Mr. Cilwick's cars 
were parked. Mr. Williams and I entered his vehicle and drove directly to Salt 
Lake City. Mr. Cilwick and I later met up at the Salt Lake City airport at 
approximately 12:00 noon; 
14. Mr. Williams and I began the drive to Salt Lake City at approximately 9:50 a.m. 
We made no stops in Brigham City and neither attempted to interview nor 
interviewed any witnesses in Brigham City; 
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I remember receiving a call on my cell phone from my office at 10:29 a.m. We 
were close to my office in Salt Lake when that conversation took place. I arrived 
at the office sometime between 10:30 and 10:50 a.m. Upon arriving at the office, 
I changed out of my suit, hung the suit in my office, and completed several chores 
before leaving for the airport to fly to Spokane, Washington; 
Mr. Cilwick and I had a flight to Spokane at 1:10 p.m. on Monday, December 5, 
2005. I left my office to drive to the airport sometime between 11:15 a.m. and 
11:30 a.m. I arrived at the long term parking lot at 11:45 a.m. That time is shown 
on the parking receipt I received upon my return from Spokane on Thursday, 
December 8, 2005; 
On Friday, December 2, 2005, Mr. Stevenson sent three DVD disks to my office 
which contained taped interviews of Wade Maughan and Glenn Griffin. The 
Glenn Griffin DVD and one of the two Wade Maughan DVD interviews did not 
work. My office contacted Mr. Stevenson's office, who agreed to re-copy all 
three DVD's. Mr. Stevenson provided copies of the DVD's in court on December 
5, 2005; 
Mr. Williams, Mr. Cilwick and I had no discovery other than the DVD's prior to 
December 5, 2005. We had no information about possible witnesses in Brigham 
City and had no names, phone numbers, nor addresses of witnesses. In short, we 
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were unaware that any potential lay witnesses lived in Brigham City; 
19. The first time I learned of any possible witnesses in Brigham City was on 
Thursday, December 29, 2005 at approximately 4:45 p.m. when a heavy-set 
gentleman purporting to be Benjamin C. Rasmussen delivered a box of discovery 
materials to our office. The discovery consisted of police reports, affidavits, 
pictures, two videotapes and a cassette tape; 
20. Cheryl Elzinga's name does not appear in the discovery. Howard Elzinga's name 
appears in the discovery as a former roommate of Glenn Griffin in the late 1970fs. 
According to the report, Mr. Elzinga was not living in Utah in 1984 when Mr. 
Perry was killed. There is no connection in any of the reports between Cheryl 
and/or Howard Elzinga and Wade Maughan; 
21. I have never spoken with, called, or attempted in any way to make contact with 
Cheryl or Howard Elzinga. I neither went to her house, nor tried to call her house 
either on December 5, 2005 or at any other time. I have never represented myself 
to be a KUTV news reporter nor any other reporter at any time in my life; 
22. I do not own a white SUV nor was I in a white SUV in Box Elder County on 
December 5, 2005. I did not go to Ms. Elzinga's home, knock on her door, nor 
attempt to speak with her in any manner; 
23. My cell phone records indicate I made or received two calls between the hours of 
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9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on December 5, 2005, both of which were either calls 
made to my office or received from my office. 
DATED: January 18, 2005. 
^ueJ^^£ /T y^^j^-
Richard P. Mauro 
Subscribed and sworn to me this ifi day of January, 2006. 
NO 
My commission expires Jyffi-A? 
HEATHER STOKES 
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH 
^ 43 EAST 400 SOUTH 




RICHARD P. MAURO (5402) 
43 East 400 South 
'Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-9500 
Facsimile: (801) 364-3232 
SCOTT C. WILLIAMS (6687) 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)220-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-3232 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE CILWICK 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
WADEMAUGHAN, : Case No. 051100355 
Defendant. : Judge Ben Hadfield 
Theordore Cilwick first duly sworn on his oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a certified licensed investigator in the State of Utah (license number 
100268). I have been an investigator for nine years. I am a graduate of Syracuse 
University with a degree in newspaper journalism. Prior to working as a private 
investigator, I worked as a journalist for 21 years. During that time, I wrote 
articles and was a contributing author to several legal publications including the 
National Law Journal and the American Bar Association's Journal. I also worked 
for several different newspapers across the country. I was a court beat reporter in 
many of those jobs covering and reporting on trials in state and federal court. In 
the last reporter job I had with the Salt Lake Tribune, my primary assignment was 
the federal courts. 
2. As a licensed investigator I have worked on 18 capital cases, 16 trial level cases 
and 2 post-convictions cases. 
3. Near the end of November, 2005,1 was retained by Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams 
as an investigator in the case of State of Utah v. Wade Maughan. 
4. On Monday, December 5, 2005,1 met Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams at the Box 
Elder County Courthouse, sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.rn. The three 
of us met briefly with Mr. Maughan in the court holding area. 
5. I remember the judge calling the matter shortly after 9:00 a.m. Mr. Maughan's 
hearing lasted only a few minutes. The parties discussed scheduling matters and 
efforts at obtaining discovery. 
6. It is my custom and practice in all capital cases to obtain a complete copy of the 
discovery from the assigned attorney as soon as possible in a capital case. Prior to 
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December 5, 2005,1 had neither received nor reviewed any reports, photos, tapes 
or any other discovery. On Friday, December 2, 2005,1 picked up from Mr. 
Stevenson's office three DVD disks purportedly containing police interviews with 
Glenn Griffin and Wade Maughan. I was informed on that same day by Mr. 
Mauro that two of the three DVD's did not work and could not be played. 
7. On December 5, 2005,1 had no knowledge that Howard or Cheryl Elzinga were 
potential witnesses in either Wade Maughan's or Glenn Griffin's case. I did not 
know where Cheryl or Howard Elzinga lived and at no time have I interviewed or 
made any attempt to interview them. I have never called their home. 
8. After court, on December 5,2005, at approximately 9:20 a.m., Mr. Mauro, Mr. 
Williams and I walked across the street to the county attorney's office. Mr. 
Mauro spoke briefly with the county attorney about the contract in Mr. Maughan's 
case. Mr. Williams spoke to Ms. Hugie about a matter unrelated to Wade 
Maughan's case. 
9. The three of us left the county attorney's office sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 
9:50 a.m., walked back to the parking area in front of the courthouse. My vehicle, 
a 1998 dark blue Honda Civic, was parked next to Mr. Williams' vehicle, a 
maroon Audi station wagon. I remarked jokingly that Mr. Williams should wash 
his car as it was covered with salt. 
3 
away. This occurred sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 9:50 a.m. 
11. I entered my vehicle Lud dm\e 10 the Farmmtiton office of Adult Probation and 
Parole. I stopped at ihe AiJ<&P office for approximately five minutes. After 
leaving the office of AP&P. I drove 10 the Salt Lake City Airport as I was 
scheduled to fly with Mi. Mauro to Spokane, Washington to meet with witnesses 
in Mr. Maughan's case. 
12. I irrived at the airport somcthie' before 12:00 noon, obtained my ticket and went 
to the gate. I met Mr. Mauro at the gate and we flew together to Spokane, 
Washington. 
13 We interviewed several v i messes in Spokane, Washington. At no time did 1 tell 
any witness not to talk to CM nor to cooperate with police. 1 also never heard Mr. 
Mauro tell witnesses not to talk to or not lo cooperate with police 
DATED: February 6 . 2006. 
led Cilwick 
4 
Subscribed and sworn to me ihis J g _ cky o!" February, 20G6. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires. I- M- oy 
Notary Public 
KAREN BODRERO 
74 West 100 North 
Logan. UT 84821. 
MyCommiMkmQmkm 
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1 
February 10, 2006 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
DETECTIVE BURBIDGE: Okay. We're recording. 
Today is February 10th. It's about 2:30 in the 
afternoon. I am with Randy Wager and his attorney, 
Scott Hill. 
Randy, do I have your permission to record this 
interview today? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE BURBIDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. SMITH: Mr. Wager, my name is Brad Smith. 
I'rn-
MR. WAGER: Wager. Its Wager. 
MR. SMITH: Wager? Okay. Thank you. 
My name is Brad Smith, and I am a Deputy County 
Attorney from Box Elder County, Utah. You understand 
that we've charged Wade Maughan with capital homicide 
down in Utah. Do you understand that? 
MR. WAGER: Yes. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. And I understand you've been 
interviewed several different times with relation to 
this case. 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: And we have a couple of follow-up 
questions and want to get some background from you, if 
2 
1 that's okay. 
2 Okay. Can I ask you how you know Wade Maughan? 
3 MR. WAGER: I met him through my brother. 
4 MR. SMITH: When did you meet him? 
5 MR. WAGER: About six years ago. 
6 MR. SMITH: How did you meet him? 
7 MR. WAGER: Went over to his house. 
8 MR. SMITH: Here in Spokane? 
9 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
10 MR. SMITH: Did you form a friendship with him 
11 after that? 
12 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. How close was your 
14 friendship with Wade? 
15 MR. WAGER: Pretty close. I was there daily. 
16 MR. SMITH: At his house daily? Would that be 
17 daily for the entire six years you knew him, do you 
18 think? 
19 MR. WAGER: Yeah, pretty much. 
2 0 MR. SMITH: What kind of stuff did you and Wade 
21 do together? 
22 MR. WAGER: Sat there and played cribbage, 
2 3 watched football, drank beer. 
24 MR. SMITH: Just normal stuff. 
25 MR. WAGER: Just normal stuff. 
3 | 
1 MR. SMITH: Did you ever go on vacation with 
2 him or camping trips or... 
3 MR. WAGER: I went aamping with him once out at 
4 Long Lake. 
5 MR. SMITH: Is that here outside of Spokane? 
6 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
7 MR. SMITH: Any other vacations or trips with 
8 him? 
9 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
10 MR. SMITH: Tell me-if I could get some 
11 personal background on you, Mr. Wager. What do you do 
12 for a living, sir? 
13 MR. WAGER: I'm no SSL 
14 MR. SMITH: And how long have you been on SSI? 
15 MR. WAGER: About three years now. 
16 MR. SMITH: What did you do before you got SSI? 
17 MR. WAGER: Worked in Alaska. Worked for about 
18 15 years for a vacuum (inaudible). 
19 MR. SMITH: What did you do up in Alaska? 
2 0 MR. WAGER: Worked on a fishing boat and 
21 processing plants. 
22 MR. SMITH: I see. How long were you up there? 
2 3 MR. WAGER: About three years. 
2 4 MR. SMITH: So about three years ago, you were 
2 5 up there for three years? 
4J 
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1 MR. WAGER: No. This has been longer. 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. And who do you live with 
3 now? 
4 MR. WAGER: Me and my mom take care of my 
5 brother's children. 
6 MR. SMITH: I see. And that's here in town? 
7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: And so there's-in your house 
9 there's you and your mom and how many kids? 
10 MR. WAGER: And three teenage girls. 
11 MR. SMITH: Three teen-oh, wow. Okay. And 
12 how long have you been living there with your mom? 
13 MR. WAGER: I've been living with my mom for 
14 about three years. 
15 MR. SMITH: And how long have you had the girls 
16 there with you? 
17 MR. WAGER: Well, my mom's had the girls since 
18 they were a year-and-a-half. 
19 MR. SMITH: Okay. So more than ten years, 
2 0 she's had them? 
21 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. Before you lived with your 
2 3 mom, where did you live? | 
24 MR. WAGER: I lived in Clarkston. 
25 MR. SMITH: And that's-1 5 
1 MR. WAGER: In Noble's trailer park. 
2 MR. SMITH: Clarkston's south of here? 
3 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
4 MR. SMITH: It's on the Washington side of the 
5 border? 
6 (No audible response.) 
7 MR. SMITH: And whafs the-is there an Idaho 
8 town on the other-
9 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
10 MR. SMITH: Lewiston? 
11 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. And how long did you live 
13 there in Clarkston? 
14 MR. WAGER: About 15 years. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you know Wade when you 
16 lived down in Clarkston? 
17 MR. WAGER: No. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'm going to ask if-you're 
19 on SSL Do you have a disability? 
20 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
21 MR. SMITH: What's your disability? 
22 MR. WAGER: Slow learning. 
23 MR. SMITH: Any other disabilities? 
24 MR. WAGER: I have a bad back. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. Anything else? 
J 6 
1 MR. WAGER: No, 
2 MR. SMITH: Are you on any prescription 
3 medications today? 
4 MR. WAGER: No. 
5 MR. SMITH: Do you take-do you have any 
6 regularly prescribed prescriptions? 
7 MR. WAGER: Well, my Dilantin. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. And Dilantin is what kind 
9 of-
10 MR. WAGER: For my seizures. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. Tell me-I understand you 
12 have a condition that causes seizures. Can you tell me 
13 about that? 
14 MR. WAGER: Well, I got in a fight at a bar one 
15 night and-with my ex-wife's boyfriend and walked away 
16 from the bar and he hit me in the back of the head. And 
17 ever since then I've had seizures. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. And when did that happen? 
19 MR. WAGER: About three years ago. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. And since then you've had 
21 seizures periodically? 
22 (No audible response.) 
23 MR. SMITH: Are your seizures presently 
2 4 controlled with the Dilantin? 
25 MR. WAGER: Yeah, unless I get real stressed 
7 
1 out 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. What kind of things stress 
! 3 you out and bring on a seizure? 
4 MR. WAGER: Just stress. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
6 MR. WAGER: I don't know. Just complicated 
7 stuff. 
8 MR. SMITH: I see. Okay. Well, if you start 
9 to feel stressed here today, you be sure to tell 
10 Mr. Hill or myself and we'll do whatever we can to 
11 alleviate that. Okay? 
12 MR. WAGER: Okay. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. When was the last time you 
14 had a seizure? 
15 MR. WAGER: It was around December-early part 
16 of December. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. And was that-we'll come 
18 back and talk about that, but you haven't had one since 
19 then? 
2 0 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
21 MR. SMITH: Okay. And before the one you had 
22 in December of 2005, when was the one-last one you'd 
23 had before that? 
24 MR. WAGER: I can't remember. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you have any idea how 
J 8 
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1 often you end up haying seizures? 
2 MR. WAGER: Maybe once every three or four 
3 months. 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. And do you see a doctor who 
5 takes your blood to test your Dilantin levels regularly? 
6 MR. WAGER: Yeah. They haven't tested it in a 
7 while. It's been up where it's supposed to be. 
8 MR. SMITH: It's been up in the right range? 
9 Okay. 
10 MR. WAGER: Yeah. Since December it's been in 
11 the right range. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
13 MR. WAGER: It was low in December, so... 
14 MR. SMITH: Your Dilantin was low in December? 
15 (No audible response.) 
16 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they test you when you 
17 went to the hospital in December? 
18 MR. WAGER: Yes. 
19 MR. SMITH: Okay. Were you actually 
2 0 hospitalized for your seizure in December of 2005? 
21 MR. WAGER: No. 
22 MR. SMITH: Just went to the emergency room? 
2 3 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
2 4 MR. SMITH: How long were you there at the ER 
25 on that occasion? 
9 
1 MR. WAGER: Four or five hours. 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. Not-not a whole day, even? 
3 MR. WAGER: No. 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they give you any 
5 treatment in the emergency room? 
6 MR. WAGER: Yeah. They gave me Dilantin and-
7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If I may. Typical 
8 seizure medication is Valium to stop seizures. Isn't 
9 that what you said you had? He has a hard time 
10 remembering Valium. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. So they gave you Dilantin, 
12 they gave you some Valium? 
13 (No audible response.) 
14 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they give you anything 
15 else that you recall? 
16 MR. WAGER: Not that I can recall. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
18 MR. WAGER: Probably did give me pain 
19 medication, because I had a really bad headache after I 
2 0 had the seizure. 
21 MR. SMITH: That's pretty common, isn't i t -
22 MR. WAGER: Yeah.-
23 MR. SMITH: - to have a bad headache when you 
2 4 come out of the seizure? 
25 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
1 MR. SMITH: Can I ask you: When you have a 
2 seizure--I understand there are different kinds of 
3 seizures. There's grand mal kind of seizures, as I 
4 understand it, where maybe you lose control of your-
5 MR. WAGER: I have grand mals. 
6 MR. SMITH: Is that what you had on that 
7 occasion? 
8 (No audible response.) 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. Where did you have the 
10 seizure at? 
11 MR. WAGER: At home. 
12 MR. SMITH: At home? How did you get to the 
13 hospital? 
14 MR. WAGER: My mom took me. 
15 MR. SMITH: Your mom took you to the hospital 
16 on that occasion? You didn't drive yourself? 
17 MR. WAGER: No. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. Was anyone else at home when 
19 you had the seizure on that occasion? 
2 0 MR. WAGER: The girls, but-I can't remember if 
21 the attorneys were there or not 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. Had you had visitors that 
2 3 day, the attorneys or anyone else? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: Well, the last seizure I remember 
2 5 having in front of anybody was I had it in front of 
11 
1 Charlie—I can't think of his last name-and another 
2 guy. 
3 MR. SMITH: But that wasn't the December 2005 
4 seizure, was it? 
5 MR. WAGER: I can't remember. I've got short-
6 term memory. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. Fair enough. 
8 MR. WAGER: I can't remember very well. 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
10 MR. WAGER: Especially when it comes to having 
11 seizures, I don't remember going into the seizure, I 
12 don't remember coming out of the seizure. 
13 MR. SMITH: As I understand grand mal seizures, 
14 sometimes you can injure yourself pretty severely, 
15 because either-maybe you bite your tongue or if you're 
16 flailing around, you can break bones or injure yourself. 
17 Did you have any of those kind of injuries in December? 
18 MR. WAGER: Yeah. No. 
19 MR. SMITH: Not in-
2 0 MR. WAGER: I've broke my shoulder from having 
21 seizures before. 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. But in December of '05, did 
2 3 you have any physical injuries from your seizure? 
24 MR. WAGER: I bit a hole through my tongue. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. You bit your tongue pretty 
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1 bad? Did you have to have it stitched up or anything? 
2 MR. WAGER: No. They said it wasn't bad enough 
3 to have to have stitches. 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. And who told you that, the 
5 doctors at the ER? 
6 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall when Wade got 
8 arrested here in December of 2005? 
9 MR. WAGER: I went over to Stubby's to see 
10 him-her and Wade that day, and she said-
11 MR. SMITH: Just so we're clear, Stubby is 
12 Lorraine Rima?' 
13 MR. WAGER: Yeah. Right. 
14 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
15 MR. WAGER: Yeah. I went over there to their 
16 house and she said that Wade had walked over here to 
17 talk to some police about a stabbing that had happened 
18 somewhere here in Spokane, from what I understood, and 
19 he never came back. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. After you became-did she 
21 tell you that Wade had been arrested? 
2 2 MR. WAGER: He called while I was there. 
2 3 MR. SMITH: I see. Who did he speak with? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: He talked t o -
25 MR. SMITH: To Stubby? 
13 
1 MR. WAGER: -Lorraine. 
2 MR. SMITH: You can call her what you're 
3 familiar with— 
4 MR. WAGER: Okay. 
5 MR. SMITH: -just so we're clear on who that 
6 is. 
7 MR. WAGER: All right. Stubby. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. And then she told you after 
9 she'd talked with him that he had been arrested? 
10 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
11 MR. SMITH: Did she tell you what he had been 
12 arrested for? 
13 MR. WAGER: Well, I could pretty much tell when 
14 she started crying that it was something serious. 
15 MR. SMITH: Did she say-did she tell you that 
16 it had anything to do with Utah or did you still think 
17 it was something that happened here in Spokane? 
18 MR. WAGER: She said it was something that 
19 happened in Utah. 
2 0 MR. SMITH: Did she tell you what the charge 
21 was against him? 
22 MR. WAGER: Not right off. 
2 3 MR. SMITH: Did she at any point during that 
2 4 day tell you what the charge was? 
25 MR. WAGER: Yeah, she did, after she calmed 
14 
1 down. 
2 MR. SMITH: What did she tell you? 
3 MR. WAGER: She said that he was being held for 
4 accessory to murder. 
5 MR. SMITH: Did she tell you that it was on a 
6 Utah case? 
7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did she tell you anything 
9 else about what Wade was facing at that point? 
10 MR. WAGER: Huh-uh. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. After Wade was arrested, did 
12 there come a time when you met with some attorneys from 
13 Utah? 
14 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
15 MR. SMITH: Do you recall who you met with? 
16 MR. WAGER: I can't remember their' names now. 
17 It's been too long. 
18 MR. SMITH: If you heard their names, would you 
19 remember them? 
20 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
21 MR. SMITH: Did you meet with a guy named David 
2 2 Finlayson? 
2 3 MR. WAGER: Is he an attorney or a private-
2 4 MR. SMITH: Mr. Finlayson is, as I understand 
2 5 it, an attorney. But I don't know if he ever met with 
15 
1 you or not, I'm just wondering if you know his name. 
2 MR. WAGER: Okay. I don't recognize that name. 
3 MR. SMITH: What about a Scott Williams? 
4 MR. WAGER: Scott Williams. 
5 MR. SMITH: You met with Scott Williams at some 
6 point? 
7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: What about-
9 MR. WAGER: I think they're the ones that came 
10 to Lorraine's house. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. What about a Richard Morrow? | 
12 MR. WAGER: Maybe that's him, Richard Morrow. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. How about a Ted Silwick? 
14 MR. WAGER: I'm not too good with names. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Fair enough. But you think 
16 Morrow-of the names I've listed, is Morrow the most 
17 likely one? 
18 MR. WAGER: Yeah. I know there was a Richard 
19 or Rick or something. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. So you remember the first 
21 name more than the last name? 
22 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
23 MR. SMITH: Okay. The-I want to focus for a 
2 4 minute on the first meeting you had with those 
2 5 attorneys, whoever they were that came up from Utah. 
16 
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1 Okay? Where was that meeting at? 
2 MR. WAGER: At Lorraine's house. 
3 ^R. SMITH: And who all was there? 
4 MR. WAGER: Me and Lorraine, Lorraine's son. 
5 MR- WAGER: What's Lorraine's son's name? 
6 MR-WAGER: Waylon. 
7 MR- SMITH: Waylon. Do you know what his last 
8 name is? 
9 MR-WAGER: Azure. 
10 MR. SMITH: Waylon Azure? Okay. So you, 
11 Lorraine, Waylon? 
12 MR. WAGER: Sarah, my mom. 
13 MR. SMITH: Who's Sarah? 
14 MR. WAGER: Waylon's girlfriend. 
15 MR-SMITH: Okay. So your mom, Sarah--
16 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
17 MR-SMITH: -who else? 
18 MR. WAGER: That's it. 
19 MR- SMITH: Okay. So there was-let me make 
2 0 sure I got the list again. Lorraine, Waylon, Sarah, you 
21 and your mom. 
22 M^ WAGER: Right. 
23 MR. SMITH: And then how many attorneys or 
2 4 other people came to visit you all there? 
25 MR. WAGER: Just two. 
17 
1 MR. SMrTH: Okay. Did they tell you that he 
2 was potentially facing the death penalty down in Utah? 
3 MR. WAGER: No, they didn't. 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they explain anything 
5 about what a capital murder charge was? 
6 MR. WAGER: No. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you understand that Wad< 
8 was potentially facing the death penalty? 
9 MR. WAGER: Most people that are in a case like 
10 that usually do, don't they? It's always that. 
11 MR. SMITH: Is that your understanding? 
12 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. Fair enough. What else did 
14 they talk with you all about? 
15 MR. WAGER: Just what kind of things we did 
16 and-
17 MR. SMITH: What kind of friendship you had 
18 with him? 
19 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they tell you anything 
21 else? 
22 MR. WAGER: No. 
23 MR. SMITH: Did they tell you specifically what 
2 4 they were doing, that they were—the guy that said he 
25 was an investigator, what did he tell you about that? 
1! 
1 MR. SMITH: Two people? What-
2 MR. WAGER: A private detective and-I think 
3 that's What he was, a private detective--and one of 
4^  wade's attorneys. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. And, again, I'm going to ask 
6 you, do you recall what their names were? 
"7 ' MR. WAGER: No. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you think that's the time 
9 when you met the attorney whose first name was Rick or 
10 Richard? 
11 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. What did they talk about 
VJ NN\tt^ o\tf 
14 MR. WAGER: They just talked about what Wade 
15 was like- About the normal questions you guys are 
16 asking. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they explain to you what 
18 charges Wade was facing? 
19 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
30 MR. SMITH: What did they tell you? 
i l MR. WAGER: They told us that he was being 
22 charged with capital murder. 
23 MR. SMITH: Do you know what capital murder 
2 4 means? 
25 MR. WAGER: No, not really. 
18 
1 MR. WAGER: He just said that he was trying to 
2 help Wade, and so did the other guy. 
3 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did the other guy tell you 
4 he was Wade's attorney? 
5 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
7 MR. WAGER: He was one of Wade's attorneys* 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Excuse me. Did they tell 
9 you anything else on that occasion? 
10 MR. WAGER: They said just don't discuss the 
11 case with anybody. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. Is that the-who said that, 
14 MR. WAGER: Both of them. 
15 MR. SMrTH: Okay. So they each said, "Don't 
16 discuss the case with anybody"? 
17 MR. WAGER: Right. 
18 MR. SMITH: Were those the exact words they 
19 used? 
20 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
21 MR. SMITH: Okay. And each of them said it 
22 once, or did they say it moire than once? 
23 MR. WAGER: Well, they kind of just agreed with 
2 4 each other, you know. I mean, they both didn't say it, 
2 5 they said, "Just don't discuss the case with anybody," 
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1 SO... 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they say anything else? 
3 MR. WAGER: I can't remember. 
4 MR. SMITH: Did they tell you that the police 
5 would be getting in contact with you? 
6 MR. WAGER: No, they didn't tell me that the 
7 police would be getting in contact with me at all. 
8 MR. SMITH: Did they tell you that you could 
9 expect to have anyone else come visit you about this 
10 matter? 
11 MR. WAGER: Yeah, they said that we could 
12 expect other attorneys and stuff to contact us on this. 
13 MR. SMITH: Did they explain that to you at the 
14 same time they were telling you to not discuss the case 
15 with anyone? Was that before or after or what was the 
16 order, if you remember? 
17 MR. WAGER: I canft remember. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
19 MR. WAGER: Like I said, I -
2 0 MR. SMITH: Were those-when they told you that 
21 other people would be coming to visit with you, was that 
22 in the same part of the conversation where they told you 
2 3 not to discuss the case with anyone? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. You just don't recall which 
21 
1 came first and which carne-
2 MR. WAGER: Right 
3 MR. SMITH: -second? Okay. Fair enough. 
4 About how long did that-that meeting where-
5 the five of you and the two guys from Utah, how long did 
6 that last? 
7 MR. WAGER: It wasn't the five of us, it was 
8 just the two guys and me and Lorraine. 
9 MR. SMITH: Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I 
10 thought you told me that-
11 MR. WAGER: No. 
12 MR. SMITH: -your mom-
13 MR. WAGER: Waylon and them-you just asked who 
14 was there. 
15 MR. SMITH: Oh, okay. Well, then tell me-
16 okay, then let's back up. That's-I appreciate you 
17 clarifying that. 
18 So the five of you were there at the house when 
19 the two guys came. Who was involved in the conversation 
2 0 with them? 
21 MR. WAGER: Me and Lorraine. 
22 MR, SMITH: Okay. So just you and Lorraine and 
2 3 the-Lorraine's son and his girlfriend and your mom, 
2 4 where did they go? 
2 5 MR. WAGER: They were just sitting in the 
22 
1 living room, watching TV. 1 
2 MR. SMITH: Where were you all? J 
3 MR. WAGER: We were in the dining room. j 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. And can you describe the I 
5 house for me? I've never been there, so... I 
6 MR. WAGER: Well, the living room's here and 1 
7 the dining room's over here. 1 
8 MR. SMITH: So- j 
9 MR. WAGER: We were in the back part of the i 
10 dining room. 1 
11 MR. SMITH: -the two rooms are right next to 1 
12 each other? 1 
13 MR. WAGER: Yeah. J 
14 MR. SMITH: Is there a door in between the two?! 
15 MR. WAGER: No. I 
16 MR. SMITH: Is it just an open passageway? 1 
17 MR. WAGER: Yeah. j 
18 MR. SMITH: I see. About how far, would you | 
19 say, where you were in the dining room was from where I 
2 0 the other folks were in the living room? 1 
21 MR. WAGER: Oh, probably 15, 20 feet. j 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. Were they close enough that! 
2 3 they could have overheard you, the folks in the living j 
24 room? 1 
2 5 MR. WAGER: I don't think they were even paying! 
23 i 
1 attention. I 
2 MR. SMITH: What were they doing? 1 
3 MR. WAGER: Watching TV. I 
4 MR. SMITH: Do you recall what time of day it 1 
5 was that- 1 
6 MR. WAGER: It was at night. 1 
7 MR. SMITH: So when you say "night," like 8:00 J 
8 in the night or midnight or... I 
9 MR. WAGER: No, it was earlier than that. 1 
10 About 7:00. I 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall what day it 1 
12 was that this meeting occurred? I 
13 MR. WAGER: No. ] 
14 MR. SMITH: Do you recall what day of the weekl 
15 it was? | 
16 (No audible response.) J 
17 MR. SMITH: Do you remember what the folks inj 
18 the front room were watching on TV? I 
19 MR. WAGER: Nope. I 
2 0 MR. SMITH: Okay. After tjie attorneys left, J 
21 what did you do? |J 
22 MR. WAGER: Oh, we sat there for a while and I 
2 3 then we went home. 1 
2 4 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you discuss what the I 
2 5 attorneys had said? fj 
24 
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MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. When you say you "just sat 
there," did you go back in the living room with the 
other three, you and Lorraine? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you have any 
conversation at all about what you'd discussed with the 
attorneys? 
MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Did you discuss Wade's situation at 
all? 
MR. WAGER: Well, we always discuss Wade's 
situation, me and Stubby do. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. And did you that night? 







And do you know how long Stubby and 
Wade-as I understand it, before his arrest, Stubby and 
Wade lived together. Is that correct? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: Do you know how long they had lived 
together? 
MR. WAGER: About 17 years. 
25 
MR. SMITH: Okay. So they were close, like a 
married couple almost? 
(No audible response.) 
MR. SMITH: Okay. After you had this meeting 
with the attorneys from Utah, when was the next time you 
met with any attorneys or investigators about Wade's 
case, do you recall? 
MR. WAGER: In December. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Was it like a day later? A 
week later? 
MR. WAGER: Like I said, I can't remember. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall-you can't 
remember when you met with anybody; is that what you 
meant? 
MR. WAGER: Right. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall what the next 
meeting was, even if you can't remember when it was? 
Did you meet with Detective Burbidge or other people 
from Utah, or do you recall? 
MR. WAGER: I think it was Burbidge and another 
cop. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. And where was that meeting 
at? 
MR. WAGER: My house. 



























(No audible response.) 
MR. SMITH: Were you expecting them? 
MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Had they called ahead or anything? 
MR. WAGER: He left a note on my door. 
MR. SMITH: "He" being who? 
MR. WAGER: Mark Burbidge. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. And what did the note say? 
MR. WAGER: It just said his name and his phone 
number and how I could contact him. 
MR. SMITH: Did it identify him as a police 
officer? 
MR. WAGER: I can't recall. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you still have the note? 
MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. So he left a note and what 
did you do when you had the note? 
MR. WAGER: I called the number. 
And did he set up a time to come MR. SMITH: 
visit you? 
MR. WAGER: 
time or not. 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. WAGER 
I can't remember whether we set a 
Okay. 
I'm not really sure about that. 
MR SMITH: Let's go forward, then, to when he 
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1 showed up. Who was it exactly that showed up? 
2 MR. WAGER: Mark Burbidge and another officer. 
3 I can't remember his name. 
4 MR. SMITH: Would you remember it if you heard 
5 it? 
6 MR. WAGER: I doubt it. 
7 MR. SMITH: If I said Madsen or Peterson? 
8 MR. WAGER: Yeah, Madsen. I think that was it. 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. And you see Detective 
10 Burbidge here with us today? 
11 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
12 MR. SMITH: Had you known Burbidge before that? 
13 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
14 MR. SMITH: You'd newer met him before? 
15 (No audible response.) 
16 MR. SMITH: Okay. So they showed up at your 
17 house. What did he-what did you discuss with him? 
18 Well, let me interrupt you for a minute. 
19 When Detective Burbidge and the other police 
2 0 officer came to your house, who was there? 
21 MR. WAGER: Me and my mom. 
22 MR. SMITH: Anyone else? 
23 MR. WAGER: No. 
2 4 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did your mom sit in on the 
2 5 meeting with you and the two police officers? 
28 
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1 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. So it was the four of you in 
3 the conversation? 
1 4 (No audible response.) 
5 MR. SMITH: Tell me what you discussed with 
6 Detective Burbidge and the other officer. 
7 MR. WAGER: Oh, they just asked me about Wade. 
8 And I started answering questions and they told me that 
9 I was basically lying, so... 
10 MR. SMITH: What did they say? 
11 MR. WAGER: Well, he just said he didn't think 
12 I was telling him the truth. 
13 MR. SMITH: What is it you told him when he 
14 said he didn't think you were telling him the truth? 
15 MR. WAGER: Things about-in the jail, what 
16 Wade was telling me. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. Had you-by the time he came 
18 to your house, meaning the two detectives, had you 
19 already been to visit Wade at the jail? 
20 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
21 MR. SMITH: Okay. • 
22 MR. WAGER: We went to visit him about-well, 
23 the first visiting day that we could after he was 
2 4 arrested. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. We'll come back and talk 
J 2 9 
1 about that conversation in a moment. But you're just 
2 saying that Burbidge or the other officer accused you of 
3 lying to them about what you had discussed-what you 
4 were telling them about the discussions at the jail? 
5 MR. WAGER: Yeah. They just said that I-they 
6 didn't think I was being completely honest with them. 
7 MR. SMITH: Did they tell you why they thought? 
8 MR. WAGER: I can't remember. 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they accuse you of lying 
10 about anything else? 
11 MR. WAGER: Not that I can remember. About 
12 what? 
13 MR. SMITH: When they told you they didn't 
14 think you were being completely honest-excuse me-what 
15 was their demeanor? 
116 MR. WAGER: I don't know. Like they wanted me 
17 to spit out something more that I didn't know, because-
18 MR. SMITH: Werethey-
19 MR. WAGER: - I didn't know. 
20 MR. SMITH: I see. Okay. Were they real angry 
21 and upset and hollering and screaming? 
22 MR. WAGER: No. They were kind of toned about 
23 it, but I didn't like being called a liar in my own 
2 4 house. 
2 5 MR. SMITH: Sure. That's understandable. When 
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1 you say they were "toned" about it, what does that—I 
2 don't know what that means. 
3 MR. WAGER: Well, just attitude change. You 
4 know, how you talk to somebody if you go to discuss 
5 something differently, the tone of your voice changes, 
6 you know. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. So you noticed that their 
8 voice changed a little bit? 
9 (No audible response.) 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. Were they-were they angry? 
11 MR. WAGER: No, didn't seem angry. 
12 MR. SMITH: Were they aggressive with you? 
13 MR. WAGER: They just—I don't know. I felt 
14 like they were trying to get-that they were trying to 
15 get me to-trick me into saying something that I didn't 
16 know. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. But they-were they being 
18 real pushy with you or bullying? 
19 MR. WAGER: A little pushy. I wouldn't say 
20 bullying. 
21 MR. SMITH: Okay. You wouldn't say bullying? 
22 MR. WAGER: No. 
23 MR. SMITH: Okay. What else did they talk 
2 4 about with you? 
2 5 MR. WAGER: Just things about Wade. 
3 1 J 
1 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they-
2 MR. WAGER: What was discussed. 
3 MR. SMITH: What was discussed .with Wade? 
4 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they discuss with you 
6 the conversation you had with the attorneys previously? 
1 7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: What did they discuss with you ' 
9 about that? 
10 MR. WAGER: They come over to question again 
11 and I told them that we weren't supposed to talk to 
12 anybody. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. So what-let me make sure I 
14 understand whatyou just told me. You said they came 
15 over to question you again. Was this the first time 
16 Burbidge and the police officer had come to your house? 
17 MR. WAGER: The second time. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. So let's stick with this 
19 first conversation for just a minute. Okay? Did they 
2 0 discuss on that occasion what you had talked about with 
21 the attorneys previously? 
22 MR. WAGER: Yeah. I think we just told them 
23 that-what we had been telling everybody all along. I 
2 4 mean— 
25 MR. SMITH: Which was what? 
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MR. WAGER: About Wade's life and-
MR. SMITH: Did you tell them you'd been told 
not to talk to anybody about the case? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: What was their reaction to that? 
MR. WAGER: Well, they said that they were 
going to go and arrest the attorneys for--I can't 
remember what it was. Something involving the case, 
saying that we couldn't talk to them. But my 
understanding was that I wasn't supposed to talk to 
anybody. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
MR. WAGER: I thought that meant the police. 
That was my own judgment of what was going on -
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
MR. WAGER: -that I wasn't supposed to talk to 
anybody, and that meant the police, too. 
MR. SMITH: I understand what you're saying. I 
want to be very clear. When you met with the attorneys 
from Utah, as I understand what you've already told me-
and I want you to correct me if I'm wrong, what they 
told you was, "Don't talk to anybody about the case." 
Is that correct? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they say anything else 
33 
about who you should or shouldn't talk to? i 
MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. So when they said, "Don't 
talk to anybody," you thought that meant anybody? 
MR. WAGER: Right, anybody. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. And those are the~those are 
the words that they used, "Don't talk to anybody"? 
MR. WAGER: "Don't discuss this with anybody." 
MR. SMITH: And they told you that-
MR. WAGER: They told us not to discuss it with 
anybody over the phone, don't discuss it with Wade. 
MR. SMITH: Don't discuss it with anyone? 
MR. WAGER: Don't discuss it with anybody. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. .And so you understood that 
to mean just what it said? 
MR. WAGER: Everyone. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. I just want to be very dear 
on that. If they told you something different, we need 
to know about that. 
MR. WAGER: No, they didn't tell me anything 
different 
MR. SMITH: Okay. What were you-skipping back 
now to the first meeting you had with the officers, when 
you told them that that's what you'd been told, "Don't 
talk to anybody," what was the officers' reactions? 
34 
MR. WAGER: Oh, they got pissed off because we 
wouldn't talk to them. And they went and they arrested 
the attorneys. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. How did you become aware 
that the attorneys had-had got arrested? 
MR. WAGER: Because the police told us that 
they were going to go arrest them. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Okay. Can you recall 
anything else about this first meeting you had with the 
police officers? 
MR. WAGER: That's pretty much it. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
MR. WAGER: Just things about what was 
discussed in the jail and-
MR. SMITH: Okay. And let's—I want to come 
back to that jail conversation, but let's move forward 
for a minute. Okay? 
After the police officers left, what was your 
next encounter with either officers or people from Utah 
about this case? 
MR. WAGER: Now, explain that again. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. As I understand what you've 
told me, you had a meeting with the attorney and the 
investigator from Utah. 
MR. WAGER: Right. 
35 
MR. SMITH: Then Burbidge and some other 
Spokane police officer came to your house and talked to 
you. 
MR. WAGER: Right. | 
MR. SMITH: Were there any other meetings with 
either attorneys or people from Utah or Spokane officers 
after those two meetings? 
MR. WAGER: I had another meeting with-just 
last week I had a meeting with— 
MR. SMITH: Some other attorney from Utah? 
MR. WAGER: -someother-
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
MR. WAGER: -attorney from Utah. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Not counting that meeting, 
back in December, before Christmas, did you have any 
other meetings with attorneys from Utah? 
MR. WAGER: No. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. So they never came back 
and~no other-after Morrow and the investigator got 
arrested, did anyone come talk to you when they got 
arrested, that day or the ne>xt couple of days? 
MR. WAGER: Yeah. Charlie came and talked to 
me. 
MR. SMITH: Who's Charlie? 
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1 MR. SMITH: He's an attorney here in town? 
2 Charlie-do you know his— 
3 MR. WAGER: I can't remember his last name. 
4 MR. SMITH: Do you know his last name, Mark? 
5 (No audible response.) 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. So an attorney named Charlie 
7 came to talk to you. Was he your attorney? 
8 MR. WAGER: No. 
9 MR. SMITH: What did Charlie have to say? 
10 MR. WAGER: Because I told them that I didn't 
11 understand a lot of the questions that were being 
12 asked-
13 MR. SMITH: By whom? 
14 MR. WAGER: By anybody. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Fair enough. 
16 MR. WAGER: The attorneys, the police. I 
17 didn't understand the way that I should answer the 
18 questions, so he told me that I should get representa-
19 tion to have an attorney present. 
20 MR. SMITH: This is what Charlie told you? 
21 MR. WAGER: Yeah. He said I should have an 
22 attorney present when anybody questions me. 
23 MR. SMITH: Okay. Was-when Charlie came t o -
24 did he come to your house to visit you? 
25 MR. WAGER: Yeah, he came to my house. 
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1 MR. SMITH: Okay. Who else was present when 
2 Charlie visited with you? 
3 MR. WAGER: It was just Charlie. 
4 MR. SMITH: And you? 
5 MR. WAGER: And my mom. 
6 MR. SMITH: And your mom. Okay. And did you 
7 know Charlie before this? 
8 MR. WAGER: No. 
9 MR. SMITH: You'd never met him before? 
10 (No audible response.) 
11 MR. SMITH: Did he tell you who he was? 
12 MR. WAGER: Yeah, he told me who he was. 
13 MR. SMITH: And what did he tell you? 
14 MR. WAGER: He told me that he was an attorney 
15 here in Spokane-
16 MR. SMITH: Did he say-
17 MR. WAGER: -and that he'd been assigned to 
18 this-he was helping out some attorneys in Utah over 
19 here, so... 
2 0 MR. SMITH: I see. 
21 MR. WAGER: Because they can't be there and 
2 2 here at the same time, so... 
23 MR. SMITH: Certainly makes sense. 
2 4 MR. WAGER: That's what he was doing. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did he-do you know if he 
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1 worked for a law firm? 
2 MR. WAGER: I don't know. 
3 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did he tell you who he 
4 represented? 
5 MR. WAGER: He said he was representing Wade. 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did Charlie arrange for an 
7 attorney for you? 
8 MR. WAGER: No. 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. He just told-he just gave 
10 you some advice, that you should have an attorney 
11 whenever you're questioned from now on? 
12 MR. WAGER: Right 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you follow that advice? 
14 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
15 MR. SMITH: And who did you get? 
16 MR. WAGER: Scott Hill. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. And when did you retain 
18 Mr. Hill? 
19 MR. WAGER: I think it was just before I left 
20 for Salt Lake. 
21 MR. HILL: If you don't mind me-I don't have 
22 my calendar here. 
23 MR. SMITH: That's fair enough. 
24 MR. HILL: He made an appointment, came in and 
2 5 seen me-it had to be around maybe the 12th of 
39 J 
1 December-
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. So-
3 MR. HILL: -something like that. Sometime 
4 around there. 
5 MR. SMITH: Is that your recollection also, 
6 Mr. Wager? 
7 MR. HILL: And I'll confirm the exact dates, if 
8 you want. 
9 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Hill. I appreciate 
10 that 
11 In any event, it sounds like well before 
12 Christmas-
13 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
14 MR. SMITH: -that you went and saw Mr. Hill. 
15 Okay. And did you do that because of Charlie's advice? 
16 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
18 MR. WAGER: And for my own protection, you 
19 know. 
2 0 MR. SMITH: Did you feel like you needed 
21 protection? 
22 MR. WAGER: Well, I felt like I was being-
2 3 every time they asked me questions, like they were 
2 4 trying to trick me into saying something that shouldn't 
2 5 have been said or -
1 40 
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1 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
2 MR. WAGER: I don't know, just -
3 MR. SMITH: Fair enough. Let me turn to a 
4 different topic for a minute. 
5 In some of the papers that we've seen in this 
6 case, someone has said that you had your seizure in 
7 December in front of some officers from the Spokane 
8 Police Department. Is that true? At your house. 
9 MR. WAGER: No. I had my seizures in front of 
10 some attorneys. 
11 MR. SMITH: Do you recall who the attorneys 
12 were? 
13 MR. WAGER: Charlie and another attorney was 
14 there. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Was this the same visit you 
16 were telling me about with Charlie and your mom was 
17 present, also, and there was another attorney present 
18 with Charlie? Is that correct? 
19 (No audible response.) 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
21 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
22 MR. SMITH: Was that other attorney a 
2 3 Washington attorney or a Utah attorney? 
24 MR. WAGER: I think he was a Utah attorney. 
25 MR. SMITH: Can you describe him for me? Let 
4 1 
1 me ask you some better questions. 
2 About how old would you say he was? 
3 MR. WAGER: Probably my age. 
4 MR. SMTTH: Which is? 
5 MR. WAGER: Mid-30s, late 30s. 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. So 35 to 40? 
7 (No audible response.) 
8 MR. SMITH: What build? 
9 MR. WAGER: Oh, skinny. Smaller than me. 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'd say skinny and smaller 
11 than me, but that includes just about everybody. 
12 How tall was he? 
13 MR. WAGER: I don't know. I'd say he was 
14 probably about 5'9". 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. What color of hair? 
16 MR. WAGER: I can't remember what color of 
17 hair. 
18 MR. SMITH: Do you recall how he had his hair 
19 styled? Long? Short? 
20 MR. WAGER: Short. 
21 MR. SMITH: Close-cut? 
22 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
2 3 MR. SMITH: Do you recall if it was blond or 
2 4 brown or red? 
2 5 MR. WAGER: It could have been any of those 
A : 
1 colors. 
2 MR. SMITH: Any of those? Okay. Did he 
3 Introduce himself when he came in, tell you what his 
4 name was? 
5 MR. WAGER: Actually, I think Charlie 
6 introduced him. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
8 MR. WAGER: And I can't remember his name. 
9 MR. SMITH: If I said Williams-Scott Williams, 
10 does that sound at all familiar? 
11 MR. WAGER: Might have been it. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. What about-I don't-if you 
13 don't remember, that's-that's a perfectly good answer, 
14 "I don't remember." 
15 How about Dave Finiayson? 
16 (No audible response.) 
17 MR. SMITH: Okay. But in any event, you had 
18 this conversation with these two, Charlie and the other 
19 attorney and you and your mom? 
2 0 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I want to make sure 
21 we're talking about the same thing here. Do you 
2 2 remember the day you had your seizure? Do you remember 
2 3 (inaudible) and then you went down? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
2 5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Because I wasn't sure 
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1 about that. \ 
2 MR. WAGER: Yeah. I-I--my mom had hollered 
3 downstairs and said that there was some attorneys there 
4 to talk to me. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
6 MR. WAGER: So I came up and sat down in the 
7 chair, lit a cigarette and had a seizure. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. And this was the same time 
9 they told you to make sure you get an attorney to 
10 represent yourself? 
11 (No audible response.) 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they tell you anything 
13 else? 
14 MR. WAGER*-Huh-uh. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. And you went into a seizure 
16 right in front of them? 
17 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
18 MR. SMITH: Okay. What did they do, do you 
19 know? 
2 0 MR. WAGER: Oh, I guess-Charlie said I scared 
21 the hell out of them and they took my cigarette out of 
22 my hand and put it out. 
2 3 MR. SMITH: And your-did they help you to the 
2 4 car or... 
2 5 MR. WAGER: No. I--I was only out for just a 
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1 few minutes, I guess. 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. Were they there when you 
3 started coming-
4 MR. WAGER: It wasn't a real bad, bad seizure, 
5 it was just like a mini mal. 
6 MR. SMITH: A mini mal or a petit mal, 
7 something like that? 
8 MR. WAGER: Yeahf petit mal seizure. I t wasn't 
9 one of my real bad ones. 
10 MR. SMITH: I see. Were they there when you 
11 came to? 
12 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. And was-is that when they 
14 said, 'You scared us-scared the hell out of us"? 
15 MR. WAGER: Yeah. They-they said, "No way, 
16 I'm not going to ask you any questions today," so... 
17 MR. SMITH: They left? 
18 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
19 MR. SMITH: Were any police officers there at 
20 that time? 
21 (No audible response.) 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. After they left, what did 
2 3 you do? Is that when you went to the hospital? 
24 MR. WAGER: Went to the hospital, yeah. I 
2 5 wasn't feeling very well. 
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1 MR. SMITH: Well, that's-that's 
2 understandable. 
3 " About what time of day was it you went to the 
4 hospital? 
5 MR. WAGER: Oh, it was probably around noon. 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. And you figured you were 
7 there for— 
8 MR. WAGER: I mean, I went right after they 
9 left. 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. And you figured you were at 
11 the hospital for six-five, six hours? 
12 (No audible response.) 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We need to switch that? 
15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: About 20 minutes. 
16 MR. SMITH: Did you have any visitors while you 
17 were at the hospital? 
18 MR. WAGER: Yeah, I had a couple officers come 
19 in there and wanted to question me. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. Do you recall who they were? 
21 MR. WAGER: The-Madsen or whatever. 
22 MR. SMITH: Was Burbidge with him? 
23 MR. WAGER: It's the gentleman-no, he wasn't 
2 4 with them. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
4( 
1 MR. WAGER: It was the officer that's-that was 
2 with him when I first met him. 
3 MR. SMITH: Okay. So it was the same two that 
4 had come-that~it was Madsen and the officer who was 
5 with Burbidge the first time Burbidge came; is that what 
6 you're saying? 
7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. So some officer you'd never 
9 met and this officer you'd met with Burbidge? 
10 MR. WAGER: Right. 
11 MR. SMITH: I see. Okay. Did-were they able 
12 to question you there at the hospital? 
13 MR. WAGER: No. 
14 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
15 MR. WAGER: I told them I wasn't going to 
16 answer any questions because I was under-I had Valium 
17 in me, painkiller in me. They'd just pumped me full of 
18 Dilantin. I was just disoriented and I told them-they 
19 wanted me to write out a written statement and I told 
20 them, "No, I'm not going to do that because I'm under 
21 all this medication and I'm not going to sign anything, 
2 2 I'm not going to say anything." 
2 3 MR. SMITH: What was their reaction to that? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: They just said, "Okay," and~ 
25 MR. SMrTH: Were they-were they angry, pissed 
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1 Off? 
2 MR. WAGER: Well, I can't really remember. 
3 MR. SMITH: Okay. Fair enough. How did you 
4 get home from the hospital that day? 
5 MR. WAGER: My mom came and got me. 
6 MR. SMITH: Okay. I want to be, again, very 
7 clear about this. The day you had your seizure, you 
8 saw-officers came to see you at the hospital. Did they ] 
9 come to see you anywhere else other than at the 
10 hospital? 
11 MR. WAGER: No, they came to see me at the 
12 hospital. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. And so you had the seizure 
14 in front of Charlie and the Utah attorney? 
15 (No audible response.) 
16 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did they offer to give you 
17 any medical assistance? 
18 MR. WAGER: They didn't really know what to do. 
19 MR. SMITH: Okay. I guess they flunked their 
20 Boy Scout first aid. Okay. 
21 When you-we talked-you mentioned a couple of 
2 2 times you went to see Wade at the jail. When you 
2 3 visited Wade in the jail, was it here in Spokane? 
24 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
25 MR. SMITH: How many times did you go to visit 
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1 Wade at the Spokane jail? 
2 MR. WAGER: Twice. 
3 MR. SMITH: Two times. Who was-Iet's talk— 
4 let's focus for a minute on the first time, okay? 
5 MR. WAGER: All right. 
6 MR. SMITH: Who was with you the first time you 
7 went to see Wade at the jail? 
8 MR. WAGER: Me, Stubby and Ashley. 
9 MR. SMITH: Who's Ashley? 
10 MR. WAGER: My niece. 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. And where does Ashley live? 
12 MR. WAGER: With me. 
13 MR. SMITH: Okay. So she's one of the three 
14 girls that's there in your house? 
15 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
16 MR. SMITH: How old is Ashley? 
17 MR. WAGER: 14. 
18 MR. SMITH: Did she know Wade before all this 
19 happened? 
20 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
21 MR. SMITH: Is she the oldest of the three? 
22 Youngest? 
23 MR. WAGER: No. | 
24 MR. SMITH: Middle? 
25 MR. WAGER: Middle. ! 
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1 MR. SMITH: Okay. When you went there the 
2 first time, what did you visit with Wade about? 
3 MR. WAGER: Well, we just talked about why he 
4 was in jail. 
5 MR. SMITH: Did he discuss the Utah case at all 
6 at that-on that occasion? 
7 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
8 MR. SMITH: What did he tell you about it? 
9 MR. WAGER: Well, I just told hlm-I said, 
10 "What the hell they got you locked up for?" And he 
11 said, "Weir-he says, "They got me in here for 
12 accessory to murder." 
13 MR. SMITH: Did he know what they were talking 
,14 about when they charged him with that? Or did he talk 
15 to you about it? 
16 MR. WAGER: No. 
17 MR. SMITH: Did he explain anything to you 
18 about what had happened in Utah? 
19 MR. WAGER: No, he didn't explain anything to 
20 me about that. He just said that some guy got murdered 
21 in a convenience store. 
22 MR. SMITH: Did he say anything else? 
23 (No audible response.) 
24 MR. SMITH: Did he say he was there when the 
2 5 guy got murdered in the convenience store? 
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1 MR. WAGER: He said they showed him pictures of 
2 a bunch of stuff. 
3 MR. SMITH: Did he talk to you about being in 
4 the convenience store either in this first interview or 
5 the second time you went to see him? Did he ever talk 
6 to you about some dispute that Wade-pardon me. Strike 
7 all that, let me start over. 
8 Did he ever talk to you about a man named Glenn 
9 Griffin? 
10 MR. WAGER: Yeah. Yeah, He said he had an 
11 argument with the clerk over ten bucks. 
12 MR. SMITH: When you say "he," you mean Wade or 
13 Glenn. 
14 MR. WAGER: Glenn. 
15 MR. SMrTH: Okay. Did Wade say he was there to 
16 see the argument? 
17 MR. WAGER: Yeah, he said he was there to see 
18 the argument. 
19 MR. SMITH: What-did he explain what happened 
20 in the argument? 
21 MR. WAGER: No, he didn't really explain why he 
22 had the argument. He said Glenn hit the guy. 
23 MR. SMITH: What else did he say? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: He said the guy behind the counter 
2 5 had brought out a weapon or something. 
5 1 J 
1 MR. SMITH: Did he say what kind of a weapon? 
2 MR. WAGER: Like a screwdriver. 
3 MR. SMITH: Okay. What else did he say? 
4 MR. WAGER: And was taking it after Glenn. 
5 MR. SMITH: And what else did he say? 
6 MR. WAGER: And he said he thought Glenn was 
7 just hitting the guy. 
8 MR. SMITH: Did he explain anything else? 
1 9 MR. WAGER: Dust that Glenn beat the guy up. 
10 MR. SMITH: Did he talk about anything else 
11 with respect to the guy that was behind the counter? 
12 MR. WAGER: No, except for it was just over ten 
13 bucks. 
14 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did he talk about-anything 
15 about how they-if they tied the guy up? 
16 MR. WAGER: No. 
17 MR. SMITH: Did he mention anything about 
18 stabbing the guy? 
19 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
20 MR. SMITH: Did he mention anything about 
21 finding some cord or something to tie the guy up with? 
\i2 (No audible response.) 
23 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did Wade explain that he was 
2 4 there when this argument over the ten bucks occurred? 
25 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
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1 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
2 MR. WAGER: He said he was there when the 
3 argument over ten bucks occurred. 
4 MR. SMITH: Did he talk about anyone else other 
5 than Wade, Glenn and the guy? 
6 MR. WAGER: There was some guy that they had 
7 picked up hitchhiking that was drinking with them that 
8 day. 
9 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did he describe what that 
10 guy looked like? 
11 MR. WAGER: I think he said he had long hair. 
12 MR. SMITH: Did he describe the hair color? 
13 MR. WAGER: Blond. 
14 MR. SMITH: Okay. So a long-blond, long-
15 haired guy? 
16 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
17 MR. SMITH: Did he explain whether he knew who 
18 that blond, long-haired guy was? 
19 MR. WAGER: No. He said he'd never met him. 
20 He was just hitchhiking and him and Glenn picked him up. 
21 MR. SMITH: I see. Did they-did he explain 
22 where he and Glenn picked him up? 
23 MR. WAGER: No, he didn't explain where they 
2 4 picked him up, he just said they picked him up. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did-have you ever been down 
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1 to Utah-
2 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
3 MR. SMITH: -Mr. Wager? 
4 MR. WAGER: Never been there. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. So you've certainly never 
6 been to Brigham City, Utah? 
7 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. So you've never seen where 
9 they're talking about? 
10 (No audible response.) 
11 MR. SMITH: Do you know where Wade grew up? 
12 MR. WAGER: Utah. 
13 MR. SMITH: You don't know where in Utah? 
14 Okay. 
15 MR. WAGER: No. 
16 MR. SMITH: Have you ever heard him mention 
17 Hyrum? 
18 MR. WAGER: Huh-uh. 
19 MR. SMITH: Okay. Now, did you discuss-was 
2 0 what-we just went over about the different things Wade 
21 told you about this incident in Utah. Was that the 
22 first time you went to visit him at the jail, the second 
23 time or both? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: The first time. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. What did you discuss the 
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1 second time you went to visit him? 
2 MR. WAGER: We just went to visit him. 
3 MR. SMITH: Just stuff t o -
4 MR. WAGER: That's when we were told— 
5 MR. SMITH: -cheer him up and-
6 MR. WAGER: -not to discuss anything with Wade 
7 or... 
8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did someone tell you that 
9 your conversations at the jail were monitored? 
10 MR. WAGER: That had been recorded, so... 
11 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
12 MR. WAGER: I kind of gathered that. 
13 MR. SMITH: Jails are not good places for 
14 confidential conversations, are they? 
15 MR. WAGER: Right. 
16 MR. SMITH: After your first visit at the jail, 
17 have you told anyone else, any of the Utah attorneys 
18 that have come to visit you, about what Wade told you at 
19 the jail? 
2 0 MR. WAGER: Yeah, I told the attorneys that 
21 came to see us. 
22 MR. SMITH: Was that Morrow and the other guy 
23 or Charlie and the other guy? 
2 4 MR. WAGER: Yeah, Morrow and the other guy. 
25 MR. SMITH: Okay. So you told them about this 
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1 discussion you'd had with Wade about what had happened 
2 in Utah? 
3 MR. WAGER: Right. 
4 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you-did you have an 
5 understanding or do you know when all this stuff Wade 
6 was talking about occurred? Like was it last— 
7 MR. WAGER: Like in -
8 MR. SMITH: -year? 
9 MR. WAGER: -1980 something, he said. 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. So Wade told you that it was 
11 back in-some year in the 1980s? 
12 MR. WAGER: Yeah. He said he was-he was 
13 supposed to be 20 or 21 years old or something like 
14 that. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Now, I understand-well, let 
16 me back up because I guess I want to know what you 
17 understand, not what I understand. 
18 Did you have any other meetings with any Utah 
19 attorneys before Christmas other than what we've already 
20 talked about? 
21 MR. WAGER: No, I don't think so. 
22 MR. SMITH: Okay. Since Christmas, up until 
23 today, you've told me that you had a meeting with Utah 
2 4 attorneys about a week ago where they took a written-or 
2 5 they took a statement that was with a court reporter 
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1 here; is that right? 
2 MR. WAGER: Yeah, and a video camera. 
3 MR. SMITH: And a video camera. Okay. Other 
4 than-and I'm going to refer to that as the deposition. 
5 Okay? Is that a word you're familiar with at all? 
6 MR. WAGER: No. 
7 MR. SMITH: Is that what they called it? 
8 MR. WAGER: I can't remember what they called 
9 it. 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. Well, I'm going to-if I say 
11 "deposition," I'm talking about that-that particular 
12 interview. Okay? Other than that deposition, have any 
13 Utah attorneys talked to you since Christmas? 
14 MR. WAGER: No. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Who arranged that 
16 deposition? 
17 MR. WAGER: The attorneys from Utah, I guess. 
18 MR. SMITH: How did you find out about it? 
19 MR. WAGER: Well, I found about from you. 
20 MR. SMITH: Scott called and told you. Okay. 
21 Where was that deposition at? 
22 MR. WAGER: Downtown at the-well, downtown 
23 somewhere. 
2 4 MR. SMITH: If I said that it was at the 
25 Federal Defenders' Office-
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1 MR. WAGER: Yeah. Yeah, that's where it was. 
2 MR. SMITH: Okay. Did you know where that was 
3 before you had that deposition? 
4 MR. WAGER: Nope. 
5 MR. SMITH: Just gave you an address and told 
6 you to go to some office and you went there? 
7 MR. WAGER: We followed him down-
8 MR. HILL: Actually, met at my office first and 
9 they followed me down. 
10 MR. SMITH: Okay. Excellent. Thank you. 
11 And who went down with you besides Mr. Hill? 
12 MR. WAGER: My mom-
13 MR. SMITH: Anyone else? 
14 MR. WAGER: -and Lorraine. 
15 MR. SMITH: Okay. So your mom and Lorraine 
16 went down? Did all three of you give a statement that 
17 day? 
18 (No audible response.) 
19 MR. SMITH: Okay. Who ail-when they were 
2 0 taking your deposition, Mr. Wager, who all was present 
21 besides Mr. Hill? 
22 MR. WAGER: My mom's attorney and Lorraine's 
2 3 attorney. 
2 4 MR. SMITH; Okay. Your mom's attorney was a 
2 5 guy named Staub? 
5 
1 MR. WAGER: No, my mom's attorney was a lady. 
2 MR. SMITH: Oh, I'm sony, your-okay. Was it 
3 a woman named Costello? 
4 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
5 MR. SMITH: Okay. And Lorraine's attorney is a 
6 guy named Staub? 
7 MR. WAGER: Or is it Scott? 
8 MR. SMITH: Scott? Okay. So when they were 
9 taking your statement, there was Lorraine's attorney, 
10 your mom's attorney, Mr. Hill, you and who else? Was 
11 Lorraine and your mom in there also? 
12 MR. HILL: Iwan t to -
13 MR. WAGER: Not at the same time. 
14 MR. HILL: I want to clarify that. Let's go 
15 back. When you were giving your statement, who was in 
16 the room with us? 
17 MR. WAGER: Oh, i twas-
18 MR. SMITH: Yeah. Thank you veiy much. 
19 MR. WAGER: - h i m -
20 MR. SMITH: "Him," meaning Mr. Hill. 
21 MR. WAGER: -me, the attorney-
22 MR. SMITH: When you say "the attorney," you 
23 mean-
24 MR. WAGER: - f r om-
25 MR. SMITH: -from Utah? 
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1 MR. WAGER: -from Utah. 
2 MR. SMITH: Do you remember his name? 
3 MR. WAGER: I can't remember his name. 
4 MR. SMITH: If I said Ken Brown, would that 
5 sound correct? 
6 MR. WAGER: I have no idea. 
7 MR. SMITH: Okay. And who else? So you; your 
8 attorney; the Utah attorney, Mr. Brown; the court 
9 reporter? 
10 MR. WAGER: (Inaudible) her, yeah. And whoever 
11 recorded it. 
12 MR. SMITH: Okay. And that was the woman or 
13 man that was typing it down? 
14 MR. HILL: And a video person. 
15 MR. SMITH: And a person running the video? 
16 MR. WAGER: Yeah. 
17 MR. SMn"H: Okay. Was anyone else in the room 
18 when you spoke? 
19 MR. WAGER: No. 
20 MR. SMITH: Okay. When your mom's deposition 
21 was taken, were you in the room for that? 
22 MR. WAGER: No. 
23 MR. SMITH: Okay. And when Lorraine's 
2 4 deposition was taken, were you in the room for that? 
25 MR. WAGER: No. 
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1 MR. SMITH: Okay. Just give me one second 
2 here, Mr. Wager, I'm about... That's all I have for 
3 you, Mr. Wager. 
4 MR. WAGER: Okay. 
5 MR. SMITH: Let me just talk with the officers 
6 for a minute and see if I need to dean up anything. 
7 That's all I have, Mr. Wager. 
8 MR. WAGER: Thank you. 
9 MR. SMITH: Thank you for your time. 
LO UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thanks, gentlemen. 
L1 (Interview ended.) 
L2 * * * 
L3 * * * 
[4 * * * 
L5 * * * 
L 6 * * * 
L7 * * * 
L8 * * * 
L9 * * * 
I o * * * 
> 1 * * * 
?2 * * * 
>3 * * * 
>4 * * * 
>5 * * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , M e l m d a J . A n d e r s e n , a C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d 
R e p o r t e r and N o t a r y P u b l i c w i t h i n and f o r t h e County of 
S a l t Lake , S t a t e of U tah , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y : 
Tha t t h e f o r e g o i n g t a p e - r e c o r d e d p r o c e e d i n g s were 
t r a n s c r i b e d i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g unde r my d i r e c t i o n and 
s u p e r v i s i o n and t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g p a g e s c o n t a i n a t r u e 
and c o r r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n of s a i d p r o c e e d i n g s t o t h e 
b e s t of my a b i l i t y t o do s o . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h e r e u n t o s u b s c r i b e d my 
name and a f f i x e d my s e a l t h i s day of March 2006 . 
MELINDA J . ANDERSEN 
62 
16 fp^rrpc; 61 tn £>?) 
Addendum L 
Page 1 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
WADE GARRETT MAUGHAN, 
Defendant, 
Case No. 051100355 
Transcript of Motion To Disqualify. 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Brigham City, Utah 
February 15, 2006 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
For Mr. Mauro and 
Mr. Willianm: 
H. THOMAS STEVENSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
SCOTT C. WILLIAMS 
Attorneys at Law 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
Attorneys at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. 0. Box 873 FILED 
Brigham C i t y , UT 84302-0873U T A H APPELLATE COURTS 


































Case number 051100355, St ate of Ut 
Counsel, please state your names 
STEVENSON: Tom Stevenson for the 
BROWN: Ken Brown and Mark Moffat 




your attendance this 
marginal on the way 
I've reviewed, I 
this case. 
the DVDs. I 
I did al 
haven't 
looked at every one 
State of 
for the 
Rich Mauro and Scott Williams 
ghan. 





morning. I suspect the roads were 
up. 
think, everything that has been fi 
so take time to look at the videos 
viewed a hundred percent of those. 
of them, but I didn't see them all 











I put it 
on DVDs, 
Did you see Lorraine Rima s video 
Mr. Smith two or three days ago? 
It was on a CD, Judge. 
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1 sense that she says now that they made no representations to 
2 her about anything. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 I MR. STEVENSON: It does indeed indicate that she now 
5 I claims not to recall things that of course she told in the 
6 video statement taken by Detective Burbridge that she did 
7 recall. 
8 1 THE COURT: All right. Before we begin, I want to 
9 take a moment, and I know counsel — I appreciate counsel. 
10 I've met with counsel on this case and this isn't a criticism 
111 of anyone. But you'll note there at the table we have the 
12 standards of professionalism and civility that Justice 
13 Nehring helped promulgate and promote. And I have copies 
14 there at the table. This particular issue in this case sort 
15 of tests those in the sense that it is a motion to disqualify 
16 and counsel's conduct in either filing it or in bringing 
17 about the filing become issues. Even so, I expect and assume 
18 I that counsel can approach this in a very professional manner 
19 and I appreciate that. Both counsel are aware of that. 
20 Now, with that, Mr. Stevenson, it's your motion. You may 
21 begin. 
22 MR. STEVENSON: As an initial matter I want to make 
23 sure, did the court get a copy of Detective Mark Burbridge's 
24 affidavit that was faxed up yesterday? 



























MR. STEVENSON: Judge, as the facts that have been 
set forth in affidavit and sworn statements and police 
reports, and in the other police reports, indicate, the 
chronology is as follows. On December 5th the Spokane police 
department receives a request for assistance to go interview 
regarding alcohol consumption. They go and visit Ms. 1 
Lorraine Rima. And interestingly she talks to them at 1 
length. You have a copy of that initial report. 1 
There's significant detail as to what he'd been drinking 
the night before and also the lack of any alcohol on his 
breath that morning, or any drinking the morning of the 
statement he ultimately gives to the police that gave rise to 
the arrest in this case. 
At the same time, Detective Burbridge is given the name 
of Randy Wager as someone who had been to see Wade in the 1 
jail. The police attempt to contact him on the 5th. They 
leave a card or a note and ask him to call them. He does 1 
call and on the morning of the 6th detectives meet with Randy 
Wager and Lorraine Rima. Significantly theyTre told we can't 
talk to you, we've been told not to talk to the police. That 
is the unequivocal direction that the police receive 1 
initially, we've been told not to talk to the police. The 
police proceed to get a statement regarding Wade Maughan's 
independent jail confession to Mr. Wager and otherwise, which 
I'll come back to because I think that is significant. 1 
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1 I They then, on the afternoon of the 6th, go back to visit 
2 Ms. Rima. And what does she say? She says I can't talk to 
3 you now. Even though the day before she had given a detailed 
4 statement, I can't talk to you now. Why? Because the police 
5 had come. 
6 1 The court has a transcript that's been provided by 
7 counsel of Ms. Rima's statement to Detective Burbridge. It 
8 has Detective Burbridgefs sworn affidavit in this case. I 
9 would urge the court to consider both, but particularly Ms. 
10 Rima's statement. On three or four occasions she indicates I 
11 was told not to talk to the police. I was told not to talk 
12 I to anybody. 
13 As counsel goes at great lengths to point out, Ms. Rima 
14 is confused at times. She is confused at times. That was 
15 something that was in the report provided by Detective 
16 Burbridge and which we made a point of providing to the court 
17 when this motion was filed. 
18 1 What happens next is -- let me finish. The detectives 
19 also interview Ms. Raney and a Ms. Kimberly, I believe is her 
20 1 name. There were four people that confirm they were told not 
21 to talk to the police. That is an initial explanation given 
22 by four separate people. 
23 Interestingly, after the 8th of December, the story 
24 changes. We know from counsel's brief, counsel for counsel's 



























investigator hired by the defense, g o and visit the witnesses 
again. And there the witness statements change. It's very 
interesting what they change to. Wh 
well, we were told not to talk to an 
important part. The context is made 
the police would be coming to see us 
to anybody. I don't think that that 
at they change to is, 
ybody. But here's the 
clear that they told us 1 
and we were not to talk 
is significantly 1 
fundamentally different from the first instruction of not 
talk to the police. Ultimately I th 
problems and the same issues. 
Those initial reports are indical 
One, clearly the Spokane authorities 
an arrest at the time they did. The 
understand it, the night of December 
told unequivocally we were told not " 
ink it has the same 1 
bive of lots of things. 
acted properly in making 
arrest takes place, as I 1 
6th when they've been 
to talk to the police. I 
would submit that even under the second version, in the 1 
context of being told the police are 
were told not to talk to anybody, it 
and appropriate. 
The court is aware that Rule 3.4 
1 Professional Responsibility are appl 
unless someone is a client you canno 
talk to others, unless, one, they're 
coming to see you, we 1 
would have been proper 
of the Rules of 
icable here, because 
t counsel them not to 
a relative of your 
client, an agent or an employee. Nowhere is that disputed. 
They haven't argued it. They haven' t even attempted to say 
L 
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1 that 3.4 doesnTt apply. 
2 I So, as of the 8th of December we have an issue where not 
3 only is there apparently an unlawful obstruction under 3.4, 
4 I but there's also evidence, at that point at least, of witness 
5 tampering. The police make an arrest. 
6 1 Counsel has gone to — counsel for counsel, I should say, 
7 has gone to Spokane and taken sworn statements of Ms. Rima 
8 and Mr. Wager. And those statements are interesting. 
9 Putting aside the nature of the questioning, both are 
10 I adamant, we were told not to talk to anybody. Indeed, on 
11 I page 11 of Mr. Wager's statement to Mr. Brown, "I just went 
12 with what they told me. They told me not to talk to 
13 anybody." 
14 If you'll look at Ms. Raney's statement she essentially 
15 says, page six, again, "No. They said not to talk to 
16 anybody." The very statements that Ken Brown support the 
17 proposition that there was a problem, whatever it was, that 
18 took place on either the 6th or the 8th. 
19 I want to talk about Randy Wager's statement given to Mr. 
20 Smith last Friday. I want to apologize to the court for not 
21 having a transcript yet. That video interview made its way 
22 back to Utah on Saturday and we simply have not been able to 
23 get it transcribed. We will pass on a copy, when it is 
24 transcribed, to the court and counsel. Mr. Smith goes at 


































Wager f s 
But 
version, 
to try to get to his knowledge. And several things 
Several that i ^ere a surprise. 
he acknowledges on the 6th telling Mr. Mauro and Mr. 
that Wade Maugh 
He also admits 
an admitted to being present at the 
to describing the general events. I 
at raises, at least on some level, a problem for 
going forward with nothing more simply because how is 
to cross-examine Mr. Wager now when we have Mr. 1 
video statement 
there's more to 
saying I told him. It's a problem. j 
it than that, Judge. Mr. Wager's 
taken in the sworn statement Friday, has a 1 
significant change from 
initiall 
cashier, 
y. And that is 
Bradley Perry, 
mix of this fray. The . 
in this case at least a 
imperfect self-defense; 
these proceedings going 
At t 
I going to 
him to t 
what he told Detective Burbridge 1 
he now claims that it was the I 
who grabbed the screw driver in the 
significance of that is it interjects 
theoretical potential for an 
and that will be a central part of 
forward. 1 
rial Mr. Wager will be called by the state. He's 
be asked to ta 
)eing present at 
Ik about Wade Maughan's admission to 1 
the murder. He's going to be asked 
[what those specifics were. And that statement is going to 
J come up and we ' re going to be entitled to ask him why he told 
1 a different statement to Detective Burbridge initially. And 
I think in the process of doing that we're going to be able 
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1 to explore his bias. And his bias is pretty apparent in his 
2 statements. He perceives things as these guys are against 
3 Wade and these guys are for Wade. He makes that point in his 
4 statement to Mr. Brown. But we're going to be entitled to 
5 inquire about Mr. Wager's bias and the reason his statement 
6 changed. 
7 And in that context, Judge, the statements that counsel 
8 were directing to him, whether it's not to talk to the police 
9 or in the context of the police are coming to see you, not to 
10 talk to anybody, I believe will come in. The jury may 
11 ultimately end up hearing about the arrest. We view it as 
12 putting Mr. Mauro in an impossible position. It is simply an 
13 impossible position for him. I don't think there is any 
14 reasonable way out for him with that issue. 
15 I want to talk about Mr. Williams for a moment. When the 
16 I motion was filed we weren't certain it was Mr. Williams who 
17 had even traveled to Spokane and visited with the witnesses 
18 1 on the 8th of December. Fortunately they made that clear in 
19 their brief that it was Mr. Williams and an investigator. We 
20 are troubled, Judge, because, as indicated in the police 
21 reports, all of a sudden the same four witnesses who were 
22 unequivocal about they told us not to talk to the police, 
23 after that visit on the 8th they changed their story. And we 
24 think it raises essentially the same issues with regards to 



























His ongoing involvement 
I think in the same 
in this case. 
way and manner, Mr. Williams's 
involvement in discussions on the 8th will come into play 
when Mr. Wager at trial, 
explain the context of b 
in front of a jury, is asked to 1 
eing told not to talk to the police 
or being told he had a misunderstanding and his changing 1 
statement. We think the 
it in given Mr. Williams 
Judge, we've raised 
in the brief. The court 
issues of bias will similarly bring 
's -- given the way this went down. 
other issues regarding Mr,, Williams 
is aware of those. I think I will 
simply wait to address those on rebuttal, see what counsel 
has to say. Perhaps they can give us an explanation that 1 
will go to some of the concerns we've expressed in our reply 
brief. 
I want to talk about 
Judge. I think that is 
never found a case where 
the very case they were 
They'd been arrested for 
We haven't found it. I 
cited don't apply. I do 
Secondly, conflicts 
decision are problematic 
J says, "experienced trial 
the imponderables," that 
the conflict of interest cases, 1 
the starting place for you. We've J 
counsel had already been arrested in 1 
attempting to defend someone on. 1 
tampering with critical witnesses. 
don't think that means the cases 
n't think that can fairly be argued. 
of interest as noted in the Wheat 
because, even as the Supreme Court 
counsel lack the ability to foresee 
's the word they used, "as conflicts 
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1 come up and how those consequences might go forward in a 
2 case." 
3 There's something about those conflict cases, something 
4 else that needs to be addressed, and that is if the court 
5 peruses the conflict of interest jurisprudence in the 
6 criminal context, they are almost all cases where the 
7 conflict comes to light at trial or on the eve of trial. 
8 This case is unusual in that this has come to light 30 
9 days from the day the initial appointment was made. And in 
10 that sense it is different from all the other conflict cases 
11 that have been cited to the court by any of the parties. 
12 It's the state's position that it makes this case very 
13 different in that it makes it much harder for any of us to 
14 ascertain the consequences of those conflicts. It makes it 
15 much harder for any of us to ascertain whether Mr. Maughan 
16 can make a knowing and voluntary waiver of those conflicts. 
17 And it makes it, in our judgment, extremely unwise to go 
18 I forward knowing we have the problem today. 
19 Judge, our office has counseled extensively with the 
20 attorney general's office in this matter. They feel so 
21 strongly about this that they've indicated their intention, 
22 if the motion is denied, to file an interlocutory appeal. 
23 And the reason is simple. Whatever you do today is likely to 
24 I be the subject of an appeal. But it's the state's position 
25 that it's much less likely to lead to reversible error if the 
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1 I motion is granted. Why? Because we're at the very beginning 
2 of this case. 
3 1 Secondly, we're dealing with a situation not where Mr. 
4 Maughan went out and interviewed a number of attorneys and 
5 hired counsel of his choice. We're dealing with appointed 
6 1 counsel. Mr. Maughan has an interest in having counsel of 
7 his choice. The Wheat decision reflects that, the Arguelles 
8 decision reflects that. But they also make it clear that the 
9 point is not that personal relationship. The point and the 
10 I focus is that there be effective representation. This case 
11 is different even from those, as I recall the facts, in that 
12 this is appointed counsel. 
13 There's been much suggestion in this case that things 
14 have been withheld from the court; or that information going 
15 to the credibility of certain witnesses, Ms. Rima, for 
16 example, were not shared with the court. I think the court 
17 sees that Mr. Burbridge's report was attached and that he 
18 himself referenced that she remained adamant, notwithstanding 
19 her confusion at times, that she was told not to talk to the 
20 police. Is there a significant difference in the word 
21 adamant and steadfast? I'll leave that for the court to 
22 decide. 
23 I do, however, want to make a comment that this is in 
24 indeed an adversarial process. And while the state, as 
25 relates to Mr. Maughan, has a Brady duty to bring things 
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1 forward, we do not view it as our obligation, particularly as 
2 to this motion to disqualify, to shed on everything that they 
3 I might find helpful to credibility issues. Itfs an 
4 adversarial process and it only works as an adversarial 
5 I process. 
6 1 I want to speak briefly about the Elzinga allegations. 
7 As indicated in the briefing, Ms. Elzinga came in and made a 
8 report to the police. We didnft go looking for that report. 
9 I We didn't ask for the report. And indeed, as in the case in 
10 all of the -- most of local law enforcement's witness 
11 statements, it contained a provision that it was made subject 
12 1 to the penalties of law if it was made falsely. 
13 At the time Ms. Elzinga's statement was made to the 
14 I police, as the chronology set forth in the brief indicates, 
15 1 we had already written counsel for counsel. Excuse me. It 
16 J may have been actually to counsel. And told them that we 
17 were proceeding with the motion to dismiss. The Elzinga 
18 1 things were added after that decision had already been made. 
19 As I've indicated in the brief, Ms. Elzinga is adamant 
20 that Mr. Mauro visited her and represented himself as a 
21 Channel 2 reporter. Our investigation suggests that that 
22 event could not have occurred at the time she claims it did. 
23 More problematic for the state, we have independently 
24 reached a conclusion that her credibility is so suspect, 
25 given the conflicting loyalties to the Perry family and 
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1 apparently some relationship with Mr. Glenn Griffin, that we 
2 are not comfortable relying on her. 
3 I We have submitted to the court — let me take a step 
4 back. When we came to the conclusion that there were 
5 questions on her timing and came to the conclusion that there 
6 were questions regarding her reliability, without being 
7 requested to we sent counsel for counsel a copy of the search 
8 warrant information that indicated the location of the cell 
9 tower Mr. Mauro's cell phone was bouncing a signal off of. 
10 We also sent them correspondence copied at the jail between 
111 Ms. Elzinga and Mr. Griffin. And it was done because, as we 
12 concluded, there were serious questions. 
13 Counsel has gone to lengths to suggest that somehow the 
14 state has hidden information of credibility; that the state 
15 has misled the court. And as the court can imagine, we take 
16 issue with those assertions. I will let the record simply 
17 reflect what it is. In any event, at this time the state 
18 does not feel it can rely on Ms. Elzinga for these 
19 allegations and has indicated in the brief, and suggested to 
20 the court, wholly ignoring them for purposes of this motion. 
21 That may or may not be the end of these issues with her. The 
22 court may have an issue to hear from her. Counsel may have 
23 an issue to hear from her. There may be civil, even other 
24 criminal proceedings. I donft know. But at this point we do 
25 not feel it would be appropriate, given our independent 
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1 questions regarding her reliability and credibility, to go 
2 forward on that. 
3 I Judge, we would ask that the court disqualify the 
4 attorneys at this time. 
5 I I want to talk about an evidentiary hearing issue for a 
6 moment. I know that!s an issue that has been raised. We 
7 believe the court has sufficient information in front of it 
8 today, in the form of Detective Burbridge's affidavit that 
9 was filed yesterday and his police report that was submitted 
10 under oath, to make that decision. You have in front of you 
111 the video statement taken of Mr. Wager last Friday. You have 
12 the sworn statement taken by Mr. Brown which fundamentally 
13 says they told us not to talk to anybody. We believe that is 
14 1 sufficient at this time for the court to make a decision. 
15 However, if the court is inclined to hold an evidentiary 
16 hearing, I think we need to talk about the parameters of 
17 1 that. We need to talk about what it would entail and what 
18 1 those issues are. Firstly, I think we need to know are Mr. 
19 Mauro and Mr. Williams going to take the stand? Are they 
20 I going to be limited -- are we the state going to be limited 
21 in cross-examination? 
22 Secondly, we need to define what the issues would be. If 
23 the issues are was there a reasonable basis to make this 
24 arrest, given what the police were told, we!ll bring the 



























find that they are credible as any law enforcement that have 
appeared in this court. If counsel want to then call Ms. 
Rima or Mr. Wager, they can do so. But I think at the end of 
the day the court will conclude that certainly applying 
standard of is there sufficient evidence to bind people 
a 1 
over, 
there is evidence that something went awry when Mr. Cilwick 
and Mr. Mauro visited these witnesses. 
If the court is inclined to go forward with an 
evidentiary hearing we will request time to take some 
additional depositions. Wefll seek, one, an order from the 
court permitting it; and, two, asking assistance from the I 
Washington State court to permit subpoena authority to g o J 
forward. As raised in the brief, we think there are issues 
that need to be followed up on as to who is directing, who is 1 
being reported to, maybe even who is paying for these 
attorneys. It is something that does not pass the smell 
test. That is an issue that needs to be followed up, an 
the court is desirous of an evidentiary hearing we will 
for time to get that accomplished. 
Given the reluctance of Mr. Stobb, Lorraine Rima's 
attorney, and a Mr. Hill, who is Randy Wagerfs attorney, 
have questions asked about how they were hired, who is 
paying, who is directing, I think questions exist today 
need to be answered before this can go forward any more 







1 Ifm sure Ifll have lots more to say on rebuttal. 
2 I THE COURT: Let me ask you one question. Earlier in 
3 your statement, Mr. Mauro interviewed Wager up in Spokane. 
4 You're not suggesting that counsel ought not to interview 
5 I witnesses, are you? 
6 1 MR .STEVENSON- Unequivocally ITm not. And counsel 
7 for counsel has made the point that there are special 
8 obligations among defense counsel, particularly in capital 
9 cases, to undergo and undertake a significant investigation. 
10 J I don't dispute that. I would suggest that I don't think 
111 that obligation is any more or less in any criminal case. 
12 But as far as a suggestion that they ought not be 
13 1 interviewing witnesses, we haven't made that suggestion at 
14 all. 
15 1 The point here is if, for whatever reason, even if it's 
16 I just bad luck, you go and interview witnesses and find 
17 yourself in jail the next night arrested for witness 
18 1 tampering, there's a problem. It's a problem that has to be 
19 addressed. It's a problem that must be brought to the 
20 1 court's attention. And the ramifications need to be 
21 considered. Particularly in a case where there's as much at 
22 stake as there is here and where a jury is going to be 
23 listening to these witnesses. And more importantly making 
24 credibility decisions about the defendant based on their view 



























1 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Brown. 
I MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I appreciate the opportunity 
to stand before you and argue on behalf of these two lawyers 
here and the investigator that I have a great deal of respect 1 
for. I want to get to that argument. But I hope that the 
court is not -- that was about the closest thing to judicial 
blackmail that I have ever heard in terms of the attorney J 
general and they will appeal a decision. I think there's a 
correct decision, a right decision, to be made. I have every 
confidence in this court ferreting through this information 
and making that correct decision. I 
Before we get into the so-called facts of the case, I 
think itfs important at this point, Your Honor, and I would 
ask the court to step back for a moment and letTs look at the 
forest instead of the trees. We have a situation here where 
competent, effective, ethical attorneys have been appointed 
to Mr. Maughan. Mr. Maughan has formed a relationship with 
those attorneys. These attorneys have engaged a mitigation 
person who is working at their direction in establishing 1 
mitigation evidence. They are working on this case. 
These individuals that accepted this appointment to 1 
represent Mr. Maughan did not accept that appointment with 
the idea that this -- that these cases are money makers. I 
assure you of that, Your Honor. People that accept 
appointments to represent an accused that are facing the 
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1 death penalty, I would dare say, do it. And as a result of 
2 doing it they suffer greatly. Years are taken off of 
3 lawyers1 lives who represent those people. And they're taken 
4 off because they are passionate about their job. They 
5 understand their duty. They understand their obligation. 
6 They understand the heavy responsibility that is placed on 
7 them as lawyers. And that's not something that these two 
8 individuals take lightly, I can assure you. From the list of 
9 qualified lawyers, Your Honor, you have two of the best. 
10 That list contains a number of people. And I can assure this 
11 court that these two people understand what is involved. 
12 What they did in this case, they did nothing wrong. 
13 Think about what happened. They got appointed to represent 
14 this man. They made some telephone calls to his common law 
15 wife. They arranged to go up and meet her and other friends 
16 after they had discussed this matter with their client, Wade 
17 I Maughan. That is precisely what they're expected to do. 
18 I appreciate very much the amicus curiae briefs that have 
19 been filed by Mr. Hart, the UACDL president, who is here, 
20 along with Tiffany Johnson and other members of the UACDL. I 
21 appreciate the fact that they have set out the obligations of 
22 attorneys when they are appointed to represent individuals 
23 charged with capital crimes. 
24 These attorneys did precisely what they were supposed to 



























is suggesting that the fact that they received some 
information from this person he says creates a problem. Your 
Honor, I have watched him at this podium lay out facts and 
circumstances that I guarantee happen in every case. The 
court is aware of that. Witnesses tell lawyers something. 
Witnesses tell cops something different. It happens in every 
single case. 1 
These two lawyers, out of an abundance of caution and 1 
because they understand the importance of it, took a very J 
qualified investigator with 'them. The only reason for the 
investigator to be there is to be a witness should it be 
necessary down the line. This is like -- this is common 1 
knowledge among any lawyer that tries cases anywhere. So, 
the fact that this witness that Mr. Stevenson says told them 
something, and then he says this creates a problem, it 1 
doesn't create a problem at all. Where is the problem with 
that? There will always be different versions. 1 
Interestingly enough, the state has a written, signed 1 
confession from Mr. Maughan. They have witnesses that say he 
told me this. And they have a different version of that. 
Where is the problem? The bias of that particular witness 
that took the statement, that received the confession, if you 
will, is always going to be there. It won't matter whether 
its lawyer A or lawyer B, it simply won't matter. 
The court has a decision to make. It's whether or not to 
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1 disqualify these lawyers. The state says, well, there's 
2 going to be problems down the line. Let me -- ITve talked to 
3 Mr. Stevenson about the problems down the line. I've tried 
4 I to be as honest and frank as I can about those problems down 
5 the line. If this court makes a decision to remove these two 
6 lawyers at this point, then every decision that is made with 
7 the next lawyer will be compared against the perfect lawyer. 
8 Ifll say that again. It won't matter what decision is made 
9 by lawyer number two. It won't matter what these two 
10 individuals would have done. It will be compared on an 
11 ineffective assistance of counsel claim as compared to a 
12 I perfect lawyer. That is the reality. That is the fact. 
13 And if this court jeopardizes the relationship, the 
14 strong presumption in favor of not removing counsel, based 
15 upon these allegations, and Mr. Maughan's preference to have 
16 these lawyers represent him, this team represent him in the 
17 face of this, then every decision, if you're talking about 
18 1 reviewing ineffective claims, are going to be reviewed 
19 against a standard of what would the perfect lawyer have 
20 done. That is the reality of it. So, instead of eradicating 
21 a problem, the problem is amplified by removal because it 
22 creates problems. 
23 Secondly, whatever conflict exists, and this these are 
24 broad concepts, but whatever conflict may exist and whatever 



























tell you to not talk to the cops, that exists whether these 
two individuals are sitting representing Mr. Maughan or not. 
If it's relevant and probative for the state to pursue that, 
it's relevant and probative regardless of who is sitting I 
there. 
So, I 've tried cases in this courtroom before and I know 
this court. I know the court controls and has a good grasp 
of the evidence that's admissible and relevant evidence. I 






I want Mr 
relevant, 
suggests, 
for a witness to be asked any questions about the 
these two individuals. I cannot -- when you boil 
conflict argument, let's take it at it's very worst. 
says don't talk to cops. Cops come and they talk to 
Now, how is it relevant, how is the statement, and 
. Stevenson to articulate for us, how is it 
how does it provide bias on redirect, as he 1 
to say did the lawyer tell you not to talk to the 





to anything? And remember, that's all that 1 
in this case. I would represent that there will 1 
a criminal case in Washington because there was no 1 
conduct that occurred in Washington. All there was 
1 was an arrest. J 
J Now, 
1 from Mr. 
I hope the court has looked at these recent files 
Costello, the lawyer for one of the witnesses. It's 
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1 rather telling regarding Detective Burbridge. He leaves a 
2 message and -- people are entitled to hire lawyers, to have 
3 lawyers. Thatfs not an issue. However, it seems to be with 
4 Mr. Stevenson. This lady has a lawyer, Alta Raney. And the 
5 lawyer calls Detective Burbridge and says whenever you want 
6 to talk to her go through me. This is the message that she 
7 gets back from Detective Burbridge, who the state relies 
8 upon. And this is recorded so itfs verbatim. "Detective 
9 Mark Burbridge calling you back referencing Alta Raney. I 
10 understand you are representing her. Ms. Raney is a witness 
11 in a homicide in Utah. I!m assisting them. As a witness, 
12 she has no constitutional protection right to an attorney. I 
13 will go contact her any time I need to. As a courtesy I may 
14 call you, but I may not. Just letting you know. You need 
15 something, give me a ring." 
16 The affidavit of the lawyer who has discussed this with 
17 1 her clients. She goes through and says just the opposite. 
18 In fact, Mr. Cilwick and Mr. Mauro cautioned the witness, her 
19 client, not to contact their clients or share accounts with 
20 other witnesses in the interest of not compromising the 
21 integrity of the accounts they were providing. 
22 I think itfs interesting if you look at — now, remember, 
23 these witnesses, these lawyers, either had in mind to tamper 
24 with witnesses or not, and yet there is not one suggestion, 



























told us about th is confession, please don't tell the cops 
about the confession. You've told us about this confession. 
Can't you change 
that. There is 
1 been, Your Honor 
or don't talk to 
it somehow. Can't you make it this, make it 
not one suggestion. All the allegations have 
, consistently either don't talk to anybody 
the police. And I don't think the court, in 
fairness, can really understand and believe at this state --
at this stage in 
said don't talk 
You know, we 
well, we're not 
the proceedings that these gentlemen ever 
to the cops or the police. 1 
had this meeting in chambers and we say, 1 
sure we want to have an evidentiary hearing. 1 
Why don't you see if you can proceed by way of affidavit. So 
we have the police reports from Detective Burbridge. There 
isn't one person , except him, who has ever said these 1 
witnesses said don't talk to police officers. That is an 
astonishing fact 
has said that. 
We go up and 
and we ask them 
talk to anybody 
claim that Raney 
I are going to wan 
the cops. Wager 
called Burbridge 
another lawyer o 
That is astonishing. Only the detective 
we talk to them and we put them under oath 1 
what did the lawyers say. They said don't 
about the case. It's interesting that they I 
, that Wager, rather, said, well, the cops 
t to talk to you. There's some reference to 
, in his sworn statement to me, said when he 
back he thought he was talking to a lawyer, 
f Wade's. So it doesn't even factually fall 
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1 that there was any discussions about cops wanting to talk to 
2 these individuals or anything else. The truth of the matter 
3 is they went up there and they talked to individuals and they 
4 attempted to ferret out information, which they are entitled 
5 to do, with an investigator there. And thatfs all that 
6 happened. 
7 I All of this business about what happened in Spokane is 
8 irrelevant to the proceedings in Utah. It's not probative 
9 and itfs not relevant. It doesn't create a conflict in and 
10 of itself. It can't. If you look at the conflict, the 
111 conflict has to be something that the state can articulate. 
12 1 They simply can't say that because they were arrested this 
13 1 creates a conflict. How is Mr. Mauro going to be comprised 
14 in cross-examining witnesses simply because he was arrested? 
15 1 It doesn't follow. 
16 1 How can that -- if the facts are as they are, they were 
17 told not to talk to anybody, they talked to the cops. They 
18 I have the bias. Randy Wager has a bias. It won't matter 
19 who's there. The bias is in favor of his friend Mr. Maughan. 
20 That's known. That's out there. These lawyers received it, 
211 the state received it. The bias has to go with the party, 
22 not the lawyer. It wouldn't matter whether it was these 
23 lawyers or any other lawyers cross-examining that witness. 
24 It simply wouldn't matter. It's either relevant or it's not. 



























establish that he said donft talk to the officers. 
I would suspect that in every case that this court hears 
there is disagreement about what this witness may have said. 
And the witness may have said this on this occasion and this 
on another occasion. That happens in every single case. 
There is never a suggestion by anybody that these men told 
these witnesses to do anything with that confession. Not 
even a suggestion. Yet the state wants to say that because 
they received that confession from a witness, that that 1 
somehow creates a conflict. I quite frankly cannot see it. 
Perhaps the court can see that. I can aid the court in 1 
arriving -- in analyzing that particular issue, because I 
don1t see it. 1 
So you have the broad -- and for their acceptance of that 
employment, of that appointment to represent Mr. Maughan, 
these lawyers have been arrested. They've been accused of 
being a Channel 2 reporter. They have been accused of 
tampering with witnesses. All in a public filing with this 
court. 
1 Itfs interesting to note that at the time the motion to J 
disqualify was filed there was much about the Elzinga matter 
that was not disclosed to this court. The fact that she had 
been sharing -- at least sharing information. You cannot 
read -- you can't look at that interview of her, that taped 




























this, yet that none 
beginning --
THE COURT: 
of that was shared. And from the 
Let me ask you a question on that 
Having read everything, I think I agree with Mr. Brown 
the Elzinga issue is now not relevant. I think that's 
Mr. Stevenson said as well. I recognize she says she' 
sharing information, 
affidavit yesterday 
but I think I saw Deputy Cosgrove 
where he says they've never worked 
her, she's never been somebody that they've had any de 
with. 
MR. BROWN: 
another question as 
Never directed her, I think. It' 
to whether or not that information 
shared. I don't know the answer to that. 
THE COURT: 
the court that this 
insert herself in th 
MR. BROWN: 
J mean, all of that is 
1 these lawyers. And 
She came to them and it would app 
individual, for whatever reason, t 
Lis case. 













> placed in a public filing involving 1 
so to the extent that we have been 
somewhat outraged in our pleadings, it is born of that 
mean, all we did is do what we're supposed to do. I'm 
speaking of the lawyers, I'm not saying me. 
Now, if you can 
that' arises -- that 
articulate for me a legitimate con 
would affect this trial, I would b 






























and interviewed a witness and the witness told them about a 
confession; or there's an allegation that you said don't talk 
to anybody, that that somehow is relevant to -- that that 
somehow creates a conflict between Mr. Maughan and his 1 
lawyers, I just don't see that. There is no conflict between 
Mr. Maughan and his lawyers as a result of that. 
However they decide to cross-examine that witness, 1 
however they decide to develop their theory of the case will 
be in the best interest of Mr. Maughan, rest assured of that. 
Whatever happened in Spokane is not -- I don't see how it can 
possibly -- I mean, think about it. Are you going to hold 
back and not cross-examine this person because it may 1 
disclose that you've been arrested, or that you said don't 
talk to the police? How is that ever -- I mean, Let's say he 
said it. These individuals have talked to the poLice. They 
didn't withhold information. 1 
And the statement changes. It changes in every case. I 
don't know how many cases Mr. Stevenson has done, but it 
always happens. Part of the problem, I think, is we're I 
J dealing with perhaps -- I know these lawyers have represented 
people that have been accused of capital crimes. I'm not 
sure Mr. Stevenson has prosecuted people that have been 1 
accused of this crime. That may be part of the problem here, 
Your Honor. These problems that he points out happen in 1 



























case of an unusual nature, the only reason we're here, is 1 
they got arrested. But that in and of itself doesn't create 
a conflict. Am I missing it? Does the fact that Mr. Mauro 
was arrested, does that create a conflict? I think not. J 
It's a fact and circumstance. It shouldn't ever be in front 
of the jury that considers the Wade Maughan matter. I'm sure 
this court would take great care in making sure that doesn't 
happen. And I'm sure if it did happen there would be a 
cautionary instruction. 1 
These problems can all be dealt with at trial. They do 
not create the sort of mammoth problem that Mr. Stevenson is 1 
portraying here. We have very disputed accounts of what the 
Spokane people say or didn't say. You can look at that and 
say, yeah, they've said this, they've said that. Ms. Rima is 
either steadfast or not. I mean, I represent to you as an 
officer of the court, when I looked at that video, at her 
statement that was taken by Mr. Smith, and she said they 
J didn't tell us anything. That's what she said. And yet she J 
is the person that Mr. Stevenson said is steadfast that they 
I said don't talk to the cops. That's all we're saying, is 
they provide us with a police report and we go up and talk to 
these people and they don't support the police report. Look 
at Mr. Wager's account. 
And this suggestion, Your Honor, and I promised myself I 



























somehow Scott Williams, along with an investigator, created 
confusion on their part. That is laid to rest -- read the 
sworn statements of these witnesses. They were asked did 
they create confusion or were -- or are those your words. 1 
Did you say you were confused. Yes, those are my words. 1 
They're not Scott Williams's words. He didn't go in there 
saying, listen, you must be confused. That's not what Ken 
Brown says, that's what the witnesses tell me under oath. 1 
There's no question about that. Look at it. 1 
Alta Raney, some question -- and then you get an idea of 
who these individuals were dealing with through Detective 1 
Burbridge when you read the message that he left on a lawyer' 
answering machine. I'll talk to this person who is 1 
represented by a lawyer. I'm not saying -- she may not need 
a lawyer, but she has one. If a cop shows up at Bill Gates's 
door step I guarantee he'll be dealing with the lawyer. 1 
There's nothing wrong with that in America. 1 
The lawyer says please deal with me when you want to talk 1 
to her and he leaves a message that says I will talk to her 
and I will let you know maybe and maybe not. And the lawyer 
says any more of this and I'm going to seek a restraining 
order. It has nothing to do -- so you get an idea of the 
attitude. And Mr. Stevenson says he was fully justified in 
making an arrest. That statement is highly disputed, as you 



























relies upon, do not support his police report. They never 
have. 
From the second interview, when it was said these people 
told us, if anything, don't talk to anybody. It was never 
don't talk to a cop. Not one person has said that except I 
Detective Burbridge. It was always at most don't talk to 1 
anybody about this case. J 
We get an explanation for that. To tamper? No. To keep 
it pure. There is some merit in telling people don't talk to 
a lot of people about this. You may have a version of this 
that's all yours. I don't want to get it contaminated with 
his and his. That's what the lawyer is telling -- what his 
own client, the recipient of that advice, said. 1 
So, as you look in terms of the broad picture here, what 1 
did they do that was wrong and how does it create a conflict? 
And weigh that against the very important Sixth Amendment 
rights that Mr. Maughan has with these lawyers. This isn't a 
fungible sort of thing. Relationships are forged. They're 
forged with Mr. Maughan. He has great respect for these 
individuals. He has great confidence in these individuals. 
He wants them to be his lawyers. 
If you allow the State of Utah to select and to remove 
these lawyers, that's a problem that will not go away soon, 
Your Honor. I think, if you look at the integrity of the 



























lawyers were properly appointed. 
J work. The state has suggested a 
improper, but when you hold 
enough they didn't. All th 
it up 
ey can 
and that that somehow creates a p 
that witness not to talk to 
to bias. It isn't and won1 
anyway. They didn't not ta 
So how is the lawyer sa 
it's never -- there's never 
change what Wade said about 
suggestion about that. Not 
Burbridge, not anybody, has 
were really going to tamper 
would be all about. That's 





They're qualified to do the 
that they did something 
to light of day and sure 
say is they were arrested I 
roblem. Somehow him telling 
ops is going to be relevant 
They talked to the cops 
the cops. They did talk. 
ying don't talk to the cops -- and 
been a suggestion that they said 






I would welcome any questions 
would also ask for some res 
THE COURT: I don' 
point. 
(Pause in the proceedin 
MR. BROWN: Mr. Wi 






relationship between Mr. Maughan 
f these witnesses, not 1 
anything like that. If they 
witnesses that's what it 
that there was no tampering 
misunderstanding up in J 
that the court has and I 
time to Mr. Stevenson. 1 
any questions at this J 
, I believe, raises a good 
the issue of the 1 
and these lawyers if the 
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1 court would allow that. 
2 THE COURT: I guess the difficulty is this. I 
3 assume there's a relationship there. I mean, I have no 
4 reason not to assume that. I!ve asked Mr. Maughan if he 
5 wants to retain them and he said yes, he does. ITm not sure 
6 what could be added. 
7 1 MR. WILLIAMS: The point is that the case law speaks 
8 fairly heavy, especially in light of the Sixth Amendment 
9 right. 
10 THE COURT: But I think Mr. Brown can talk about the 
11 case law. 
12 MR. WILLIAMS: But there's a factual basis to 
13 support the language of that case law and talking about the 
14 nature of the bond, the trust, the history, especially in 
15 light of two factors the government has talked about, a 
16 deafening silence in respect to the nonstatements and 
17 nonresponse of Mr. Maughan and myself as counsel in this 
18 1 case. Notwithstanding what I understood was the agreement 
19 that the present way of proceeding with counsel for counsel 
20 is the most appropriate way to preserve Mr. Maughan's 
21 interests. 
22 But secondly, they've also cited the early -- the fact 
23 that this comes early in the defense and the appointment 
24 process. I do not want the record to in any way suggest that 



























or the actual establishment of diligent efforts in the case, 
significant efforts, of contacts with clients and family. 
And the establishment of a close bond, one of trust and the 
unequivocal statements of Mr. Maughan to us of his desire to 
have us represent him. I 
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, you can confer with your 
clients and then make any further argument you like. I think 
that's the way I would prefer to proceed. 
MR. BROWN: I just wanted the court to understand 
that they do have a relationship and it's a good one. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stevenson. 
MR. STEVENSON: Judge, let me just clarify one thing 
for the court. I'll direct the court's attention to exhibit 
H, the statement of Detective Joe Peterson. He also makes it 
clear that these witnesses -- that Rima said both of these 
people told her not to talk with the police about the 
investigation. It's exhibit H. Counsel has made a point of 
saying no one but Burbridge ever made that statement. That 
was part of the motion filed with the court originally. 1 
I think it's important to talk about the context. The 
context is what? Apparently Mr. Wager shares with Mr. 
Maughan's attorney and the investigator his confession, his 
admission, whatever. At some point there's a direction. Is 
it don't talk to the police? That's what the police were 
told initially. Even by Ken Brown's own interview, it's they 
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1 told us not to talk to anybody. 
2 Judge, all you need to do is look at Rule 3.4 and see 
3 that there is a problem here. Rule 3.4 would prohibit that. 
4 I haven't heard it argued to the contrary. 
5 1 Ifve heard for the first time that Ms. Rima is the common 
6 law wife of the defendant. We would like the opportunity to 
7 brief the court on common law marriage in the state of 
8 Washington. We don!t believe that to be the case. If Mr. 
9 Brown is correct in that assertion, Rule 3.4 may not apply as 
10 to any direction to Ms. Rima, but it certainly wouldn't apply 
111 to the direction to Mr. Wager. Hefs no relationship, he is 
12 1 no employee, heTs not an agent. I've heard nothing to 
13 suggest that 3.4 is somehow not at issue here. 
14 I The state is not making any attempt to select an 
15 attorney. We are fulfilling our duty and our obligation, as 
16 1 we perceive it, to bring these matters to the attention of 
17 the court early on in the proceedings. The court is aware of 
18 J post-conviction appellate practice in our country today. If 
19 this case goes forward, if the state ultimately seeks the 
20 1 death penalty, and if there's ultimately a conviction for 
21 I that, this case and the decisions we are addressing today 
22 will be reviewed for decades. The court is aware of that. 
23 The state felt an obligation to bring these matters forward 
24 at this time because of that. 



























business of I was confused. You have Detective Burbridgefs 
statement, which was signed under the penalty of perjury. 
It's the lengthy one, where he says 
him I was confused. Look at it. Fc 
Wager told me they told 
or them to suggest that 
there's nothing to support that I think is missing a 1 
substantial part of what's in the court's file. 1 
I want to talk about two things 
attempt to gloss over them. Number 
little different regarding this new 
events with Mr. Wager regarding the 
I think there's been an 
one, this case is a 
story or new version of 
admission. It's 1 
different because unlike all other cases, or all of the cases 
our office has been involved in, we have a videotaped 1 
statement in our possession today of his saying, yeah, I told 
Mauro and Cilwick that. There's no question that in a normal 
course, in a normal case, stories change. That happens. In 
this case the fact that we're aware 
documented is different. 
of it and have it 1 
I want to go to the bias argument because I just simply 
fundamentally disagree with counsel on this point. As the 
court is aware, anything going to bias, when Mr. Wager is on 
the stand, is fair game. Issues of 
changed his testimony, his dealings 
those attorneys, is fair game if it 
anything that might have 
and interactions with 
fairly goes to bias. J 
1 Does that necessarily mean the arrest is going to come in? 
No, it doesn't. It doesn't necessarily mean that. But does 
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1 it mean I was told not to talk to the police or I was told 
2 not to talk to anybody after they told me the police were 
3 coming, is that going to come in? It probably will. 
4 1 Judge, depending on how that inquiry goes, if Mr. Wager 
5 stands up and says I never told the police that, we would be 
6 entitled to call Detective Burbridge and Detective Peterson, 
7 put them on the stand. What will come in then I don't know. 
8 The fact of the arrest may well come in. The point is there 
9 is an issue here. It is something we can see today and 
10 1 there's an easy fix today. 
11 I want to talk about the standards the court has to 
12 1 consider. The court has the actual conflict standard, or the 
13 serious potential conflict standard, or the appearance of 
14 1 impropriety standard set forth in Johnson. It's the state's 
15 position that under any of the three there is a basis for the 
16 court to disqualify and remove counsel at this time. 
17 Particularly as relates to Johnson, where the court made it 
18 I clear there need not even be proof of that impropriety, 
19 simply a reasonable possibility that it occurred. 
20 You're there, Judge. Even under Mr. Brown's statements 
21 that he took, even with the leading questions, they both 
22 acknowledge we were told not to talk to anybody. You're 
23 there even under the statements they took. When you take 
24 into consideration the police reports, it's far more serious 
25 than just a question of 3.4. It's far more serious than 
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1 that. 
2 I I want to visit finally about this issue of judicial 
3 I blackmail. I find that offensive as well. Apparently 
4 counsel and I disagree on that. 
5 1 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a minute on 
6 that one. I think that's a bit of a red herring. Ifll 
7 J explain for the benefit of both sides, from time to time that 
8 gets raised. I don't considered it blackmail. I think this 
9 is the first time I ever the prosecution raise that. It's 
10 normally raised by defense counsel. Sometimes the courts 
11 I welcome an interlocutory appeal. It's not as if there's some 
12 intimidation involved in that. I wouldn't think so at all. 
13 I'll allow you both to address that to the extent you want 
14 to, but I think that's a nonissue. 
15 MR. STEVENSON: I'll leave it alone, Your Honor. As 
16 we've indicated in our briefing, and we stand by this, I 
17 think whatever the court does is going to get run up the 
18 ladder on one side or the other. It is the state's position 
19 that the safest approach today is to make the change simply 
20 1 because we're a month or two in. I accept their 
21 representation that they've developed a relationship with the 
22 defendant. I accept that. But if you look at Wheat, if you 
23 look at what is described particularly in Johnson, when it 
24 talks about the court weighing and balancing the court's 



























way they're held, I think the standard is clearly established 
and it would be appropriate for the court to make the change 
at this time. That is the request of the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, I!ll give you the last word. 
MR. BROWN: I think the court needs to understand 
exactly what is going on here. I mean, if the court allows 
the state to remove a qualified team of lawyers and an 1 
investigator, mitigation people, et cetera, based upon an J 
arrest, the precedential value of that is significant, the 
chilling effect to other lawyers that do this work. What 1 
these lawyers have done is remarkable. It speaks to their 1 
duty and speaks to their obligation to their client. The 1 
very easy solution for them, and one that would be personally 
beneficial to them, would be to get off this case, but they 
feel a sense of obligation to Wade Maughan. 1 
And the state says because they were arrested for having 
told witnesses not to talk to the police, when we went and 
talked to those witnesses who said they never told us that, 
is astonishing and remarkable. We can chronicle the various 
1 permutations of that through the pleadings and through the 
police reports, et cetera. But when you set these people 
down, put them under oath and ask them questions, they to a 
person say the lawyers never told us to do that. 
That's an astonishing fact. One that has to be 



























these people said. ItTs not what is in a police report, it's 
what the people said. 
J And you have a police report that is crafted by Detective 
Burbridge which has been at the heart the controversy from 
the beginning. And even if itfs true, it doesn't create a 
conflict. And even if there is a conflict, Wade Maughan can 
waive it. And even if -- and this all against the back drop 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the relationship 
that's been forged between this individual and these lawyers. 
And the state says just simply sweep that all under because 
there is this, quote, possibility of something happening down J 
the line. That's offensive. That is not paying respect to 
the Sixth Amendment. 1 
There is nothing that's happened in this case that 1 
doesn't happen in every other case, except the lawyer got 1 
arrested. That's it. And, Your Honor, if you alLow that 
fact to control whether or not these lawyers can continue to 
represent Wade Maughan, then you're allowing the State of 1 
Utah to orchestrate who his lawyers are going to be. That's 
the fact of this case. 1 
All of those situations that Mr. Stevenson points out, 
and I never heard him articulate any basis upon which it 
would be both admissible and create a conflict. The bias is 
there regardless of who's there. Removing these lawyers 
doesn't correct that. If it's relevant cross-examination or 
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1 redirect examination, it is relevant whoever is sitting 
2 there. It doesn't matter. By removing them you have not 
3 solved any problems. And by removing them you have created a 
4 standard that Ifm not sure the state wants to create. That 
5 is, every decision that is made by the next lawyer will be 
6 weighed against the perfect lawyer and the decision the 
7 perfect lawyer would make. That's a standard this court 
8 doesn't need to reach because you have lawyers on this case 
9 that are good lawyers. They will represent this man 
10 diligently and ethically and they have done nothing wrong to 
111 deserve being removed from this case. 
12 I Any questions about any conflict that you see that I 
13 haven't addressed? 
14 THE COURT: I don't think so at this time. Thank 
15 you. Counsel, I'm going to take some time this morning. 
16 1 I'll get you a decision later this morning. But I want to 
17 take at least 20 or 30 minutes to go over things in chambers. 
18 1 I'll have a ruling for you shortly. 
19 MR. BROWN: I would honestly ask you to look at the 
20 Rima statement taken by Mr. Smith. 
21 THE COURT: I'll see if I can arrange to do that. 
22 I'm not sure if I have the equipment. 
23 MR. BROWN: It's a DVD. 
24 THE COURT: There's one on CD and that's why it 
25 won't play on our DVD player. I'm not sure how that 
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11 occurred. When it didn't play, I got to studying the disk 
2 and it was different from the others. 
3 I MR. BROWN: You know, I wish I was more technical, 
4 but I'm not. If you've got a laptop --
5 1 THE COURT: I'll get somebody downstairs to help me, 
6 They always do when I get in trouble with the computer. 
7 We'll see if we can make it play on one of the computers. 
8 All right. Court is in recess. 
9 1 THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
10 1 (Recess pending judge's review.) 
11 I THE BAILIFF: The judge will not be coming back in, 
12 1 so court is in recess. 
13 (Lunch recess.) 
14 1 THE COURT: We're back on the record in the matter 
15 of State of Utah versus Wade Garrett Maughan. The defendant 
16 is present along with counsel. Counsel and the defendant 
17 1 have been provided a copy of the court's memorandum decision 
18 I issued this morning. 
19 Mr. Maughan, have you had an opportunity over the noon 
20 J hour to visit with your attorneys? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Is it your desire to retain 
23 one of them as co-counsel on this case? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: It's my desire to retain both of 


























1 THE COURT: I understand that. That's clear on the 
record. You told me that I believe in our last hearing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You've seen 
issued, correct? 
MR. MAURO: Judge, we we 
discussed it with him. Although 
conflict, or potential conflict, 
of the court's ruling. 
THE COURT: Okay. So he 
allow him to make an election in 
his position is he wants both of 
MR. MAURO: Yes. And Mr 
him, along with Mr. Cilwick, over 
the written decision that I 
nt over that with him and 
we disagree that there's a 
we have advised Mr. Maughan 
understands that I will J 
as much as -- I understand 1 
you? 
. Williams and I met with 
the lunch hour. Mr. 
Maughan indicated to us that to the extent there is a 1 
conflict or potential conflict he 
as to both lawyers. That was the 
Mr. Maughan during the lunch hour 
he has an equal relationship with 
degree of trust in both of us. W 
1 his case. We have discussed the 
We have employed ancillary people 
representation of Mr. Maughan. M 
them. We have established a rapp 
have begun significant efforts at 
would waive both of those 
discussion that we had with 
He indicated to us that 
both of us, has an equal 
e have worked extensively on 
facts of the case with him. 
to assist us in the 
r. Maughan has met with 
ort with his family. We 
completing mitigation in 
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1 this case. Mr. Maughan is aware of all that. I believe that 
2 is why, if there is a conflict or a potential conflict as to 
3 I both lawyers, Mr. Maughan would be willing to waive that. 
4 J THE COURT: Understood. I think counsel clearly 
5 understand, though, that the court has issued its decision. 
6 So, Mr. Maughan, at this point, if you don't elect one of 
7 1 them, then I'll appointment new co-counsel as well. But if 
8 you want one of these gentlemen to remain on your case, I'll 
9 allow to you tell me that. 
10 THE DEFENDANT: So I have to make a choice? 
Ill THE COURT: Yes. And if you need another five 
12 minutes to go back and talk with somebody about it, I'll give 
13 you that time. 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No. If I have to make a choice, I 
15 1 think Mr. Mauro. 
16 THE COURT: You're asking to keep Mr. Mauro as — 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
18 1 THE COURT: You understand that he'll be co-counsel? 
19 The new attorney will be the lead attorney on your case? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right. That will be the order of 
22 the court, then. Counsel, for purposes of the capital 
23 defense fund, do one of you want to prepare an order of some 
24 kind so that will fit with their requirements? 
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te has no objection. 
That's fine. We'll stay 
Wednesday, the 22nd of J 
if an order is submitted the 
question on a different 
Maughan's case? 
u want this on the record? 
fine. 1 
, Mr. Maughan, you?ve had the 
t with counse 
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Mr. Mauro represent you, as 
make sure that you're aware 
If, for instance, at trial 
would possibly become a 
to testify because he's your 
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attorney. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you need any more time to talk with 
counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't think so. Not at this time, 
THE COURT: All right. Any other issues we need to 
address this afternoon, counsel? 
MR. STEVENSON: No, Your Honor. 
MR. MAURO: Nothing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Court is in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the motion hearing was reported 
and transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter in and for the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 46, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder 
County, Brigham City, Utah. 
Dated this 28th day of February, 2006. 
^IJ^^JJ^^^. 
Rodney M."^Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R" 
Addendum M 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 




Case No. 051100355 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
This case is before the Court pursuant to the State's Motion to Disqualify Counsel. 
After extensive briefing and argument, the Court issues the following decision: 
1. The arrest of defense counsel in another jurisdiction on charges of witness 
tampering related to a witness in this case appears to be an unprecedented 
occurrence. 
2. The arrest and potential prosecution of defense counsel has created a firestorm 
of controversy totally independent of the pending capital homicide charges. 
3. There is the continuing possibility of prosecution of defense counsel in the state 
of Washington or of other proceedings under Rule 3.4 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
4. This case is in the earliest stages; a preliminary hearing has not even been 
scheduled. 
5. There is a potential conflict that examination of Mr Wagar at trial might raise 
issues which implicate either Mr Mauro or Mr Williams to the Defendant's 
detriment. 
This Court must balance "Defendant's right to be represented by an attorney of his 
choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, 
r r R •? 4 /':JS 
the public concern in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of 
justice." 
State v Johnson, 823 P2nd, 488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
This Court is persuaded that there is "at least a reasonable possibility that either a 
serious violation of law or ethical standards occurred. The Court therefore directs that a 
new lead counsel be appointed from among those qualified for this type of case. The 
normal procedure utilized by the Administrative Office of the Courts shall be followed. 
In an attempt to balance the Defendant's 6th Amendment rights, the Court will allow 
the Defendant to confer with counsel during the noon hour and then select one of the 
current counsel to remain as co-counsel on this case. That election will be made in open 
court after Mr Maughan is advised of the potential conflicts of interest. 
This Court is not making a finding that defense counsel have committed wrongdoing. 
On the contrary, this Court's prior dealings with both defense counsel have all been 
positive. The Court finds today only that there is a reasonable possibility that witness 
tampering occurred. 
Dated this 15th day of February, 2006. 
BY THE COURT Ay / " \ S ^ 
Judge Ben H Hadfielc| ''• ' ^ , f 
District Judge %~. ],^ 
